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ABSTRACT 
A notion of free-will is as indispensable a concept to 
the philosophical principles of the Buddhist tradition as it 
is to the tenets of Christianity. The primary undertaking 
of this thesis has been to test this hypothesis through an 
analysis and evaluation of the notion of free-will as it 
pertains to the belief systems of both traditions. Critical 
evaluation has permitted me to establish how central and 
vital the issue of free-will is in both theory and practice. 
I have reflected upon this centrality and what it has 
revealed about the status of human free-will within the 
context of each tradition's understanding of reality. 
The methodology has been through the principle of 
analogy of proportion. The approach has also been 
Wittgensteinian in emphasis, mindful of the need to appraise 
words used within the context of religious language in their 
native environment. Although concerned to present the emic 
meaning of the tradition, this has not precluded speculative 
enquiry by extending the analogous correlation. 
From the evidence of my research it is apparent that 
only a partial endorsement of the original hypothesis can be 
sustained as a genuine statement. Within the Christian 
theistic tradition, a notion of free-will qualifies as an 
indispensable function within its philosophical framework. 
Given a priori significance, theological doctrines and dogma 
have been articulated and constructed to sustain 
metaphysical speculation and presumptions. The reality of 
free-will is maintained as an ontological imperative. 
The Buddhist tradition does not seek to preserve a 
view in which God exists as the primal being of the created 
order. Regarded as an intrinsic part of human nature 
nevertheless, a notion of free-will certainly functions as 
an indispensable concept to support their doctrinal 
principles of the experiential world. Within a Buddhist 
frame of reference all concepts at an ultimate level of 
truth have to be recognised as conditioned, relative and 
empty. This is the crucial and significant distinction that 
separates Christian theological ontology and Buddhist 
philosophical thought. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A notion of free-will is as indispensable a 
concept to the philosophical principles of the Buddhist 
tradition as it is to the tenets of Christianity. The 
primary undertaking of this thesis is to test the 
validity of such a hypothesis through an analysis and 
evaluation of the notion of free-will as it pertains to 
the belief systems of the Christian and Buddhist 
traditions. The foremost task being, to explore the 
function of free-will within each tradition's frame of 
reference and thereby establish to what extent it can 
be considered a meaningful notion. The character and 
nature of its role and status as a significant concept 
can then be more effectively assessed. Furthermore, 
any crucial distinctions this has revealed about the 
indispensability of a notion of free-will within the 
context of the two traditions, can then be legitimately 
presented. 
Clearly the term "free-will" when applied to 
religious language is being used in a special way, for 
it is taking terminology from its familiar, mundane 
context and conceptualising it within the philosophical 
thought and word structures of the traditions based 
upon their own categories of experience and practice. 
Hence intrinsic to my methodology is the principle of 
analogy, in which the impact of this expression within 
a religious context conveys a different conceptual 
sense because of the way that it is employed. The 
crucial characteristic of this analogical ascription 
lies in its quality of proportionality, supplying a 
framework that corresponds to, and depends upon the 
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familiar terminology, but points further to a dynamic 
process of understanding. 
Consequently I am using this specific analogous 
interpretation to provide a structure in which to 
confront both terminology and doctrine within the 
context of Christian and Buddhist philosophical 
appreciation. The manner in which each tradition 
values the notion of free-will as significant to their 
truth claims can then be assessed. Although I have 
found it legitimate to juxtapose the two referents 
throughout this thesis, careful attention has been 
given to the nature of any comparison. Hence I have 
paid particular attention in my evaluation of the 
notion of free-will to its contextual setting, 
endeavouring to be both philosophically and textually 
accurate. 
My approach has been Wittgensteinian in emphasis, 
mindful of the need to appraise words used within the 
context of religious language in their native 
environment. Wittgenstein believed that to avoid any 
baseless assertions, words should be evaluated 
according to their user's inbuilt assumptions, 
experiences, attitudes and beliefs. Similarly, 
Nagarjuna the founder of the Buddhist Madhyamika 
School, developed his distinct methodology with regard 
to language ""constructs". Therefore concerned to 
present the emic meaning of the tradition, I have 
attempted to be linguistically precise so as not to 
distort any philosophical or doctrinal structures, but 
to encapsulate each tradition's belief-values that make 
up their reality. Nevertheless this has not precluded 
me from speculative enquiry in specific areas by 
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extending the analogous correlation to look beyond that 
which is immediately represented to a more expanding 
perspective. 
I fully acknowledge that my categories of enquiry 
have their origin in Western theological consideration. 
Hence the road I have followed within a Christian 
theological context is a well-defined route through the 
doctrinal and dogmatic principles which support their 
religious language. Critical analysis within Christian 
theism has focussed on exploring and evaluating 
specific metaphysical precepts, doctrine and practice 
from within this tradition's cultural and philosophical 
background. By reflecting on the religious language 
that sustains their theological conceptualisation and 
supports their belief systems, my concern has been to 
establish to what extent a notion of free-will is an 
essential religious doctrine within theism's sphere of 
reference. This has involved demonstrating and 
justifying my conclusions that a concept of free-will 
plays a crucial role, having ontological significance 
within the philosophical discipline of Christian 
theology. 
The nature of my enquiry within the Buddhist 
tradition is clearly interpretative, for the 
investigative categories were not devised from within 
their scholarly discipline and have not explicitly 
disclosed the language defining a concept of free-will. 
In fact in specific areas I have emphasised that such 
enquiry is incongruous or an alien concept to their 
worldview. My exploration therefore has been more 
speculative, and only justifiable by paying precise 
attention to the insights of the Buddhist conceptual 
and doctrinal framework. Hence it has been my aim to 
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represent as emically as possible an internally, 
coherent appraisal of the philosophical belief systems 
which sustains their conceptual structure. 
I have claimed throughout this thesis that a 
notion of free-will is not supported by an explicit 
theoretical structure within Buddhist metaphysics, yet 
this issue does make a significant contribution to the 
Buddhist understanding of existential reality at the 
level of relative truth. I have sought to demonstrate 
that a notion of free-will clearly functions as an 
indispensable role within their morally ordered and 
meaningful world. Nevertheless, in contrast to a 
Christian theistic conviction this is merely an 
existential imperative, having no appropriate 
significance at the ultimate level of truth. Moreover 
critical evaluation has revealed substantive 
differences in the nature and character of this concept 
that has led to a limited endorsement of my original 
hypothesis. 
I feel it is important at this juncture to define 
the parameters of this thesis with regard to both 
traditions. Within Christian theism I constantly refer 
to ""traditional" or ""classical" when explaining the 
theistic attitude or perspective. These terms are 
being used synonymously to indicate the Christian 
theological heritage that extends back through Saint 
Aquinas to Saint Augustine. Their philosophical 
thinking crystallised into the doctrines and dogma that 
are still regarded as basic to the Christian church's 
belief system. Thus in the mainstream institutions of 
both the Roman Catholic and Protestant churches this 
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legacy remains. Any reference to theistic philosophy 
outside this framework has been indicated as such. 
My sphere of reference from a Buddhist perspective 
includes both the Theravada and Mahayana traditions. 
However, when I refer merely to the Buddhist tradition 
I am indicating that the doctrinal teaching is 
fundamental to them both, being rooted in the guidance 
and instruction of the Buddha's formative sermons. The 
Mahayana tradition has sought to interpret the Buddha's 
teaching by expounding this discipline in a more 
comprehensive way so as to appeal to all minds at every 
stage of their spiritual development. Whenever it has 
been appropriate to stress or explore different aspects 
of the teachings I have indicated my motive for doing 
SO. 
I felt the most logical stating point for my 
analysis was to focus on the conceptual framework that 
supports each tradition's differently conceived 
worldview. Clearly how they comprehend the nature of 
reality will have a crucial effect upon the manner in 
which they shape and endorse their philosophical 
principles and theories. Hence chapter one 
concentrates on the formational structures which 
underpin their essential beliefs and precepts. Within 
Christianity this has signified evaluating the 
theological doctrines and convictions sustained by 
specific religious language in the way God can be 
perceived and understood. A diversity of theories, 
postulations and assumptions have provided intense 
polemical debates throughout the ages which seek to 
defend or dispute the crucial feature of free-will to a 
Christian conceptualisation of reality. 
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Buddhist insight into what constitutes reality has 
a profoundly different frame of reference from the 
Western theistic worldview. Within this tradition the 
philosophical principles and doctrines are endorsed by 
"scientific" analogues as a way of explaining the 
interdependence of the physical and psychological 
dimensions which make up the Buddhist perception of 
ultimate reality. The notion of free-will within this 
context can only be apprehended through the realisation 
of the moral law of causality sustained within the 
theory of universal flux, which explains the spatio- 
temporal complexity of the cosmos. 
Integral to the Christian worldview in God's 
providential guidance and control, is the belief that 
this act discloses the sustaining grace of God. Within 
this theistic sphere of reference this is a gratuitous 
function only applicable to divine activity. Liberated 
from this theological framework however, the concept of 
grace as an unmerited gift of compassion and 
benevolence might be found to express a more 
comprehensive spiritual process. Hence the central 
theme of chapter two is to explore the religious 
beliefs and doctrines of each tradition in respect to 
their understanding of the function of grace. Within a 
Christian theistic perspective, the religious language 
that supports this concept of God's divine providential 
control and unmerited gift of loving benevolence, also 
has to reconcile this doctrine with the crucial issue 
of free-will. The unsolicited favour of God's grace 
has profound implications for a belief in the 
contribution of human responsible action. Once again 
these essential tenets of Christian theology are 
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exposed to controversy and debate, and it has been 
encumbrant upon them to defend these key principles. 
Within a Buddhist context an analogous 
interpretation to the concept of gratuitous activity is 
clearly being embraced. To ascribe this language to a 
Buddhist philosophical framework requires that the 
notions of grace be explored as dimensions of a wider 
spiritual experience. However, within this sphere of 
reference the Mahayana tradition can be seen to have 
explicitly developed a comprehensive concept of 
merciful benevolence within its elaborate Buddhology. 
Hence the bodhisattva ideal of selfless mercy and 
loving compassion for all sentient beings has been 
expressly probed, for on initial reflection this 
doctrine might appear to invalidate the law of karma by 
introducing universal salvation into the tradition. 
Moreover the question is raised as to how the Mahayana 
tradition can sustain human autonomy as a meaningful 
notion within such an environment. 
Undoubtedly there is within both traditions a 
functioning of gratuitous activity that acts as a 
sustaining benevolent force. Furthermore this provides 
a religious response to the yearnings of the human 
condition as a means of spiritual edification. Thus it 
seems reasonable to assume that an existential problem 
such as the intensity and universality of human 
suffering might offer ground for some mutual 
understanding of this phenomenon. However chapter 
three illustrates, that because of very different 
conceptions of what constitutes the human predicament, 
both traditions have responded with radically 
distinctive perspectives to this problem. Within 
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Christian theism there is the conviction that all 
suffering is a consequence of our spiritual and moral 
estrangement from God, whereas Buddhism's central 
philosophy supports the thesis that the causes of 
suffering pertain to the unsatisfactory nature of the 
actual process of existence. 
The enigma of evil and suffering in the world 
provides Christian theology with the arena for a "soul- 
making" theodicy, supporting both an eschatological 
dimension and soteriological goal. The relevance of 
the notion of free-will to the theological problem of 
suffering remains an infinitely significant factor, 
both defending God's justice and righteousness and 
vindicating his responsibility for human actions. 
Furthermore freedom of the will would seem to be 
intrinsic to God's purpose for human beings beyond this 
life, and is important to our progressive 
sanctification towards a final union with God in 
eternity. 
The Buddhist worldview sustains the belief that 
the existential causes of suffering can more 
appropriately be described as dukkha. The Buddha's 
primary concern in expounding the Four Noble Truths was 
to explain that ignorance and a lack of insight 
perpetuated further karmic conditioned existence. Thus 
the notion of human volitional action can be affirmed 
at this level of retributive justice within an 
impartial, causal moral order. However, the Buddha 
also pointed to the elimination of this mode of 
existence and to the unconditioned state of nirvana. 
Consideration is therefore given in this chapter to the 
Buddhist understanding of the path to enlightenment, 
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for it purports to a soteriological realisation that 
transcends any self-determination, for it is liberation 
from the duality of a compounded existence. 
Enshrined in the goal and nature of reality is 
each tradition's perception of the human predicament. 
Clearly this discernment is closely related to their 
assumptions as to what constitutes the essential human 
being. Consequently both traditions have shaped their 
philosophical doctrines and principles around their 
accepted theories of what constitutes individual 
identity and human personality. Hence chapter four 
focuses on how this concept is represented by Christian 
theism as an essence of being which sustains an 
enduring '"self" or soul. However, Buddhist 
philosophical thinking asserts an opposing view, in 
that it is a complex function and fluid structure to 
which no permanent individual essence can be ascribed. 
Consequently any attribution of free agency to these 
profoundly different views of personal identity, would 
seem to have significant implications for the way in 
which salvific realisation should be understood. 
Western philosophical theology has consistently 
confirmed the uniqueness of the individual to which the 
essence of being is eternally fixed. This assumption 
supports the need for a continuous programme of 
spiritual and ethical striving towards perfection 
through one's lifetime. Thus Christian theism's 
concept of the soul's immortal destiny accounts for how 
moral responsibility in this life, and continuity of 
"self-identity" is maintained into the after life. 
Buddhism however, has resolutely endorsed the doctrine 
of anatta and insisted that the essence of being is 
10 
determined by the individual's karmic-volitional 
dynamism, which is imprinted on one's phenomenal 
identity throughout successive lives. By means of 
continual spiritual discipline the individual can 
choose a course of volitional impetus which will 
eventually lead to enlightenment and nirvanic 
perfection. Thus instrumental to the question of 
personal deliverance is the need to enquiry into the 
very nature of Buddhist salvation. 
A continual theme and point of reference 
throughout this thesis, has been to probe the 
intelligibility of the notion of freedom of choice as 
the underlying factor to human responsibility and moral 
goodness. Chapter five is dedicated to the issues 
arising from the philosophical debates of whether 
causal determinism can be reconciled with moral 
responsibility in human action. Many thinkers of both 
Western and Eastern persuasion are of the opinion that 
the question of free-will is an ontological concern 
about the reality of human nature, whereas moral 
accountability is a normative enquiry questioning moral 
judgement. They maintain therefore that it is 
conceptually illogical to apply causal relationships to 
ideas of what constitutes moral justice. However, both 
traditions have defended their perspective by 
responding to this philosophical enigma from within 
their own conceptual framework. 
Within Christian theology the religious analogue 
to the philosophical debate has been to uphold the 
belief that divine providence is consistent with human 
moral accountability. However, there are considerable 
controversial aspects pertaining to the specific nature 
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of this moral imperative, and therefore this chapter 
will focus briefly on these polemics- Nevertheless, in 
general, theism supports the belief that the nature of 
free-will applicable to human conduct is a personal 
God-given autonomy, and the causal conditions of this 
action are not contingent on external circumstances of 
physical causation. 
The Buddha in all his teachings promoted the law 
of universal causation yet firmly denied a totally 
deterministic perspective of reality. Hence he 
explained the intricate nature of psychological 
causality as it applied to the moral sphere of karmic 
activity. He therefore supported individual moral 
endeavour asserting that these doctrines were intrinsic 
to the moral order of all existence. Nevertheless it 
has been necessary to consider the scholarly criticism 
that causal determinism, free-agency and moral 
responsibility within the Buddhist philosophical 
framework cannot be reconciled. The tradition contends 
however, that the doctrine of paticcasamuppada, like 
that of sun_yata, has been seriously misunderstood if we 
fail to appreciate that utility concepts at the 
conventional level of reality, cannot be evaluated as 
principles at the ultimate level of truth. Similarly 
Nagarjuna made this distinction within the concept of 
upa_va teaching the expedience of ""skill in means" to a 
spiritual objective. 
Lastly I should like to acknowledge that by 
attempting this comparative study I have run the 
unavoidable risk of projecting theories and 
implications that are misinterpretations of the 
Buddhist philosophical belief structure. Clearly 
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have found the utility of analogous construction 
valuable and productive as a means of expressing 
similarity and difference. Throughout this thesis 
have been confronted with the need to penetrate the 
connection and relationship of the language with the 
manner in which it is discerned and employed. Such a 
task has been a salutary reminder that the association 
between language and meaning cannot be assumed to 
correspond uniformly to perception and experience. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
To What Extent is the Christian Understanding of a 
World Under the Providential Care of a Creator God an 
Alien Notion to the Buddhist Tradition? How Does a 
Concept of Free-will Affect their Differently Focused 
Worldviews? 
Preface 
The primary concern of this first chapter is to 
examine the distinctive worldviews of both Christian 
theism and Buddhist philosophical thought. Clearly 
their specific viewpoints will have a decisive impact 
on how they understand cosmic reality and finite 
existence. The significance of a notion of free-will 
can then be explored within the context of each 
tradition's sphere of reference. 
Classical or traditional Christian theology(l) 
focuses on a personalistic, divine-human relationship 
which gives account of God as the supreme power 
supporting providential sustaining properties. 
However, since the nineteenth century, this 
metaphysical structure of reality has been challenged 
by different strands of Hegelian philosophy, (2) and 
confronted in the twentieth century by the new 
approaches in evolutionary biology and quantum physics. 
This has given rise to a picture of the world as 
interrelated events. Within this atmosphere a 
-philosophy of organism" was developed by Alfred 
Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne which has become 
widely known as Process Theology. Hence both 
traditional theism and process thought will be 
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evaluated to illustrate their specific responses to a 
concept of human free-will. 
The belief in God's providential care that has 
developed in traditional Christian theology supports 
his active involvement in the ordering of history. 
This belief subscribes to God attributes of 
transcendence, omnipotence and omniscience, together 
with immanence, righteousness and mercy. These 
properties are essential to the accustomed 
understanding of God as the source and power of all 
things, while upholding a belief in the world as an 
abundantly providential place. This assertion, it is 
maintained by classical theism, does not destroy the 
initiative of God in endowing a measure of freedom and 
responsibility to his creatures. 
Hence the classical view is one in which God is 
the sovereign ruler of the created order, and whose 
existence is ultimately independent of his creation. 
Process theists however, following a Whiteheadian 
doctrine, claim that the divine activity of God is to 
be experienced as an organic process, wherein God and 
the world contribute to each other in a highly 
integrated and interdependent pattern of events. The 
process vision of God and the world form an ecosystem 
where: "'God is not to be treated as an exception to all 
metaphysical principles, invoked to save their 
collapse. He is their chief examplification". (3) 
Thus process theism rejects the assumptions of 
classical theology in which God is acknowledged as 
absolute transcendence, omnipotence and omniscience. 
Emphasis is put on the mutual embodiment of God and the 
world, stressing the spontaneity and novelty of divine 
action in which the world is fundamentally significant 
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to the enrichment of the divine experience. Thus God's 
power is one of divine possibility, providing creative 
possibilities for the world to actualise by persuasion 
rather than coercion. Self-determination therefore 
lies in the capacity to respond to the present, and to 
exercise that freedom in the light of possible future 
opportunities. 
Traditionally, Western Christendom has always 
strongly emphasised the importance of human free-will 
as intrinsic to the concept of providential 
participation and divine salvation. However, the 
notion of providence as the activity of God who is also 
omnipotent and omniscient, introduces a fundamental 
difficulty that calls for explanation or justification. 
Thus a defence of free-will has a long ancestry 
extending back to Augustine. It is based on 
explanations as to why a wholly good creator gave 
humankind free-will considering it has produced 
innumerable forms of evil and suffering in the world. 
However, it is maintained that this does not 
necessarily show that God cannot be mutually all 
powerful, all knowing and all good. 
Nevertheless, many argue that these essential 
attributes of God cannot be reconciled with the 
autonomous nature of human beings. They insist that it 
creates a paradox, for if God can control the evil 
volitional activity of agents, but refrains from 
intervening then God is not omnigood. Yet if God 
cannot subsequently control human agency, then he is no 
longer omnipotent. Process theists claim that their 
conception of reality, in which the world is understood 
as dynamic and processive, revokes the immutable and 
unchanging attributes of classical theology and makes 
God an evolving and finite divinity. (4) They maintain 
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that such a perspective can mitigate for the 
theological problem of evil and suffering, and is more 
consonant with the philosophical and scientific 
thinking of the present era. 
Consequently this chapter will seek to indicate 
that a notion of free-will has been a constant and 
systematic Western preoccupation, and is a crucial 
component within a Christian theistic sphere of 
reference. A free-will defence is not just a plausible 
legitimisation for moral evil; whether God could 
prevent evil if he wanted to, but focuses on the 
question of the very existence of God. Theistic 
postulations and theories have been attacked as 
implausible and irrelevant. The debates have reached 
an intense pitch of refinement, for to discuss God's 
providential care is more complex than it would first 
appear. An evaluation of those proposals that seek to 
uphold traditional categories, process theism which 
aims to modify them, and an atheistic debate which 
disputes them, all confirm that a notion of free-will 
underpins a theistic worldview in all its diversity. 
Buddhist Theravada and Mahayana traditions(5) 
firmly deny a supreme creator-deity, and focus on a 
cosmological dimension that emphasises the principle of 
universal relativity and the transitoriness that is 
common to all things in the universe. In the early 
canonical texts there are many arguments presented 
against theism which are succinctly recorded in the 
"Jakat: a" as an argument from evil: 
if God(Brahma)is Lord of the whole world and 
creator of multitude of beings, then why has 
he ordained misfortune in the world without 
making the whole world happy? For what 
purpose has he made the world full of 
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injustice, deceit, falsehood and conceit? 
The Lord of creation is evil in that he 
ordained injustice when there could have been 
justice. (6) 
Buddhism has insisted therefore that the contradictions 
between a concept of divine providence and the 
existence of evil in the world has supported the 
opinion that, "the world was without -refuge and without 
God'-'(at: t: ano loko anabhissaro). (7) 
Within Buddhist philosophical understanding it is 
the theory of universal causation, and the moral law of 
karma as an unseen force or law of nature, which 
suffices to explain what would otherwise require an 
intelligent creator. It is stressed that it is a false 
assumption that human beings are saved or doomed 
because of the grace or will of God for this cannot be 
reconciled with the notion of human accountability. 
The issue of free-will has to be engaged with in terms 
of one's ka=a which must be eliminated to achieve 
emancipation. Hence the concept of attachment or 
devotion to God can only be seen as an obstacle to 
release from dukkha which is at the heart of Buddhist 
analysis. 
Indeed within Buddhism's philosophical- 
psychological framework, all life is understood as 
dukkha due to one's desires and graspings for sentient 
existence. Therefore it is not necessary to invoke the 
grace of God to control the karmic path, for it is by 
means of spiritual practice involving the contemplative 
path of meditation and self-mastery that one is able to 
relinquish these attachments. It is through the 
cessation of our attachments that the attainment of 
nirvana is possible. Hence this chapter will aim to 
reveal that the concept of free-will within the 
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Buddhist tradition is a significant feature at the 
level of samsaric-karmic reality. However, Buddhism 
points to the goal of release from this samsaric 
existence, and it is only through the abandonment of 
all desire and attachment that a complete freedom is 
attained in nirvana. Thus emancipation from ka=a does 
not lead to the will of God but to a spontaneity 
without will. It is necessary therefore to appreciate, 
that at this level of truth, (with analogies here to 
Nagarjuna's concept of ka=a and free-will) the 
relevance of a notion of free-agency to the attainment 
of a nirvanic state, is meaningless. 
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Theistic Attributes of God 
Traditional theism postulates God as a being who 
is omnipotent in the sense that, "God can do whateve-r 
it is logically possible that God can do". (8) Thus God 
can freely limit his power in granting to human beings 
the capacity to act freely without sacrificing his 
omnipotence. In creating human beings with this 
ability, it can be argued that God's self-limitation 
has caused things to be actualised which he 
subsequently cannot control. This fact it is claimed 
does not count against an affirmation of omnipotence 
however, as it is logically impossible for God to bring 
about any other state of affairs. 
In a very competent attack on this traditional 
doctrine of omnipotence, J. L. Mackie asserts that there 
is a fundamental difficulty in accepting the theist's 
explanation. He insists that their solution implies a 
"paradox of omnipotence", maintaining that if God 
actually creates things which he cannot subsequently 
control or makes rules which constrain him, then God is 
not omnipotent once these rules have been set in 
motion. (9) Mackie suggests that this is a crucial 
issue; if God originally used his omnipotent power to 
assign to his creatures the independence of freedom of 
choice, limiting himself in such a way that they were 
subsequently beyond his control, then Mackie asserts: 
"we cannot consistently ascribe to any continuing being 
omnipotence in any inclusive sense". (10) 
This argument is firmly opposed by Richard 
Swinburne who declares that God's omnipotence is the 
power to permit or make happen; that God is perfectly 
free for he depends on nothing. God is a being with 
the -choice of intention", which is totally uninhibited 
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due to the fact that God is beyond the boundary of 
justification. (11) Swinburne also asserts that God is 
a being with "beliefs" which are consonant with the 
infinite quality of his omnipotence. These beliefs, 
which are God's infinite knowledge, are only limited in 
order to preserve the freedom of divine future actions 
and to allow his creatures to determine their 
destiny. (12) God is omniscient therefore in the sense: 
""that God knows at any particular time whatever it is 
logically possible that God knows at that time". (13) 
Those scholars critical of Swinburne's position 
argue that if it is necessary for God to engage in 
cognitive self-limitation to preserve human action, 
then such a condition signifies that God has never been 
future omniscient in any everlasting sense. 
Furthermore, if God chooses not to be everlastingly 
omniscient because of his self-imposed limitation then 
that is tantamount to saying that God has freely chosen 
not to know the future. Swinburne maintains 
nevertheless, that God, "will never do any action if he 
acknowledges overriding reasons for refraining from 
doing it". (14) In this manner, the presupposition that 
God reserves the power of future omniscience, but for 
the sake of freedom chooses not to implement it, is 
preserved. 
Traditional theism is accustomed to deducing God's 
perfect goodness from his omniscience and significant 
freedom. Thus God is espoused as capable of making 
morally significant choices. This aspect of his nature 
Swinburne maintains is God's ""complete rationality" in 
that he: "will always do any action for which there is 
overriding reason, never do any action for which there 
is an overriding reason for refraining, and only do any 
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action if there is a reason for doing it". (15) once 
again he contends that the constraints imposed on God's 
choice of action, by what is logically possible, are 
compatible with the freedom attributed to human beings. 
God's freedom however, does not imply that he could 
perform a morally wrong action, for although God has 
perfect freedom between various courses of action, this 
is not the freedom of choice between actions in respect 
to their rightness or wrongs. God is considered to be 
perfectly and essentially good which expresses a 
necessary truth of God's nature. (16) 
Hobbes in the "Leviathan" pointed out that the 
theist who tried to give a plausible interpretation of 
God's capacity 'to do ever_ything', ', ', landed themselves 
in intz-actable pz-oblems and hopeless confusion". (17) 
However, another explanation of this conundrum is 
suggested by Peter Geach who admits that this classical 
proposition involves inherent logical difficulties. He 
expresses the opinion that omnipotence and omniscience 
understood as God 'can do and knows everything' is 
merely "a piece of theological etiquette", (18) and 
recommends that it is preferable to reflect on God's 
almightiness as his essential attribute. 
Almighty, he insists indicates that God as the 
source of all power is by far more powerful than any 
creature. Any power assigned to human beings is 
maintained only as long as it is God's will. God's 
will and his power are inextricably bound together for: 
"God does whatever he wills, and what God cannot be 
said to be able to do, he therefore cannot will to 
do". (19) Hence Christian theism Geach maintains, does 
not have to justify a thesis of omnipotence and 
omniscience, but can account for a doctrine of God's 
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almightiness which he considers to be reconcilable with 
human free-will. 
Traditionally therefore, theism has claimed that 
the attributes essential to a God who is creator of all 
things are non-negotiable articles of faith- Hence it 
is the assertion that the world is under the divine 
providence of God as the supreme sustainer of the 
universe, which gives rise to the problem of evil. The 
question ensues whether a world can be the work of a 
God with the capacity of almighty power, complete 
knowledge and who is perfectly good, given the reality 
of both moral and natural evils. As Kenneth Surin 
points out, "it would be pragmatically futile to seek a 
justification of God vis-a-vis the fact of evil without 
this supposition of God". (20) Thus scholarly 
reflections on the attributes ascribed to the nature of 
God, seek to exonerate God from any responsibility for 
the evil and suffering which is a reality of 
existential experience. 
Whereas classical theism has to defend a seemingly 
self-contradictory concept of God, Whiteheadian 
metaphysics promotes an understanding of God as the 
creative power of the universe, which is essentially 
shared by all creatures. The essence of a process 
theology therefore is the concept of God as a bi-polar 
divine principle, both eternal and temporal in nature. 
Understood as an abstract expression, God's primordial 
nature is the unchanging source of all. In this aspect 
belong all the attributes which classical theism 
ascribe to God, namely the ""attributes of infinity, 
eternity, impassibility, immutability and self- 
experience". (21) Thus God is regarded as the 
foundation of all reality, sustaining the world by the 
richness of the divine experience. As the binding 
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element in the world he is the source of all 
possibilities and the embodiment of all creativity. 
Yet this conceptual aspect of God is only one pole 
of his nature for, ", each actuality in the temporal 
world has its reception in God's nature". (22) It is 
this aspect of God which is his consequent nature, for 
without ceasing to be the perfectly divine being he 
shares in the creative process of the world. In this 
physical pole God's reality is relative, passive, 
mutable and contingent for, "there is a reaction of the 
world on God. [ --- I Xt is consequent upon the creative 
advance of the world". (23) God's temporal nature is 
directly influenced by events in the world, there is a 
mutual relatedness and interdependence between God and 
ongoing temporal events, in that God's immanent being 
is the ultimate recipient of all the world's finite 
experiences. These he takes into his nature and reacts 
to them with his primordial wisdom. In this 
respect, "the world's nature is a primordial datum for 
God; and God's nature is a primordial datum for the 
world". (24) 
Process theologians claim that this bi-polar 
aspect of God's actuality provides a coherent way of 
recognising the intimate relationship between God and 
the world. Thus God's reality is both necessary as the 
underived ground of all existence, and is contingent on 
genuine involvement with finite creativity, for God's 
consequent nature is directly dependent upon the 
world's unfolding events. Hence God acts in the 
creative process as the ground of novelty, providing an 
ever-rich source of possibilities upon which temporal 
events can draw, yet it is contingent on temporal co- 
operation and shaped by his labour alongside creation. 
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This concept of relativity is an essential element 
in process thought, for it is maintained that his 
consequent nature vindicates God from any 
responsibility for the amount of evil and suffering in 
the world. Although God acts upon creation having the 
power to persuade and influence finite creativity, God 
does not determine the actual form of all that happens. 
The temporal process is only partly determined by 
preceding events, for God presents free alternatives, 
creating a spontaneity which allows each creature to 
make its own unique contribution to the experience of 
the world. In this way self-creativity in the 
unfolding reality of temporal events provides a degree 
of autonomy, in which all entities are free to 
determine themselves. (25) 
Although many scholars dispute the credibility of 
such a conception of God(26) undoubtedly process 
theology has made valuable contributions to current 
debates on the reality of God's nature and his divine 
relationship with the world. Therefore before we turn 
to theism's attempts to provide a teleology of evil and 
suffering for a phenomenon which consistently perplexes 
the human mind by evaluating the various free-will 
defences and justifications which reconcile their 
theistic beliefs, it is important to comprehend the 
relationship between Creator and creature which 
sustains these propositions. 
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Creator - Creaturely Relationship 
Within traditional theism the most fundamental 
implication of the relationship between God as the 
infinite, perfect Creator and the temporal nature of 
human beings, is the consciousness of the immense gulf 
that separates humankind from God by virtue of this 
finite status. Within religious experience this 
distinction has customarily been understood as an 
alienation from God, due to the unbridgeable gulf 
caused by the sinful nature of humankind which set it 
against the Divine purpose and the moral law. (27) The 
problem of reconciling human beings' propensity to evil 
willing with a perfectly good God who created them, has 
therefore been a persistent concern of Christian 
philosophical thought. 
The solution propounded by Saint Augustine that 
became integral to the theology of Western Christendom 
well into the nineteenth century, was the doctrine of 
original sin (peccatum originis) . It was the aversio a 
Deo conversio ad creaturam which was the basic sin or 
evil of mankind inevitably resulting in a terrible 
distortion of existence. Augustine asserted that God 
had originally created a world which was perfectly good 
but also made human beings with the facility of free 
agency. In the "De Vera Religione- he argued that 
through Adam's disobedience and subsequent fall from 
grace, the whole of Adam's seed was implicated in a 
corruption of nature from which all evils have ensued. 
By means of this doctrine Augustine was able to 
conserve not only the innocence of God by maintaining 
that he held no responsibility for the existence of 
evil, but also to confirm the guilt of mankind. The 
effects of original sin were ultimately due to the 
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shameful misuse of the culpable volitions of human 
freedom: "For when the will abandons what is above 
itself, and turns to what is lower, it becomes evil - 
not because that is evil to which it turns, but because 
the turning itself is vicked". (28) For Augustine "'what 
is above itself" was the higher good, namely God. This 
he explained in his doctrine of efficient causation: as 
there is no ""efficient" or positive cause of evil 
willing, it is a negation or ""deficiency". Evil 
willing therefore is a self-originating act and as such 
the origin of moral evil is not explicable in terms of 
prior causes, but lies concealed within the enigma of 
human freedom. (29) 
Prior to the development of this theology by 
Augustine and the Latin Fathers, Irenaeus (c 120-202) 
was propounding a significantly different conception of 
humankind's epistemic distance from God. Mankind was 
not seen by Irenaeus as having first lived in perfect 
harmony with God and nature and then fallen from 
original righteousness to a profound depth of total 
depravity, it was rather a delaying of their spiritual 
development at some early stage in the evolutionary 
process. Through this progression of the moral and 
spiritual development of the human personality God 
could gradually create perfected, finite beings and 
bring them into the '"likeness" of God. (30) 
The legacy of these classical Augustinian and 
Irenaean accounts of humanity's fallen state, may have 
been adapted or modified by modern theism, but they 
nonetheless represent an essential constituent of many 
contemporary theodices. Traditionally understood 
therefore human beings are created to worship God and 
by this devotion to enter into a personal relationship 
with their Creator. For this to be a genuine 
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association of love and trust it is considered that 
human beings must first experience a certain degree of 
freedom and autonomy. Richard Swinburne contends that 
it is through this freedom to choose, together with the 
ability to translate that choice into action and 
knowledge to discern what choices are available, that 
human beings are "an independent source of the 
character and development of the world". (31) 
It is relevant at this juncture to consider the 
views expressed by process theology as to the 
relationship between God and humanity. By denying the 
traditional perspective of omnipotence essential to 
classical theology, process theism also rejects its 
correlative doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. 
Whiteheadian thinking asserts that, ""he is not before 
all creation but with all creation". (32) Thus the 
principle of absolute origination is drastically 
modified and the notion of continuous creation is 
promoted. It is maintained that if God created the 
world out of nothing, as classical theology suggests, 
then the power inherent in creation is absolutely 
dependent on a supreme Deity. (33) However, process 
theism does not renounce this textual legacy but 
renders a more unorthodox view of this biblical verse 
which suggests that God's creation was the 
accomplishment of symmetry or "a remoulding of pre- 
existing materials". (34) 
Process theologians claim that the words, "when 
God began to create the heavens and the earth, the 
earth was without form and void [ --- PI, (35) indicate 
that the world was created through a long evolutionary 
process out of a state of chaos. God therefore does 
not have total monopoly on control and authority, for 
he is limited by the built-in power which has existed 
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in non-divine entities and cannot be overridden. Hence 
God co-exists in a relationship of interdependence in 
which he is immanent in all events ensuring the general 
order of the evolutionary process. However, God always 
acts along with other causes; it is the fusion of God's 
active role as the ground of all possibilities and the 
self-creation of individual entitities. Thus 
reciprocal inter-action does not jeopardise creaturely 
autonomy for divine creativity is restricted to 
influencing the outcome of events. 
Hence the distinctive feature of process theology 
is that God's power is necessarily a shared power with 
creation. The creative influence is contemplated as a 
two-fold sovereignty: "embodied by a multiplicity 
because the vezy nature of creativity involves 
incessant oscillation between the one and the 
many". 06) Thus the power attributed to God is of a 
kind which cannot unilaterally determine the affairs of 
human beings; it is a power shared by all sentient 
creatures which affects not only themselves, but 
directs other actualities. Consequently instead of a 
gulf of separation between a supreme Creator and his 
creation, God's relationship is viewed as one of 
personal involvement in the destiny of all creatures as 
the dynamic source of persuasive power. 
The underlying characteristic of God's consequent 
nature therefore is that, "'God creates by pex-suading 
the wox-ld to create itself" (37) towards the most 
desirable forms of order. God is not considered purely 
to be an objective part of the creative process but an 
integral participant, who is affected and influenced by 
the contingent processes of all temporal events. 
Knowing the world totally and intimately God acts in 
the world by constantly introducing genuine new 
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initiatives and ever-richer possibilities, to which 
creatures can spontaneously respond. 
Hence God's persuasive purpose is to encourage 
self-creation in the accomplishment and maximisation of 
temporal achievements and values. God's unchanging 
goal is to promote his own preferred ordering of 
particular potentialities. Hence there is a reciprocal 
communication between the persuasive activity of divine 
influence and all temporal entities through the power 
of thought and feeling, inspiration and suggestion, to 
which all beings can respond or react to God's 
prehensive nature. God therefore unifies the 
"multiplicit. y of actual components" (38) provided by 
the world commensurate with his insight of their 
creative harmonisation. 
In this way God's divine power does not determine 
the outcome of events but can only have a causally 
effective influence. All actual entities preserve some 
measure of freedom to respond to, or deviate from God's 
desired order. Accordingly God cannot ensure temporal 
victory over adversity and evil intent, for its very 
source is embodied in the self-creation of emerging 
reality. Process theology declares therefore that 
God's persuasive nature preserves not only the 
integrity of creaturely freedom but also the moral 
purity of God. 
Many critics of process theology (39) take issue 
with the fact that by abandoning the doctrine of 
creation ex nihilo God's divine power over the cosmic 
order is necessarily limited. If creation came about 
as an uncreated process, out of a state of primordial 
chaos, then God too is subject to the limitations 
imposed by the causal laws of relativity. Hence John 
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Hick claims that, "the idea of a finite God seems to be 
metaphysically unsatisfactoxY"1(40) for there can be no 
concept of God as the divine omnipotent creator and 
sustainer of the world; this is essential to 
traditional theistic thinking. Furthermore Kenneth 
Surin points out that by dissembling the traditional 
doctrine of omnipotence and denying an infinitely 
powerful Creator, process theism "cannot legitimately 
claim to have reconciled the propositions of classical 
theism". (41) A God who is limited in his involvement 
with his creatures, given that divine reality is 
experienced through a mutual relatedness with all 
temporal events, is not consistent with Christian 
theology; one that supports the belief in a God who 
takes the initiative in his relationship with the 
world. 
Moreover David Pailin maintains that the 
primordial aspect of God presents an understanding of 
the divine nature which is both philosophically and 
theologically debatable. (42) Traditionally understood, 
God withholds his unlimited power thereby allowing for 
the existence and growth of autonomous human beings to 
freely respond to their Creator. Within process 
thought however, God does not empower his creatures 
with self-determination for to be part of the temporal 
world involves an element of self-causation, in that 
all finite actualities exercise a measure of self- 
creative power. Process theologian S. M. Ogden defends 
this doctrine however, asserting that the divine 
initiative traditionally attributed to God in creation 
is not vital and is adequately replaced by the 
necessary progress of the cosmic process. He comments 
that: 
the prima-ry meaning of God fs action 
whereby in each new present he constitutes 
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himself as God by participating fully and 
completely in the world of his creatures, 
lays the ground for the next stage of the 
creative process. (43) 
David Griffin, a forceful advocate of process 
theology, who has presented what he calls a "coherent 
creationistic omnipotence", supports these sentiments. 
He therefore comments: "God does not refrain from 
controlling the creatures simply because it is better 
to use persuasion, but because it is necessarily the 
case that God cannot completely control the 
creatures". (44) Nevertheless many critics reject such 
an argument and believe that process theism cannot be 
supported as a credible option to supplant or replace 
traditional theology. The interdependence of the 
creative power of God, and the temporal self- 
originating activity of finite beings, is not consonant 
with the biblical conviction of God as Redeemer, for it 
compromises the Christian gospel of its quality of 
providential grace. (45) Further critical appraisal of 
process doctrines will be considered in conjunction 
with the debates and theodicies in which Christian 
theism responds to the enigma of evil. Prior to this 
however, it is important to consider the non-theistic 
perspectives of the Buddhist tradition and to reflect 
on the doctrines and principles which support their 
specific worldview. 
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Buddhist Non-Theistic Perspective 
Buddhism, in both its Theravada and Mahayana 
traditions, denies that the universe is the product of 
a deity as a personal, creator God possessed of the 
attributes of omnipotence, omniscience and infinite 
goodness. The early canonical texts provide an 
abundance of arguments against such a deity stressing 
the fallacies of any theistic assertions of the 
existence of a supreme God: "Xf God designs the life 
of the entire world - the gloxy and the misexy, the 
good and evil acts, man is but an instrument of his 
will and God (alone) is responsible". (46) Consequently 
the Buddha would not support a creation in which the 
lives of all beings determined by a transcendent Deity, 
were merely carrying out the commandments of that 
Deity. 
Hence the world with all its imperfections could 
not be the creation of a perfect Being. The Buddha 
argued that theism did not have the ability to provide 
a rational explanation, either for the incompatibility 
between divine providence and human free agency, or the 
contradiction between divine goodness and the 
inexplicable evils in the world: "[ --- I for what 
pux-pose has he made the world full of injustice, 
deceit, falsehood and conceit, or the lord of beings is 
evil in that he ordained injustice when there could 
have been justice". (47) The Buddha therefore refuted a 
First Cause, emphasising that to be active and creative 
any deity would have to have phenomenal properties 
which arise from some prior cause. 
The Buddha insisted instead on the "universal 
concatenation of all things and their mutual 
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relationship". (48) This pure contingency left no place 
for a creator who transcended his creation and 
creatures. Consequently the absence of a supreme 
creator and ruler of the universe signified that there 
was no beginning in terms of creation; the spatio- 
temporal complexity of the cosmos was to be understood 
in evolutionary terms by the causal formula. 
Accordingly Buddhist philosophy has explained 
everything in the world as causally conditioned and 
under the law of an unending chain of cause and effect. 
This takes account of physical change in the 
impermanent nature of all component parts. The general 
formula of causality stating that: "when this is 
present that comes to be; from the arising of this, 
that arises. When this is absent that does not come to 
be; on the cessation of this, that ceasesff. (49) 
Thus this causal principle operates in every 
sphere of existence and to: "penetrate the doctrine of 
paticcasamupada is to penetrate to the very core of 
existence". (50) Buddhist philosophical thought has 
therefore transcended the necessity of a creator God in 
a way uniquely its own. The realisation that every 
eventuality takes place according to a certain pattern 
is considered as a cosmic truth, abidingly valid and 
self-supporting. Within this frame of reference there 
can be no divine element immune from this universal 
flux; no projection of a transcendent form. Hence a 
recognised aspect of the Buddha's teachings is his 
claim that any speculation about the existence of a 
First Cause of the cosmos is irrelevant(51) and should 
be set aside as having no significance to the path of 
enlightenment and ultimate salvation. (52) 
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conception of the realm of finite beings within 
a universe of ever-changing flux of interdependent 
causality, stands in stark contrast to the theistic 
perception of the world as the act of divine creation, 
explained in terms of God's sovereign purpose and 
intention throughout its history. Hence Buddhism is 
not confronted with the question of how to reconcile 
the existence and nature of a pre-eminent God with the 
horror and apparent iniquity in the world. The 
theistic dilemma is avoided by accounting for universal 
justice through a specific application of the doctrine 
of dependent co-arising in the moral order of karma. 
This then explains the human tendency to moral 
corruption. Good and evil is distributed to every 
individual as the result of prior causes in the follies 
and misdeeds of past lives. 
Buddhism therefore has not had to provide a 
morally sufficient reason for evil within a 
metaphysical framework of a world in which the 
sovereignty of a providential God, and the freedom of 
human beings, is maintained. However, the Buddha did 
have to defend the universal law of moral causality 
against claims that this theory was deterministic. In 
order to indicate how Buddhism supports a notion of 
free-agency within this causal reality, it is necessary 
to understand the operative structure of the karmic 
principle. 
35 
The Karmic Causal Formula 
Within Buddhist philosophical thought the 
universal law of moral cause and effect is considered 
to determine the direction of events and the destiny of 
one's existence. Understood as the driving force 
behind all actions it operates to maintain that all 
wholesome acts are rewarded and all unwholesome actions 
punished. Thus the principle of ka=a determines the 
fate of individuals according to the nature of the 
action, and binds them to the samsaric process of birth 
and rebirth. The monk Nagasena quoting the Buddha 
asserts: " Young man, beings have their own kamma, they 
are heirs to kamma, kanima is the matrix, kanima the kin, 
kamma the arbiter, kamma divides beings, that is to say 
into low or lofty". (53) 
Hence one is conditioned by the maturation 
(vipaka) of all that one has been in previous lives, 
for the law of ka=a is irrefragable, signifying that 
it cannot vanish,, but lives potentially until its 
effects are played out or overcome by some 
counteracting force. Consequently the results of one's 
present actions will have significant relevance for 
one's future destiny. The Buddha as recorded in the 
"Dhammapada" summed this up very succinctly: ""By self 
alone is evil done, by self is one disgz-aced; by self 
is evil left undone, by self is he purified; purity and 
impurity belong to self. No one can purify 
another-". (54) 
The principle of ka=a is understood as having a 
two-fold aspect; both an individual and universal 
expression. (55) Essentially one is constrained by 
one's own ka=a, in which one's volitions are morally 
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characterised as a self-responsible action, producing 
the endless round of rebirth to which one is firmly 
bound due to one's fundamental ignorance and 
desires. (56) On the other hand the universal aspect of 
ka=a is the realisation that one's own ka=a is 
inseparably linked to that operating in the universe; 
one's individual karma affects not only the unremitting 
round of rebirth of the distinct person, but the 
unanimity of all human existence. Thus the cravings 
and desires of ignorance, characterised by dukkha which 
are intrinsic to human nature, are realised as 
universal ka=a operating in and beyond oneself. 
Consequently it is through an understanding of this 
karmic-samsaric aspect of all existence which provides 
the means by which one can ultimately overcome the 
endless cycle of events, in the achievement of 
enlightenment or nirvana. (57) 
Ka=a is primarily and essentially understood 
therefore as human action which is characterised as 
being morally imputable. This ethical action is the 
human volitional activity conceived as the command or 
consent of the will(cetana). Buddhist thought has 
traditionally recognised that "cetana- formally 
constitutes the essence of ka=a and as such it 
designates it as the "mentally and intentionally 
grounded exercise of the will". (58) Hence the human 
condition is not considered as the mechanical results 
of previous deeds in which actions and experiences are 
all predetermined as an uninterrupted chain of karma 
and vipaka, but one in which human voluntary action has 
the ability to consciously shape their future 
existence. 
In the 
_"Majjhima 
ivika_va- the Buddha affirmed the 
efficiency of human effort and the role of self- 
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responsibility, asserting that if there was no 
possibility of altering ka=a in any way then "all 
undertaking is fruitless, all effort fruitless". (59) 
Hence Buddhism claims that ka=a is not a mechanical 
concept but viewed as "an organic power which grows 
expands and gives life to new kax-ma". (60) In this way 
there is genuine possibility of development for a 
person to mould or to modify their actions and thus 
determine their own future. The fact that present 
karmic actions are malleable, counteracting or 
reinforcing past actions, indicates that personal 
endeavour(purisa-kara) is intrinsic to the mechanism of 
the karmic-samsaric cycle. 
It is because the dispositional tendencies 
inherited from past karmic action are viewed only as 
inclinations or a proneness to act, that there is the 
possibility in one's current response to resist, 
control, or alter them, and thus affect future 
situations. It is K. N. Jayatilleke's opinion that the 
"Culakammavibhancra Suttaff confirms that the karmic 
principle is correlated to the causal laws, ""as 
tendencies rather than inevitable consequences". (61) 
Moreover Buddhaghosa's interpretation supports the 
claim that only when necessary conditions are available 
will something come into existence: ""From the 
condition or group of conditions that give rise to such 
states as decay and death thex-e is said to be 
'conditionalityf". (62) 
As a contemporary Buddhist thinker Jayatilleke 
supports the claim that causality has to be understood 
as a probability rather than a necessity when 
attributed to psychological factors such as 
dispositions and desires, thereby accommodating a 
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notion of free agency. (63) The karmic principle 
therefore asserts that through personal effort of self- 
knowledge, self-discipline and self-control, one's 
karmic potentials(ka=a-ayuhana) can be finally 
exhausted so that any act produces no further fruits. 
According to the laws of causality, if there is no 
longer any cause, then the effect is removed also and 
without the causal condition of karma the cycle of 
rebirths also ceases. Hence one can attain liberation 
in nirvana, not through any act of providential 
influence, but through the agency of personal free 
endeavour. 
However, the belief that "each individual forges 
his own destiny" (64) through the provision of human 
freedom of choice, is not shared by all Buddhist 
philosophical thinkers. Vasubandhu a Mahayana scholar 
of the fifth century, categorically denied the 
plausibility of independent free action: 
Actions are either of the body, or of the 
speech or of the mind. The first two 
classes, those of the body and of speech, 
wholly depend upon the mind, and the mind 
wholly depends upon unexorable causes. (65) 
Moreover it is interesting to note that Winston King 
quotes Nyanatiloka Thera, the author of a Buddhist 
dictionary, as firmly denying the possibility of free 
agency in the causal process. In it he declares that: 
the only admissible question would be whether 
the arising of irwill 11 is independent of 
conditions.. or whether it is conditioned[ I 
the answer would be [ --- I the arising of 
anything whatever is dependent on conditions, 
and without the conditions nothing can ever 
arise or enter into existence. (66) 
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The Buddha however, is generally accepted to have 
avoided giving either a deterministic or indeterminate 
explanation to the causal laws, thereby establishing 
'the middle path'. He therefore rejected karma as a 
remorseless law from which one could not escape and 
defended the idea of free action in the causal account 
of human behaviour: "There is fzee action, there is 
. ret. ribution --- IX maintain the doctrine of free 
action". (67) It would appear therefore that the 
experience of free-will is an essential factor in 
providing the means by which human beings can reshape 
their future karmic heritage, thereby affording hope 
for improvement and escape from the realm of 
conditioning. 
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Nirvana - Beyond the Will 
Masao Abe, a contemporary Mahayana Buddhist 
thinker, has claimed that in Buddhism, "the problem of 
Eree-will has never been gx-asped positively". (68) In 
fact free-will linked to the karmic process is to be 
regarded negatively. one engages with freedom of 
choice within this karmic-samsaric cycle of life but it 
is only through liberation from one's ka=a, and hence 
cessation from rebirth, that will ultimately lead to 
the attainment of nirvana. Thus the Buddhist path to 
salvation is not based on a personal creator-creature 
relationship through worship and a desire to know God, 
but on the potential to become, "emancipated from the 
transience common to all things in the universe". (69) 
Thus liberation from one's ka=a is through the 
realisation that the experienced world, as 
characterised by dukkha, is created by the ego-centred 
consciousness. It is this which constitutes the 
samsaric world of desires and ignorance which is the 
source of all craving and delusion. (70) It is only 
through the realisation of our ignorance and the self- 
centredness of those desires that the delusion can be 
assuaged. Consequently Buddhism points to the goal of 
release from such suffering, urging the abandonment of 
all attachments. Karma therefore belongs to the sphere 
of the relativeness of all things, for emancipation and 
release as an "awakened one" in nirvana cannot be 
desired. Moreover all efforts to use conceptual 
thought to understand nirvana are obstacles to its 
realisation. 
Etymologically nirvana implies cessation or the 
destruction of something. In the early canonical texts 
it is described thus: "the destruction of lust, the 
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destruction of illusion, friend, is called 
Nibbana-". (71) Hence nirvana is considered as the 
cessation of experience as conditioned by, and in 
bondage to, the self-regarding and self-awareness of 
the ego-centred self. Nirvana is however, more than a 
simple psychological statement of the self-abnegating 
condition of being different from the existence of the 
subjective self. It is rather the eternal reality 
which is realised through the cessation of the ego- 
centred being, and gives rise to perfect wisdom, 
compassion and freedom. 
Furthermore because emancipation lies beyond all 
possible shifting experience and is understood as 
totally unconditioned, nirvana is considered to be 
beyond the will. It has been expressed, by a 
contemporary Theravadin Narada Mahathera as, "the 
pex7nanent, immortal supramundane state which cannot be 
exp. ressed by mundane texms". (72) This concept further 
developed into the notion of sunyata in the Mahayana 
schools, ultimately made no distinction between them. 
Nirvana, characterised as transcendent in that, "it is 
unbox-n, unbecoming, unmade and uncompoundedfl (73) is 
considered an ""emptiness" without any boundaries. 
Nothing can be outside this unrestricted and limitless 
dynamic oneness in which everything in the universe is 
equally embraced. 
Masao Abe stresses therefore that this key term of 
sunyata, rendered as "emptiness", is also "fullnes"', 
for it is the realisation of the totality of 
"evexything Just as it is--(dha=a dhatu). (74) When the 
world is seen devoid of human thought projected by the 
discriminative self-centred ego, it is just what it is, 
full of its own being or "suchness" (Lathata). Thus: 
"difference as it is, is sameness(of things in their 
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suchness)as it is, is difference". (75) Hence in 
sunyata everything is realised as it is in its 
suchness; full of particular and individual things 
freely functioning without impeding one another. 
Furthermore in the concept of sunyata everything 
is recognised as reciprocal and reversible, 
transcending all polarities. Consequently it signifies 
a spontaneity implied in the Sino-Japanese term jinen 
meaning "'so of itself". Accordingly jinen is perceived 
as a natural dynamic state that is beyond any kind of 
willing. It is the basis from which the individual and 
everything else mutually interpenetrate as a continuous 
process of free activity, based on this realisation of 
its suchness. Thus liberation from ka=a, and all its 
attachments, leads to this dynamic reality of the 
unconditioned nature of all things in sun_vata, which is 
ultimately nirvana. 
At this juncture it is relevant to turn once again 
to the theist perspective, and briefly consider the 
free-will debates central to a worldview which 
ultimately references everything to a supreme deity. 
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Christian Theism's Free-Will Defences 
Classical theology supports the viewpoint that 
ultimately the notion of human free-will as a gift from 
God bestowed on his creatures, is to remove all 
responsibility for evil and suffering from God. (76) 
Intrinsic to this idea is the divine-human relationship 
which attributes God with intentions, in that human 
beings should enter into an association of love and 
trust with their Creator. Hence the traditional free- 
will responses that have been developed by Alvin 
Plantinga, Richard Swinburne and John Hick, are based 
on the notion that the freedom attributed to human 
beings allows the possibility of wrong choice. The 
existence of evil is considered to be a necessary 
requirement to bring about certain "second-order 
goods", and consequently genuine freedom of choice does 
not inexorably conflict with God's traditional 
attributes. 
Although I do not intend to engage in a prolonged 
discussion of the, "subtle distinctions and the 
meticulous refining of existing arguments" (77) these 
theodicies exhibit the classical Christian responses to 
the problem of evil. Hence the chief debates which 
focus on the crucial element of human free agency as a 
plausible justification need to be briefly 
considered. (78) More recently traditional theism has 
been challenged by the responses of a modern process 
theodicy. This view-point has been argued very 
competently by David Griffin who maintains that the 
traditional theologian's task is limited to defending 
their ,,, inherited view of God against criticism-1-1, (79) 
where "God's existence,, goodness and omnipotence are 
taken as axiomatic". This he describes as "privileged 
cz-itez-ia". (80) 
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Crucial to Richard Swinburne's theodicy is the 
belief that God gives to human beings the "', choice of 
destiny". He asserts that God cannot achieve this 
without first subjecting them to temptations and 
challenge, for if human beings are to become morally 
good and respond to their Creator, then there must 
conceivably be the possibility of attaining higher 
virtues as well as the baser vices. Therefore human 
freedom of choice was a logical constraint on the sort 
of universe that God could create. As a consequence of 
this choice of destiny individuals have the freedom 
either to acquire knowledge by means of a process of 
commitment, and thus grow into a fuller relationship 
with God, or as Swinburne claims, "return tcý the level 
of the beasts". (81) 
Likemindedly John Hick supports this opinion that 
evil and suffering are the unavoidable price which has 
to be paid for human freedom and responsibility; the 
necessary condition for acquiring moral virtues. He 
argues that the real possibility of encountering evil 
is indispensable to the idea that the world is a ""vale 
of soul making", and essential to the development of 
human souls if they are to respond freely to God. (82) 
Hick's theodicy, although open to considerable censure 
over the question of extreme suffering, where he is 
accused of retreating "behind the talk of divine 
myste. ry-'-', (83) nevertheless allows a supreme Creator to 
be characterised as the traditional, providential and 
caring God. 
Strongly attacked by J. L. Mackie is the notion that 
a world containing human beings with the ability to 
make moral choices between good and evil is superior to 
a world lacking free agency; one in which individuals 
act in a wholly determined way. He contends that if 
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there is no logical impossibility of a person sometimes 
choosing to do good, then there seems to be no logical 
reason why God should not have made human beings with 
the capacity of free agency, but that they should 
always chose to do what is right. Mackie argues that 
it would be perfectly reasonable to presume that an 
eternally omnipotent and wholly good God could have 
availed himself of this possibility. (84) 
As a response to this criticism the Christian 
theologian argues that it is necessary for there to be 
the genuine choice of moral evil to bring about the 
higher good; for God to have created beings who always 
chose to do good would in fact violate their free 
agency. It is better therefore to allow human freedom, 
although the consequences of this could exact a costly 
price, than for human beings to be programmed 
automatas. Hence they contend that the essential 
attributes of God are not inconsistent with the 
existence of evil in the world. The essence of the 
theistic position is the development of the human soul 
choosing freely to make moral choices. It would 
therefore be logically impossible for this state of 
affairs if they always chose the good. 
Alvin Plantinga, as one of the most impressive 
contemporary advocates of the free-will defence, has 
put forward a formidable debate in terms of a "possible 
worlds solution". He describes "'a state of affairs" of 
some particular nature as "a way things could have 
been". (85) Employing a skilful display of deductive 
reasoning, he rejects the idea of an infinite number of 
possible worlds, maintaining that it is logically 
impossible for God to actualise a world in which the 
beings he creates perform only morally good actions. 
He constructs his defence by asserting that the notion 
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of free-will is merely a rational possibility, arguing 
that this entails logical constraints on the kind of 
world God could necessarily create. 
Plantinga defends his position against the 
objections of such protagonists as Flew and Mackie by 
employing the notion of "', transworld depravity", r 
maintaining that people would possibly suffer from some 
kind of morally reproachable action in every world in 
which they could have been actualised. He contends 
therefore that: "it is not within God's power to 
actualise any world in which that person is 
significantly free but does no wrong". (86) Peter Vardy 
is critical of the notion of transworld depravity 
contending that this is a Lutheran conception that 
assumes the basic corruption of human nature. He 
argues that Plantinga asserts depravity as a necessary 
constituent of human nature in all possible worlds; yet 
if God can do everything that is logically possible 
then human depravity is only a contingent factor in 
Plantinga's thesis, not a necessary truth. Moreover 
although Plantinga denies the basic goodness of human 
nature, he then makes the tacit assumption that in the 
final outcome human evil can be balanced or outweighed 
by good, for it is logically possible for free agents 
to perform a greater number of good actions than 
reprehensible ones. (87) 
Plantinga is also criticised by the exponents of 
process theology who declare that he "has invented 
merely a possible hypothesis". (88) In David Griffin's 
opinion: "it is a solution whose truth, probability and 
even plausibility are said to be lutterly beside the 
point"'. (89) Plantinga responds to this point of view 
by asserting that his defence is primarily a rational 
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discourse with entirely theoretical implications. He 
claims therefore that: 
clearly it need be neither true, nor 
probable, nor plausible, nor believed by most 
theists [ --- I The fact that a particular 
proffered "Ir-1-1 is implausible, or not 
congenial to "modern man", or a poor 
explanation of IIqFII or whatever, is 
utterly beside the point. (90) 
Returning now to the debate from the perspective 
of process theology, David Griffin contends that a 
process theodicy provides both a credible and adequate 
solution to the theistic dilemma. God's bi-polar power 
is seen as consistent with a world composed of beings 
which allow a substantial degree of self-determination. 
Process thought emphasises that God provides both order 
and flexibility, participating fully in the world 
process. Yet no event can be attributed solely to God, 
for the purpose of his creative power is to produce 
autonomous beings who, in actualising their own 
potentialities, are an integral part of the creative 
process. God's nature is therefore necessarily limited 
by the reality of this freedom of sentient beings. 
Hence the God of process theology is thought of in 
terms of his persuasive power, whereby his creativity 
introduces aims and possibilities for human beings 
which he then strives to motivate to the realisation of 
their potentialities. (91) Thus divine persuasion seeks 
to maximise the harmony and intensity of every 
occasion, while creating new possibilities for greater 
accordance and profoundness in the future. In this way 
God endeavours to evoke, "the maximum richness of 
existence in every situation". (92) In as far as every 
moment of experience embodies the responsive activity 
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of autonomous beings, God's persuasive influence 
elicits greatly varying responses. Hence there is 
always the potential in every situation for the values 
of harmony and intensity not to be realised. Increased 
levels of complexity and severity can endanger harmony 
and produce the evil of discord. Consequently God's 
divine reality does all that his persuasive influence 
would be good for him to do without compromising the 
creative freedom of human beings. 
By incorporating all actualities into his divine 
nature, God preserves the self-creative experiences of 
all sentient beings. Thus within his nature is the 
knowledge of all adversity and misfortune, together 
with all success and pleasure which he eternally 
integrates into the rhythm of the world's progression. 
Accordingly the possibility and actuality of evil in 
the world is entailed in the nature of God's mutual 
embodiment in the unfolding temporal process. God 
therefore has to balance the risk of evil against the 
opportunity of enhancing the total harmony of the 
world. It is only God who knows whether the whole 
weight of temporal sorrows are contributing to a larger 
good, and whether the total balance of evil and good in 
the world makes that risk worth taking. Thus Griffin 
co=ents: 
In other words,, the one being who is in a 
position to know experientially the bitter as 
well as the sweet fruits of the risk of 
creation is the same being who has encouraged 
and continues to encourage this process of 
creative risk taking. (93) 
Hence process theism contends that divine activity 
is Justified, and God's goodness vindicated, on the 
grounds that the good produced towards the harmonious 
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perfection of the world outweighs and renders 
worthwhile the degree of evil and suffering which 
exists and will exist in the future. Furthermore there 
is no disputable issue involved concerning Gods powers 
of intervention in nature or human affairs because a 
process God's power ',, is of a different kind--. (94) The 
self-determining activity of human agency constitutes 
an elemental aspect of the shared power of creativity 
as the, "creative influence of one being or event upon 
another". (95) It is this internal power of self- 
purposefulness which provides the freedom of self- 
creation and mitigates for the problem of evil and 
suffering in the world. 
Nevertheless there are strong protagonists against 
such a theodicy who insist that process theology might 
have resolved the problem of evil, but only by 
effectively preventing the theodicy dilemma from 
arising. John Hick suggests that the attraction of 
such a theodicy is that it avoids the problem of having 
to reconcile evil with a totally omnipotent God. Yet a 
God who is restrained by the self-determining 
creativity of natural agents is a God who is limited in 
his powers to act, and subsequently unable to prevent 
it. (96) Such a God Ian Barbour agrees, "lacks 
sovereign control and the moral intensity of the 
biblical LTehovah". (97) Moreover David Pailin questions 
whether the exposition of a process theodicy is, 
"significantly different from the "willed limitation of 
powerf of the standard free-will defence". (98) Whether 
it is a bi-polar God who is limited by the shared 
initiative of his creative process, or the divine self- 
limitation of the classical Christian deity, there is 
still the necessity to adequately justify God's 
goodness in the face of evil. 
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Furthermore Hick asserts that the theodicy 
presented by David Griffin "involves a moz-alljy and 
x-eligiousl. y unacceptable elitism". (99) He takes issue 
with the notion that such a degree of physical and 
mental evil, which is part of human experience, is 
purely an integral element of the creative-evolutionary 
process. Hick claims that process theology seeks to 
justify a complex process in which God balances the 
intensity of all temporal evils and sorrows, together 
with all ""the glox-y of earthly happiness", (100) and is 
content that the degree of human misery does not 
prevail over the greater values of harmony and 
perfection. Thus it is acceptable to God that the 
quantity and quality of goodness and virtue render 
worthwhile all the heinous crimes committed, and all 
the terrible suffering endured. 
Hick denies that such a perspective of God can be 
reconciled with the Christian ideals of the Gospels, 
and a Creator God who values and loves human beings 
equally and impartially. Moreover he questions whether 
such a doctrine is compatible with the principles of 
Liberation Theology to which some process theologians 
have aligned themselves. (101) This movement promotes a 
God who loves and cares for the oppressed, enslaved and 
exploited of humanity, not merely a God who ultimately 
values only the exemplary and favourable amongst 
humankind. He maintains therefore that a process God 
would hardly inspire those devastated by suffering as 
worthy of worship and devotion. 
However, David Griffin firmly rejects Hick's 
critical appraisal of a process theodicy, and comments 
that in fact the appeal of the Whiteheadian metaphysics 
is that it indeed permits the assertion of the 
impartial love of God. That God far from sanctioning 
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the blatant discrepancies in well-being and 
opportunity, works continually with his creation to 
overcome them. He further argues, that it is in fact a 
God attributed with all the traditional forms of 
omnipotence which provides the basis for concluding 
that divine providence is neither equal nor 
impartial. (102) Hence Griffin claims that because 
divine power is not all-determining but intimately 
involved in the risks of creative activity, "the 
occurrence of genuine evil is not incompatible with 
God's beneficence towards all his creatures". (103) 
Moreover Griffin asserts that Hick's whole 
discussion suggests that, having been involved in the 
creative progression of the human species, and given 
the fact that so much disharmony and anguish was 
probable, then the God of process theology is morally 
defective. He maintains that Hick's characterisation 
of his process theodicy as '"elitist", "'truns totally 
counter to everything I mean to be saying--. (104) He 
therefore charges Hick with failing to contemplate in 
the context of the situation of whether God should, 
'"for the sake of avoiding "man-s inhumanity to man--., 
have avoided humanity(or some comparably complex 
species) altogether? " (105) In fact he insists that he 
was purely considering the question that, assuming God 
was faced with such a choice, would we honestly say 
that the physical and moral pain was so horrendous and 
monstrous it would have been better if temporal beings 
had never evolved to the advanced level of humankind? 
Hick also criticises a process theodicy as being 
devoid of an eschatological content. He argues that it 
is disputable whether a God of this nature could be 
attributed with the redemptive powers that are the 
essence of the sovereignty of an infinite deity. 
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Classical theism might have difficulties in justifying 
and defending the enigma of evil in the present, but 
they can give assurances that God's power will have 
victory over all adversity in the future. Within a 
Whiteheadian metaphysics no doctrine of redemption has 
been developed, (106) and thus a process theodicy cannot 
point to the eventual fulfilment of the creative 
process of all actualities in an ultimate state of 
eternal bliss. 
Griffin maintains however, that a process theodicy 
adequately reconciles the evil and suffering in the 
world without having to believe in eventual blessedness 
in an after life. Given the hypothesis that the 
conditions for enhancement of good are necessarily the 
conditions for increased evils, the profound 
inequalities in the distribution of good and evil in 
the world do not conflict with the impartial love of a 
God of divine persuasion. Process theism admits that 
God cannot guarantee an eternal cosmic purpose, for the 
nature of God's divine creative control eliminates a 
definitive, final and harmonious assurance. The fact 
that the creative progression involves the responses of 
autonomous agents whom may elect to frustrate the 
divine ideal, means that there can be no certainty that 
evil will eventually be overcome. However, there is 
ground for optimism in that up to the present God has 
prompted ever-richer forms of evolutionary advancement 
in the world, and in this continuity therein lies our 
hope for the future. 
Hence it would appear that within a belief 
structure which references everything to God, whether 
conceived of as a supreme divinity or a being of 
creativity, the notion of free-will is cited as a 
convincing explanation of moral evil. Although process 
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theology has solicited a free-will defence of a 
different character to classical theism,, the necessity 
to emphasise creaturely co-operation has made the 
concept of free-agency a positive and pivotal element. 
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Process and Buddhist Philosophy: 
Affinities and opposing views 
Before concluding this chapter I feel it is 
appropriate to reflect on the more recent insight and 
dialogue between process theology and Mahayana 
Buddhism. Many process theologians feel that there are 
striking affinities between Whiteheadian metaphysics 
and the modes of thought found in Mahayana Buddhism. 
John Cobb in particular, believes that the principles 
of universal relativity as conceptualised by a process 
philosophy, show a notable parallel with the Buddhist 
notion of dependent co-origination. He considers 
therefore that such parity provides a fruitful link for 
a more constructive appreciation of this fundamental 
notion of paticcasamupda. Moreover Cobb believes that 
such similarities afford a useful basis for 
contributing towards a more progressive Christian 
theology. (107) 
However, Masao Abe contends that although these 
two processes involve many likenesses, there is in fact 
a deep chasm which separates them. He claims that: 
it is important not to overlook the important 
differences, essential, fundamental and 
intrinsic, being deeply rooted in the 
structure of their ways of thinking, and of 
understanding reality. [ --- I There 
differences are not of degree, but of quality 
of nature and structure. (108) 
Abe acknowledges that the principles of universal 
relativity, as conceptualised by Whiteheadian 
metaphysics are similar to the Buddhist understanding 
that everything in the universe is interdependent and 
mutually conditioning. Nevertheless he questions 
whether process philosophy can fulfil the Buddhist 
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conviction that universal causality strictly applies to 
the essential interdependence of everything without 
exception. 
Abe argues that although Whitehead claims that all 
actualities are bi-polar by nature this characteristic 
of God's nature must be considered a distinguishing 
quality. Whereas Whitehead uses the terms "'actual 
entity" and "'actual occasion" synonymously he also 
claims that "the te= 'actual occasion' will always 
exclude God froza Its sccpe. (109) Thus God cannot be 
considered bi-polar in the same way as all other 
actualities. God's bi-polar nature is peculiar to God 
for although he is an actual entity, he is not an 
actual occasion. 
Abe also challenges a process perspective of 
universal relativity in relation to their concept of 
God's bi-polar nature. He explains that it might 
entail the rejection of absolute transcendence, yet 
this principle embodies two kinds of relativity. He 
considers that it is important to distinguish between 
them, in that the mutual independence between actual 
entities in the world is different in nature to the 
relative causality between God and the world. Although 
actual entities transcend God by virtue of their self- 
determining nature, God is more self-creative than all 
temporal entities, and thus transcends these 
actualities by reason of this perfection. 
Hence, despite his interaction with actual 
temporal entities, God is eternal and the principle of 
limitation upon all actual occasions. In this sense he 
is beyond the interdependence of everything in the 
temporal world. Such a vision of reality is 
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inconsistent with the Buddhist principle of mutual 
relatedness of all thingsf and the rejection of any 
notion of divine transcendence. Moreover Abe maintains 
that although process theology emphasises the mutual 
embodiment of God in the unfolding cosmic progression, 
there is still a trace of duality in relation to God's 
nature and activity in the world. 
The essence of Buddhist philosophical perception 
is to understand that there is nothing more "real" than 
the principles of dependent co-origination. The 
interdependence of everything in the universe is beyond 
the duality of transcendence and immanence and hence 
without any source of determination or limitation. 
Despite the intimate interaction between God and the 
world, by virtue of his bi-polar nature, he is 
nevertheless not an actual occasion but a non-temporal 
entity performing the function of persuasive influence 
on all temporal actualities. 
Clearly a Whiteheadian duality is minimised yet it 
still constitutes a two-fold structure of God's nature 
and activity in the world. The causal process of the 
universe is never experienced distinctly from the 
primordial creativity of the divine nature of God. In 
this respect therefore a process theology is lacking 
the realisation that ultimate reality must be grasped 
through the realisation of absolute emptiness in terms 
of sun_yata. Within Mahayana Buddhism "'nothingness" is 
not a relative concept to 'somethingness' but is 
completely non-dualistic. Thus nirvana is precisely 
this realisation of the total relativity of all things 
in the universe. Consequently Abe concludes that the 
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concepts of universal relativity as understood by 
process thought and Mahayana Buddhism, far from 
exhibiting a basic conformity display fundamental dis- 
similarities. In fact he asserts: ""in Mahayana 
Buddhism Ehptiness replaces God, including Whiteheads 
notion of God. Hence there is no issue of God and the 
world". (110) 
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Summary Comments 
God is undoubtedly regarded as the most primal 
consideration in classical Christian theology which 
asserts that communion with one's divine creator should 
evoke a desire to know and do God's will. Nevertheless 
this divine will can only be embraced through a 
relationship based on the ability of human beings to 
respond to God through the agency of freedom of choice. 
However, it has been argued that the freedom asserted 
by theistic philosophy, in which the sovereignty of God 
and the freedom of human beings is maintained as a 
means of explaining the enigma of evil and suffering, 
is based on precariously makeshift foundations. While 
traditional theology has attempted to make physical and 
moral evil intelligible through complex explanatory 
theories, process theism has denied that the accustomed 
understanding of God can produce a plausible theodicy. 
Process theology claims that its metaphysical 
system is more commensurate with a modern scientific 
worldview and therefore stands as a credible 
alternative to the traditional theodicy problem. 
Nevertheless many argue that process theism produces 
not only an anthropomorphic perspective of the world 
but a God who is ultimately too powerless to overcome 
temporal adversity. The fact that this is due to the 
corruption of human freedom within world events 
scarcely commends such a deity. Consequently they 
contend that, "this theodicy does not represent a real 
or fundamental advance over traditional theodicies at 
all-l-'. (111) Accordingly many scholars who dispute these 
theological assertions declare that the notion of free- 
will is used purely as "a philosopherfs technical te=" 
(112) on which to formulate their propositions. 
Moreover it is claimed to be merely a theoretical 
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superstructure devised by theologians with particular 
appeal to abstract reflection. 
The explicit question of free-will as a 
theoretical issue seems to have seldom been discussed 
by the Buddha in his teachings and rarely remarked upon 
in the Buddhist sutras. When the topic did arise it 
was from a practical view-point in connection with the 
issue of karma and therefore implicit in the notion of 
human responsibility and universal justice. (113) The 
existential reality of karma affords the necessity to 
relinquish all desires and attachments, and hence the 
attainment of nirvana is considered as the "awakening 
to egolessness" (114) which is beyond the duality of 
volitional activity. 
Hence one must be completely free from all 
conceptualisation for ultimate reality is a spontaneous 
freedom based on the realisation of the unconditioned 
nature of all things just as they are. Consequently in 
Buddhist thought, nirvana as the primary focus of the 
contemplative path, produces a radically different 
perception of free-will from that within Christian 
theism. Thus the goal for the Christian theist is to 
freely devote oneself to God by the true and honourable 
use of one's free-will. Buddhism however, points to the 
release of all volitional desires, for emancipation in 
nirvana is realised through the cessation of all such 
self-originating attachments. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE 
I am using the words "'classical" and 
"traditional" synonymously, to denote the long 
established doctrines and theology that have 
prevailed from Augustine and Aquinas, which are 
crucial to the beliefs and practices of the Roman 
Catholic and/or Protestant persuasions. 
Please see my comments in the Introduction to this 
thesis for a more comprehensive evaluation of the 
meaning that I have attributed to these words. 
2 George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. 1770-1831. 
He was a philosophical monist in that he believed 
that everything is interrelated within one vast 
complex system. Amongst many of his ideas are 
those of a panentheistic nature, in which he saw 
God as an essence needing to manifest himself in 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Within Their Specific Worldview, How Does a Notion of 
Free-will Relate to Each Tradition's Understanding of 
the Function of Grace? 
Preface 
The Christian understanding of God supports not 
only a belief in Divine Providential control and 
guidance, but this act also discloses the sustaining 
grace of God. Viewed as integral to the divine 
activity of God, grace is an unmerited gift that 
reflects his loving kindness, and is the means by which 
salvation is possible for all human beings. Thus it is 
asserted in the Pauline doctrine that, "they are 
justified by his grace as a gift". (1) Buddhism on the 
other hand has a very different view of the goal and 
nature of existence and the human condition. It does 
not seem, at first sight, that a perspective which is 
non-theistic in conception, in that it denies the 
merciful loving action of a personal God, can be 
reconciled with the inexorable law of universal 
causality and its concordant principle of dependent co- 
origination. 
Many without further reflection would therefore 
reject any notion of grace in the Buddhist tradition. 
It is certainly true that such a notion of grace 
defined in specific theistic terms would have to be 
denied. Consequently any idea of grace within the 
Buddhist tradition would have to be explored in a more 
speculative manner. However, presented otherwise than 
exclusively as a divine function, the notion of grace 
might then correspond to a whole dimension of spiritual 
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experiences. This chapter is therefore committed to 
exploring ways in which the function of grace can be 
considered a meaningful concept within both a Christian 
and Buddhist worldview. The intelligibility of a 
notion of free-will within their specific perspectives 
can then be questioned and evaluated. 
Hence within a theistic frame of reference, God's 
grace is the unsolicited act of benevolence and 
compassion bestowed on human beings irrespective of the 
merit of the recipient. Paradoxically however, it is 
not considered absolutely independent of any 
relationship to human effort, for spiritual grace has 
to be freely received. This crucial issue is 
succinctly expressed by Saint Thomas Aquinas, who 
maintains that: "it is the part of man to prepare his 
soul r --- I yet he does not do this without the help of 
God moving him [ --- 1111. (2) 
Consequently within Western Christendom, the 
status and contribution of human free-will has provoked 
considerable scholarly controversy throughout its 
history. It has therefore been encumberant on 
Christian theology to defend their claim, that it is 
through the exercise of human freedom to choose to have 
faith in God's providential loving care, that the 
favour of divine grace can be appropriated to make that 
salvation effective. 
The changing and perduring aspects of these 
polemics have illustrated the essential significance of 
this Christian doctrine. It was the ethical challenge 
in the fifth century CE., with the full-scale 
controversy between Augustine and Pelagius, which first 
provoked meticulous theological debates. Although 
specific difficulties were freshly debated, with the 
need to explain the role of grace and predestination 
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and their actions upon human free-will, it was 
essentially the Augustinian theological paradigm that 
prevailed. The Reformation, and later the 
Enlightenment heralding the Age of Reason, rekindled 
these old controversies. There is no doubt that debates 
on the problem caused by the triad of divine grace, 
human free-will and predestination have been pertinent 
to theological discussion up to the present. 
Clearly within the Buddhist worldview, the context 
of a dhamma-ka=a cause and effect, which rigidly 
governs moral justice, would seem to leave scant 
grounds for the notion of grace as a divine function, 
at least in Christian terms. Indeed the Buddha strongly 
recommended the jiriki self-power approach to the 
dhamma, (3) where reliance on one's own efforts was 
expressed in karmic dispensation. (4) Hence redemption 
was not to be achieved through sanctifying, gratuitous, 
divine grace. The path to enlightenment was through 
rational self-confidence and valid experience, not 
through credulous faith in the favour or merit of a 
metaphysical power. 
However, beneath the initial grace-faith negation, 
there is to be found in the Buddhist tradition 
significant elements of grace. Possibly the key to 
understanding the meaning of grace in a Buddhist 
context, is to examine the doctrines and the manner of 
application which have determined the nature of their 
attitudes and responses. "'We axe not in this mattex, 
dealing with an abstract and neutral theorem". (5) 
Consequently this chapter will firstly reflect on the 
life of the Buddha as a supreme means of grace; for 
embodying the Buddhist ideal of karuna, a deep love and 
compassion for all beings, the Buddha was intent on 
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serving all humanity towards the path of religious 
practice and spiritual growth. 
There is little doubt that as the Mahayana 
tradition evolved it developed an elaborate Buddhology. 
The cults of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas can be considered 
as characterising the function of grace, for the 
Bodhisattva path is the very charter of grace. The vow 
of self-sacrifice to share his accumulated merit with 
those bound by the powers of samsara, and his unselfish 
devotion to facilitate their liberation, introduced the 
idea of universal salvation into the tradition. Thus 
this appreciably different understanding of human 
destiny in respect to ka=a and emancipation requires 
examination. If the Bodhisattva ideal serves to 
mitigate for the apparent inflexibility of the law of 
karma, then this must also have significant 
consequences for the notion of human autonomy. 
Within the Mahayana traditions in China and Japan 
the celebrated tariki or Jodomon "'easy path" of the 
Pure Land sects developed. Providing a foundation of 
compassion, this doctrine promotes progress to 
salvation and buddhahood by requiring only a devotional 
attitude and faith in Amitabha Buddha. This would seem 
to suggest that karmic reality is suspended, for 
Amitabhals saving power as a channel of grace fulfils 
all desires of those in the Happy Land(Sukhavati). It 
is necessary therefore to consider the implications of 
this doctrine. It is questionable whether the notion 
of human free effort has any significance if the all 
powerful principle of cause and effect has become 
subservient to the ideals of mercy and benevolence. 
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Theocentric Providence 
The concept of grace is one of the principal areas 
that has helped to shape the Christian understanding of 
God and develop the notion of a personal, providential 
presence. Thus the classical Christian perspective is 
of a God whose divine activity of government, guidance 
and benevolent care is demonstrated in his loving 
kindness as the unmerited act of grace. (6) In 
theological terms, divine grace denotes God's mercy to 
human beings, experienced as this unsolicited gift of 
grace, in order to effect their sanctification and 
redemption. This gratuitous act is demonstrated in the 
atoning love of Christ; in which God took upon himself 
the rejection of humankind and all its consequences, so 
that the sinful condition of human beings could be 
redeemed. God's grace therefore permits and provides 
justification for, mankind's participation in his own 
divine glory and the attainment of eternal life. 
Understood as the indwelling of God within the 
soul, divine grace gratuitously given, can neither be 
constrained or claimed by mankind. (7) However, as the 
reality of God's self-communication to human beings, it 
can only be received by recognition of one's own 
unworthiness. God's creatures must freely accept and 
preserve their Creator's indispensable gift of 
sanctifying grace, in order to prepare for the state of 
justification and the reward of an eternal destiny with 
God. Hence the world is viewed as an abundantly 
providential place whereby the sustaining favour of 
God's grace provides the means to withstand life's 
misfortunes. Consequently this facilitates the 
development of one's character rather than necessarily 
eliminating the suffering. (8) In this way traditional 
theology has been able to assert providential 
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dependence on God as a sustaining power while 
disclaiming that this initiative destroys the essential 
freedom and responsibility of human beings to the 
concept of salvation. 
Those that forcefully reject the notion of 
providential control and guidance as the activity of 
God, maintain that it cannot be reconciled with genuine 
human autonomy. They assert, that if the universe is 
governed by a God who can make not only decisions, but 
has ultimate control over human actions, then this 
undermines the credibility of belief in human freedom 
of choice and responsibility for one's actions. (9) 
Nevertheless Christian theism upholds the conviction 
that, without God's grace, we would turn away from our 
divine creator, for we are not naturally capable of 
performing meritorious acts adequate to the attainment 
of eternal bliss with God. Thus every free moral 
action becomes a saving act through the gratuitous gift 
of sanctifying grace for, "we must declare our own 
freedom to be a grace of God". (10) While critics 
declare that if God's help is needed to sustain human 
liberty then man's autonomy is not assured, theology 
contends that the parallel truths of human free-will 
and the need for God's gracious help have been 
maintained. Scholarly debate still seeks to reconcile 
these two seemingly incompatible viewpoints. 
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Theological Origins 
The general ambience of first century Christianity 
and Pauline theology in particular, was one in which 
divine grace pervaded all their thoughts and actions. 
For Paul God's charis made explicit in Christ, bestowed 
not only forgiveness of sin but the hope of redemption 
and reconciliation with God in eternity. (11) The 
message therefore was to respond to God's bestowal of 
grace; to pray at the throne of grace and through his 
grace to prepare for redemption and the hope of life 
everlasting beyond the grave. Thus Paul entreated 
believers to: "approach the throne of grace with 
confidence, so that we may receive mercy and find grace 
to help us in our time of need". (12) 
Whereas Paul's theology did not dwell on any 
inconsistency in the relationship between divine grace 
and human free-will, by the second century a marked 
tension had emerged between Eastern and Western 
thought. For the Greek Fathers of the Hellenistic world 
free-will was taken for granted. Consequently the 
developing theology of the Eastern Empire reinforced 
the autonomous powers of human nature, while 
emphasising that God's saving grace enlightened and 
instructed the intellect. God's divine plan and 
presence was finding particular expression through the 
liturgy and the gift of divine grace was celebrated 
through the sacrament of worship. 
Divergent paths were undeniable as the Western 
mind increasingly emphasised the Hebrew concept of 
humanity's total dependence on God. (13) As early as 
Tertullian (c. 160-C. 225), often regarded as the Father 
of Latin theology, the predominant view of grace was 
that of the action of a divine quasi-physical force or 
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energy. This inspired righteousness in human beings 
who in response would be rewarded with immortality in 
an after-life. 
However, there was a lack of consistency among the 
early Church Fathers as to the degree of emphasis that 
should be put on mankind's dependency on the will of 
God. Jerome, one of the most influential biblical 
scholars in the early Christian church, writing in the 
middle of the fourth century, asserted that God's grace 
would perfect the efforts that man had freely 
determined: "Xt is for God to call, and for us to 
believe". (14) Ambrose, Bishop of Milan and a 
contemporary of Jerome, was also of this opinion: "Un 
evexything the Lord's power co-operates with man's 
efforts". (15) Shades of predestination creep into his 
theology however, when he expresses the belief that 
God's sanctifying grace is not bestowed as a reward for 
meritorious acts but, '"simply according to the will of 
the Giver". (16) 
The late fourth century theologian, John 
Chrysostom, emphasised a characteristically Eastern 
perspective by laying great stress on God's grace, but 
setting human virtue alongside it as a crucial factor 
in man's salvation. He firmly stated: 
for example it 
sinners should 
secondaxy will 
should perish. 
matter of inev 
will. (17) 
is God -s primary wi 11 tha t 
not perish; it is his 
that those who do become evil 
For their punishment is not a 
itable necessity but of God's 
Writing about the same time Gregory of Nyssa, in 
his %%CatecheLical Orations-, was not only developing an 
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argument which freed God from the responsibility of 
evil in terms of human free-will, but was also 
formulating his theology for God's redemptive grace. 
He emphasised that human free-will was, "the most 
excellent and precious form of goodness", yet this gift 
of liberty gives the human will the facility, "'to 
choose what pleases it, God is not the cause of your 
present evil state. He provided you with a free and 
independent nature, it is your folly that has chosen 
the worse instead of the better". (18) 
Thus fourth century Patristic reasoning had 
highlighted the tension caused by stressing humankind's 
fallen state and subsequent need of divine guidance and 
mercy while firmly asserting a belief in man's free- 
will and moral responsibility. The status and 
contribution of human autonomy was progressively 
becoming an issue of contention. Conflict was 
unavoidable and indeed flared into a full scale 
controversy in the fifth century; the subtlety of this 
relationship was then vouchsafed to Saint Augustine to 
explain. 
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Augustine on Grace 
Nowhere in the heritage of Christian theism is the 
ambiguous nature of providential power and grace 
explored more comprehensively than in the doctrines of 
Saint Augustine, who sought to reconcile an insistence 
on the necessity of genuine freedom of choice with 
divine foreknowledge, predestination and grace. He was 
convinced that without God's grace human beings were 
unable to avoid sin and do good. (19) God's help was 
therefore necessary to arouse our hearts to act in a 
worthwhile manner. Augustine spoke of, "a cruel 
necessity of sinningl, (20) maintaining that although 
our choices were freely made we were psychologically 
disposed to wayward action, human beings having lost 
the liberum arbitrium to good. 
Thus the operation of grace was positive and 
forceful, working by, "aiding our mental sight" (21) 
and acting, "upon the will and actions directly". (22) 
The power of grace therefore counteracted the specific 
effects of sinful human nature, providing human beings 
with the will to will good. So for Augustine divine 
grace was absolutely necessary for, "without God's help 
we cannot by freewill overcome the temptations of this 
life". (23) It was only through the aid of grace 
therefore, that one could by the exercise of human 
free-will consistently choose to do good. This was the 
"'grace of regeneration" whereby all past sins were 
washed away. Any future sinning would then not count 
against one's salvation providing the will to do good 
was there. 
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Early in the fifth century while compiling his "Ad 
Simplicianum", in which he contemplated this 
theological enigma, a Celtic monk by the name of 
Pelagius was promoting a theology which was 
diametrically opposed to Augustine's doctrine of human 
nature. Believing in the fallen nature of human 
beings, Augustine asserted that mankind was, "a lump of 
sin" whose sinfulness was incapable of reversal except 
through God's divine grace. All good deeds were 
therefore due to this gratuitous benevolence, and 
consequently Augustine accredited the responsibility 
for humankind's redemption wholly to gratia gratis 
da ta. 
Pelagius did not intend heresy, but he was 
convinced that the ability to make free choices for 
good or evil a fundamental quality of human nature. In 
particular he found Augustine's prayer,, ""give what thou 
commandest, and command what t]2ou vilt" (24)disturbing. 
This seemed to undermine the ability of human beings to 
act as moral agents and contribute to their own 
salvation. If mankind was solely controlled by divine 
grace then he saw no merit in God's retributive 
justice. The underlying basis for this belief was the 
claim made in Deuteronomy, "I have set before you life 
and death, blessings and curses. Now choose life, so 
that you and your children may livel. (25) 
Thus the idea of unconditional free-will to choose 
one's actions and take responsibility for those 
decisions was given scriptural endorsement. Pelagius 
therefore regarded divine grace as God's loving 
bountifulness to assist and perfect human potentiality. 
He acknowledged that God's grace was necessary, "not 
Only every hour and every moment, but in every act- 
(26). He rejected however, the suggestion that God's 
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sovereignty limited human autonomy, or that there was 
any special inducement on man's will to choose the 
good, for this would restrict the action of grace. 
A clash was inevitable and Augustine condemned his 
propositions as dangerous apostasy. Indeed the 
Pelagius controversy vilified this contemporary of 
Augustine into one of the most denounced heretics of 
the Christian church. Augustine contended that, to 
believe that virtue was obtainable through one's own 
efforts contradicted the principle that God was the 
source of all goodness. He argued that God's grace was 
necessary to release the will from a nature that had 
forfeit the ability to choose the good. 
Moreover Pelagius' theory made nonsense of infant 
baptism, which was necessary to counteract the original 
sin that distorted one's very nature. Augustine 
believed that baptism was a divinely instituted 
sacrament, without which a human being could not begin 
along his spiritual path. Baptism therefore wiped the 
slate clean, so that through the aid of grace one could 
freely choose the good, and thereby receive 
sanctification. 
Pelagius however, rejected the claim that sin was 
an organic, inherent quality of humankind, but was 
primarily a characteristic of individual human actions 
which could be performed or suppressed. He maintained 
that an infant was not born with a congenital fault 
asserting that, "before he begins exercising his willf 
there is only in him what God has created, ". (27) Thus 
Pelagius taught that adult baptism was certainly 
necessary for their regeneration, but for babies who 
had been born as enlightened beings baptism was purely 
benedictory. 
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Furthermore Pelagius developed his "'doctrine of 
impeccantia", whereby he envisaged the possibility of 
attaining moral perfection solely through human free 
endeavour. Indeed, ', ', a man can if he will, obsez-ve 
God's commanchnents without sinning", (28) for unless we 
willed to do wrong we did not commit any sin. This 
notion was strongly condemned by Augustine however, who 
insisted that through Adam's sin humankind was 
inherently damaged. To refrain from sinning one needed 
the active mercy and assistance of divine grace. 
Augustine's theological interpretation prevailed 
and the Council of Carthage in 418CE. outlawed 
Palagianism in unambiguous terms. Divine grace was 
declared to be indispensable, not a discretionary extra 
to accomplish more easily that which one could achieve 
through one's own virtue or merit. When in 431CE. at 
the Council of Ephesis the Pelagian doctrines were 
finally anathematised, there was no further serious 
ethical challenge to Augustine's orthodoxy concerning 
human nature until the days of the Reformation. 
The Pelagian controversy had however raised a 
number of apparent contradictions in Augustine's 
doctrines. Many people found it increasingly difficult 
to reconcile his beliefs concerning free-will with the 
operation of divine grace. The two doctrines seemed to 
be incompatible, for eternal salvation could not be 
both recompense for a virtuous life and the free gift 
of grace. Such gratuitous action by God must clearly 
restrict human freedom of choice. 
Nevertheless Augustine claimed that there was no 
paradox in these doctrines and in his treatise "On 
Grace and Freewill" written in 426-427CE. he responded 
to such allegations. He stressed that it had to be 
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understood that all meritorious deeds prompted by the 
grace of God were accomplished by an autonomous act of 
our will. It was however God's bountiful providence 
which had made this free action possible. (29) 
Over the years Augustine gradually came to the 
opinion that humanbeings contributed very little to 
their own salvation. He attributed the choosing to do 
good acts more and more to the gift of God, and less 
and less to any human effort. Furthermore he became 
increasingly convinced that human beings were not able 
to earn divine favour, as all good deeds were 
themselves the effect of God's free gift. In his book 
"The Gift of Perseverance", Augustine therefore 
concluded that, ""if all good things cam from God, how 
could a man do something good by himself? " (30) 
In addition he developed the belief that divine 
grace was a direct action of God to those of his 
choosing. Thus God prepared some as suitable 
beneficiaries of grace, with the capacity of willing 
good actions irrespective of any autonomous human 
response. These were God's elect, those predestined to 
be rescued from the consequences of their sins. (31) He 
meticulously worked out an explanation which would 
reconcile predestination and grace with the necessity 
to preserve human self-determination, concluding that, 
"predestination is a preparation for grace". (32) 
Hence Augustine's doctrine of predestination 
presupposed God's prescience. He asserted in "The Cit 
of God" that, "he whose foreknowledge is infallible, 
foreknew that we would do it". (33) Yet, "there are 
things which God foresees, but which he himself does 
not intend to bring about". (34) He insisted that it 
was because God foreknew all actions that would come 
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about in the future, that he predestined certain souls 
for eternal destiny with Him. Through the operation of 
his grace therefore God's intentions were made 
effective, while still preserving human freedom of 
choice. 
God's grace gave the initiative to those he had 
chosen for election to freely choose to do good deeds. 
To those human beings not amongst the elect God granted 
only "sufficient" grace, which they would freely 
disregard choosing to disobey the call of God. Those 
chosen by God to be justified God provided 
"efficacious" grace, which inclined the will to 
voluntarily consent to choose virtuous action. (35) 
Consequently Augustine was able to maintain that there 
was no antithesis between the doctrine of God's 
foreknowledge, predestination and the operation of 
free-will. 
His rationale claimed that, although God clearly 
had knowledge of a human being's propensity to sin, 
this did not prevent the free act of the will. 
Moreover the power to will good acts was prompted by 
the divine grace of God. Hence the freedom of choice 
of those pre-ordained by God were according to 
Augustine,, 'I'Imore free than the will of the 
un egenerated man". (36) The gift of God's sustaining 
grace enabled the will to give up the freedom to do 
evil and to regain its unspoiled freedom to do good. 
There is little doubt that in the latter years of 
his life Augustine had developed a very severe 
interpretation of predestination. Although this most 
extreme form was anathematised as abhorrent at the 
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Council of Arausiacum in 529CE. the influence of his 
doctrines prevailed. However, the paradoxical nature 
of Augustine's teachings concerning the relationship 
between human free-will and the grace and 
predestination of God, remained the principle focus for 
polemic debate for many centuries. (37) 
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The Continuing Debate 
These specific difficulties continued to be 
pertinent to the medieval theologians, who debated 
afresh the problems of the role of grace and 
predestination with their actions upon human free-will. 
However, essentially the Augustinian doctrinal 
explanations were accepted. Saint Anselm of Bec(1033- 
1109), in his "De Concordia" composed towards the end 
of his life, reinforced Augustine's assertion that evil 
willing was entirely due to human nature, while all 
virtuous actions could only be achieved through the 
assistance of divine grace. Saint Anselm maintained 
therefore that human autonomy was not overridden by 
grace, because good resolve naturally concurred with 
the will of God. 
Bernard of Clairvaux(1090-1153CE)the great 
Cistercian abbot of the early twelfth century, while 
not always agreeing with Anslem's reasoning, 
nevertheless endorsed his claim concerning the 
indispensability of grace. He firmly asserted that 
both God's gratuitous benevolence and human freedom of 
choice were necessary to effect one's redemption. 
Exhibiting the need for logical reasoning to underpin 
his argument, he maintained that if human autonomy was 
revoked, then there were no souls to be saved. 
Similarly without God's divine grace there was no way 
of effecting this salvation. 
Hence he asserted: 
Grace is necessary to salvation, freewill 
equally so- but grace in order to give 
salvation, freewill in order to receive it. 
Therefore we should not attribute part of the 
good to work of grace and part to freewill; 
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it is performed in its entirety by the common 
and inseparable action of both; entirely by 
grace, entirely by freewill, but springing 
from the first in the second. (38) 
Bernard explained that the human will retained three 
kinds of freedom; that which was man's by nature, that 
which was given by God's grace, and that which human 
beings would receive in eternity. (39) 
Although Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century 
defended his opinion that mankind possessed the 
potential to seek goodness and truth, he nevertheless 
emphasised that human beings had to freely turn to 
their divine Creator. However, God as the Prime Mover 
of all things was the only one who could transform the 
transgressor. He concluded therefore that: "infused 
grace healed the soul, giving power to will the good, 
granting perseverance, and finally conducting to 
eternal glox-y". (40) 
It was during the time of the Reformation that the 
old controversies of how to reconcile God's 
foreknowledge, election and divine grace with human 
self-determination were rekindled. Martin Luther, 
taking an Augustinian position concerning the nature of 
grace, promoted his theology of justification by faith. 
Grace was essentially the mercy of God presented 
through the sacrifice of Jesus Christ, and thus 
experienced primarily as forgiveness for one's sins. 
To have faith in the saving mercy of God therefore was 
to have divine grace. (41) In this manner justifying 
grace was once more set beyond the control of human 
motivation and a reward for virtuous endeavour. 
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At this time, Calvinistic theology also endorsed 
the belief that mankind could not achieve anything by 
its own merit. Salvation was due solely to the actions 
of a gracious God. In 1536 John Calvin published the 
first edition of his "Ch-ristianae Relicrionis 
Inst: itutio" in which he set out his principle teachings 
on the question of predestination. He stated: 
[I all are not created in equal condition; 
rather, eternal life is fore-ordained for 
some eternal damnation for others. 
Therefore, as any man has been created to one 
or other of these ends we speak of him as 
predestined to life or to death. (42) 
In both the Lutheran and Calvinistic doctrines the 
paradoxical nature of their theology is apparent; it is 
necessary to work at achieving a salvation which can 
only come through God's gracious election. (43) 
Hence the centuries that followed leading up to 
the Enlightenment became a time of rigorous theological 
debate concerning the nature of divine grace, 
predestination and human autonomy. In their need to 
find an adequate explanation for this problem polemics 
focused on a range of perspectives. While some 
theories exaggerated human autonomy, and hence exposed 
an inadequate theology of divine prescience, others 
neglected to take seriously the doctrine of original 
sin, and consequently did not preserve the sanctity of 
divine grace. 
The Enlightenment sought to transform religious 
understanding by viewing it as a facet of reason. 
Certain nineteenth century philosophers saw no 
necessity to sustain any separation of grace from human 
nature or existence. (44) However, whilst a twentieth 
century theology of grace no longer supports a Lutheran 
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belief in grace as the change in God's will, or as 
confirmed by the Council of Trent in the mid sixteenth 
century, as a divine power agitating within human minds 
and wills, it does firmly assert its underlying reality 
as the presence of God. 
To evaluate the Christian doctrine of grace it has 
been necessary to explore its historical heritage, for 
it illustrates the importance of this theological 
problem throughout the Church's history. The potency of 
an Augustinian legacy is unmistakably evident in 
Christian theism's current interpretation of a doctrine 
of providential grace. This firmly endorses the claim 
that the ability of human beings to respond freely to 
their Creator is not removed. 
Grace therefore as the loving will of God is not 
interpreted as a speculative reference, but as an act 
of faith in which Christian theists are said to abide 
or dwell as a response to the gift of divine grace. 
This faith is further rooted in the wider belief that 
God's sustaining power acts in the lives of 
individuals, opening up the potential to transcend the 
ordinary existential experiences of frequent pain and 
suffering: ", as the patient, luminous, inviting presence 
of a transcendent God, intimately active in the pain 
and glox-y of life". (45) 
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The Buddha as a Supreme Means of Grace 
It is pertinent to re-emphasise at this stage that 
Buddhism rejects the idea of a divine saviour who will 
redeem human beings through his gratuitous providence. 
However, it is possible to interpret the entire life of 
the Buddha as a sheer act of grace. The Buddha can be 
seen to exemplify an active compassion for all 
beings, (46) in that he offers the highest degree of 
assistance, counsel and inspiration that could 
conceivably be extended to another human being seeking 
salvation. 
His motivation was truly altruistic, in that he 
was devoted to sharing his insight with a benevolence 
and concern for others' well-being, which inspired them 
to follow his teachings towards enlightenment. As one 
ready for Buddhahood he need not have consented to 
being reborn in human form, or to have remained on 
earth after attaining enlightenment. (47) Yet out of 
compassion, and intent on serving humanity who were 
beset by the anguish and suffering of samsaric 
existence, he persisted in this world so as to expound 
the healing truths which would bring liberation from a 
life characterised by ignorance and delusion. 
The function of the Buddha as a spiritual master 
can surely be acknowledged therefore as a genuine 
channel of grace. In the Pali Canon there are numerous 
references to the Buddha's very special kind of 
sympathy(anukampa) and active compassion(karunna). (48) 
While teaching a group of monks the Buddha explained in 
the " AnquLtara Nikava" that: 
there is one individual who arose and came to 
be for the welfare of the multitude, for the 
happiness of the multitudes, out of sympath_v 
for the world; for the benefit, welfare, and 
happiness of gods and humans. Who is that 
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one individual? The Harmonious One, the 
Perfectly Enlightened One. (49) 
Although the powerful teaching of the dha=a 
offered a supreme quality of inspiration to his 
disciples, the Buddha would still have insisted that 
those who were prepared to help themselves only 
appropriated this assistance. Liberation could only be 
gained through one's own efforts to follow the truths 
of the dha=a. Human beings had to freely choose their 
own path to follow, and thereby work out their own 
salvation. Merely relying on the Buddha's gracious, 
benevolent sustainment was not sufficient. 
Throughout the Buddhist world in both the 
Theravada and Mahayana traditions, images of the Buddha 
making the " earth-touching" (bhumi-sparsha) gesture 
are to be found. This classical form portrays the 
Buddha's right hand pointing downwards towards the 
earth, characterising the realm of human existence with 
its temptations, delusions and desires. The left hand 
is turned upwards towards heaven and is supporting a 
begging bowl. These two gestures displayed by the 
Buddha's image epitomise the essence of humankind's 
spiritual needs. Thus in the same way that a monk must 
be content to accept and acknowledge the free gifts of 
daily sustenance, human beings must be willing to 
receive the gift of grace freely given by the Buddha to 
inspire, refresh and aid their ineffectual powers of 
discipline. 
Many would support Marco Pallis' claim that, the 
sacred ikon is a manifestation of the grace of the 
Buddha, it emanates from his supra-human power--' . (50) 
He goes on to suggest that, whatever serves as a 
reminder of enlightenment or assists in keeping one's 
attention on the path of religious practice, must 
surely be a means of grace. Moreover the beneficiaries 
of this channel of grace are not restricted to those 
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disciples who were present for his teaching. All 
disciples who depend on the Buddha's instructive 
teaching and follow the dha=a, can experience the path 
which leads towards the realisation of ni-rvana. (51) 
It is apparent that the Buddha as a channel of 
grace can inspire faith, not as religious devotion in 
his supreme powers, but as a rational belief that 
provides both an intellectual basis and volitional 
perception for spiritual growth. In the "Milindapanha- 
it states: "faith, as it is uprising, extixpates 
the(five) hindrances and thought that is without 
hindrances is clear, pure serene". (52) Again the 
"Milindapanha, " suggests that it is the gracious, 
benevolent assistance of the Buddha which encourages 
this 'leap forward', whereby one adopts the appropriate 
behaviour, and cultivates the discipline necessary to 
following the path which leads to enlightenment. 
However, to place one's reliance on the 
Enlightened One is not sufficient. The Buddha cannot 
remove human beings from the unsatisfactoriness of 
their cyclical existence in the same way as a thorn can 
be plucked from the flesh; without a co-operative 
effort nothing can be achieved. 
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The Bodhisattva Ideal 
The bodhisattva doctrine is an essential 
characteristic of the Mahayana tradition, and in its 
ideal manifests an intrinsic quality of grace. 
Although the notion of the bodhisattva is not entirely 
absent in the Theravada tradition, the Pali literature 
merely designates the term as a buddha-to-be. Thus the 
subject of the "Jataka"' stories is a description of the 
self-sacrificing deeds of Sakyamuni in all his previous 
lives, as he perfected himself for enlightenment and 
buddhahood. (53) 
This path was rigorous, requiring total dedication 
and extraordinary spiritual energy throughout many 
lives of self-discipline. It was therefore considered 
the domain of a small, exclusive number of beings. 
Consequently the appearance of a buddha in the world 
was pronounced, "as rare as the appearance cýf the 
udumbaz-a blossom". (54) Liberation for most sentient 
beings entailed insight into the truths of the dharma 
as discovered and taught by the Buddha. Through the 
realisation of these truths one became a s-ravakas or 
"listener", and aspired to arhatship as a truly 
enlightened being. 
The early schools of the Hinayana tradition 
therefore endorsed the belief that emancipation was 
exclusively one's own responsibility. The indelible 
mark of each human being's karmic destiny could only be 
subdued by making scrupulous efforts to follow a 
disciplined and spiritual path. Any function of grace, 
as inspired by the Buddha's benevolent concern for the 
welfare of all beings, did not mitigate for the 
predominant individualism of the religious path to 
salvation. 
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However, by the commencement of the Common Era the 
Mahayanist tradition considered that the spiritual path 
of arhatship, characterised by self-centred concern for 
personal salvation, was fundamentally selfish and 
impassionate. Arhatship seemed to encompass an 
incomplete insight into the nature of reality, and 
consequently was distinctly inferior to that of 
buddhahood. Furthermore it was recognised that human 
beings caught up in the irrefragable principle of karma 
and the never-ending cycle of samsara, could do little 
towards their own liberation. There was a need for 
something which yielded to the sheer misery of 
continual rebirths. 
Thus the Mahayana texts proposed that the 
spiritual goal of enlightenment should entail a 
selfless compassion for others, in that truly perfected 
beings should devote all their powers to assisting the 
spiritual welfare of suffering mortals towards 
liberation. The career of the bodhisattva consequently 
evolved with the resolution to postpone his own 
liberation and to remain in the world exercising pity 
and compassionate concern for all sentient beings, 
sharing in the afflictions and misery of their samsaric 
existence. 
It has to be acknowledged that certain texts have 
generated a measure of confusion concerning the 
bodhisattva practice of postponing or "turning back"' 
from their own enlightenment, until all human beings 
have been liberated. In the "Pancavimsati Sutras-" 
there would seem to be an apparent prima facie 
incoherence. It is stated: 
through this skill in means will 1, for the 
sake of all beings, experience that pain of 
the hells [ --- I until these beings have won 
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niz-vana. Afterwards I will, for the sake of 
my own self, know full enlightenment. (55) 
However, according to Tibetan scholars such texts 
should not be taken literally, for they are almost 
certainly the mistranslation from Sanskrit into other 
tongues. (56) It is stated quite categorically in 
Tibetan practice, that a bodhisattva always directs his 
merit from virtuous deeds towards enlightenment and 
obtaining full buddhahood. 
Notwithstanding however, within the two traditions 
distinct paths of religious practice emerged. Whilst 
the elder Theravadin tradition emphasised the spiritual 
route of the sravakayana towards self-liberation, the 
Mahayana conception of bodhisattvayana, stressing the 
notion of universal salvation, gradually took root. 
Thus through self-sacrifice and selfless devotion, the 
bodhisattva vowed to exert himself for the spiritual 
benefit of suffering human beings, and to turn over all 
merit attained as a reward for spiritual endeavours to 
aid their path towards enlightenment. In the 
"Perfection of Wisdom Treatise"' the bodhisattva 
expresses the sentiments that: ""by the Mex-it of my 
charitable deeds, may I become the guide and saviour of 
the world,, which is lost in the wilderness of mundane 
existence. I wish to accomplish the good of 
othersff. (57) 
Moreover in the "Saddharmapundarika Sutra-(Lotus 
Sutra) there is the insistence that all who hear the 
truth of the dharma, and believe faithfully in its 
teachings, will eventually become buddhas. All mortal 
beings are in fact a manifestation of the 
Dharmakaya(58) reflected in individuals as bodhi or 
intellect. Thus through insight into this truth, as 
fully enlightened beings we are in essence of one 
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nature with the ultimate reality, which underlies all 
phenomenal existence. 
There would seem little doubt that an essential 
characteristic of the bodhisattva ideal, in his vow to 
donate the merit of his exemplary deeds for the benefit 
of all sentient beings, was to mitigate for the 
inflexibility of the law of ka-rma, and stress universal 
salvation. It is the "superior intention" of all 
bodhisattvas filled with compassion and love, to make 
the vow to,, "'undertake the task of liberating all 
beings froza suffering; this is solely my duty and 
. responsibility". (59) The traditional doctrines of the 
Pali Canon however, had promoted a purely 
individualistic application to the karmic principle. 
The merit or demerit produced by one's actions were 
strictly personal, and it was impossible to escape the 
consequences of these deeds. The teachings of the 
"Sutta Nipata"' firmly asserted that,, "no-one's karma is 
lost; it comes back and its owner meets it. The Ebol, 
who does evil, himselE experiences the pain in the 
other world". (60) 
The question arises therefore, if personal 
responsibility is assumed by the bodhisattva for the 
spiritual welfare, progress and final release of all 
sentient beings from the cycle of samsara, then this 
must surely constitute a charter of grace that renders 
the notion of self-endeavour and self-determination 
meaningless? Clearly the Mahayana tradition had 
abrogated the uncompromising individualism of the old 
law of karma and its consequences, and replaced it with 
a principle of pity and compassion. This process of 
parinamana or the "transfer of merit", took root 
therefore as a response to the existential needs of the 
Indian peopler who could no longer tolerate the harsh 
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implications of their transgressions and the penalties 
of this moral principle. 
The essential nature of all bodhisattvas which 
constitutes their very essence is the "intelligence- 
heart" or the concept of bodhicitta. This is the vital 
karuna(loving compassion) and prajna(intelligence- 
wisdom) which is present in all human hearts, yet in 
lesser mortals it lies dormant debilitated by the 
tarnish of worldly existence. (61) Nagarjuna in his 
"Discourse on the Transcendentall_v of the Bodhicitta" 
claims that: 
one who understands the nature of the 
Bodhicitta sees everything with a loving 
heart, for love is the essence of the 
Bodhicitta. The Bodhicitta is the highest 
essence. Therefore, all Bodhisattvas find 
their raison d'&tre of existence in this 
great loving heart. (62) 
In the aspiring bodhisattva, this intelligence- 
heart has been awakened by contemplating the misery of 
human lives in temporal existence. The awakening mind, 
inspired with spiritual energy, accordingly desires the 
virtues necessary to help other human beings to 
enlightenment. Hence the bodhisattva truly motivated 
to suffer himself in order to aid the liberation of 
fellow-beings, proceeds to make his vow(pranidhana) to 
practice the bodhisattva path through infinite series 
of rebirths. (63) 
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Shantideva one of the most eminent scholars of the 
early eighth century, praises the awakening mind of 
bodhicitta in his great spiritual treatise the 
"Bodhicaryavatara" (The Path of Enlightenment): 
It is like the supreme gold-making elixir, 
For it transfozmLs the unclean body we have 
taken 
Into the priceless jewel of a Buddha-Form. 
Therefore firmly seize this Awakening Mind. 
How can I fathom the depths 
Of the goodness of this jewel of mind, 
The panacea that relieves the world of pain 
And is the source of all its joy? (64) 
Clearly the power of the bodhicitta can be 
considered a function of grace through which the 
bodhisattva assist all human beings engulfed in the 
world of ignorance, delusion and suffering. In his 
book "Meaningful To Behold"', Geshe Kelsang Gyatso says 
of the bodhicitta: 
where is there a virtue comparable to the 
bodhicitta, the mind of enlightenm nt that 
dispels the confusion of all beings, 
eradicates their suffering and bestows upon 
them boundless joy? Where is there a friend 
equal to the precious bodhicitta who 
accomplishes all benefits and prevents all 
ha=? (6 5) 
There would seem to be little doubt that the 
bodhisattva path reveals a very specific charter of 
grace, of which the bodhicitta concept is a function of 
that gracious loving heart. Geshe Kelsang Gyatso 
maintains however, that a bodhisattva might resolve to 
work for the salvation of all human beings by leading 
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them along the path to enlightenmentf but without a co- 
operative endeavour nothing can be achieved. If human 
beings are not prepared to exert the necessary effort, 
or do not undertake to follow the path offered to them, 
they will remain secured within cyclical existence: 
further endorsement that it is not sufficient to rely 
merely on an enlightened being. 
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The Development of Mahayana Buddhology 
As the Mahayana tradition developed, an elaborate 
buddhology also evolved disclosing the function of a 
"heavenly sangha of buddhas and bodhisattvas". (66) The 
conception of the bodhisattva ideal, with its emphasis 
on merciful benevolence and universal salvation, had 
been projected into the world of samsaric existence, 
posing the question: If the true ideal was that of 
bodhisattvahood, then why did Gautama Buddha not remain 
one instead of becoming a buddha and passing into 
nirvana? 
This paradox was explained in the Doctrine of 
Trika_va, and constitutes one of the most significant 
differences between the earlier Pali literature and the 
Mahayana texts. Hence Mahayana Buddhism proclaimed the 
notion of the three ka_vas or "'bodies of buddhahood", 
which as manifestations of the Dha=aka_va were in 
essence all expression of one eternal truth. It was 
this doctrine therefore which bridged the gap between 
the human Gautama Buddha and the eternal absolute of 
the dharmaka_ya. Also considered as the "'three mansions 
of enlightenment", it was as the third 
body(nirmanakaya), an avataric projection into the 
world, that the Buddha assumed an earthly form as the 
human Gautama in response to the spiritual needs of all 
sentient beings. 
The nirmanakaya was however purely an enamation of 
the body of bliss(sambhogakaya) which, as the spiritual 
body of a buddha, dwells eternally as a supreme god and 
responds to the needs of all bodhisattvas. This 
mansion, as a shadow of the dha=aka_ya, is considered 
to be eternalf possessing immense spiritual powers, yet 
as substance and subject to transformation, cannot go 
105 
beyond temporal boundaries. (67) Within the vast 
Mahayana cosmology there evolved many bodies of bliss 
as emanations of the absolute body of essence. (68) 
Hence whenever the spiritual needs of human beings 
became necessary the dharmaka_va, the ultimate mansion 
of enlightenment, responded in the most appropriate 
manner. 
The dha=akaya, although pure essence, was not 
considered as impersonal for it manifested itself as 
compassion and wisdom. Furthermore there is within each 
human mind a reflection of the dha=akaya, and when 
one"s bodhi is fully illuminated the awakened mind 
perceives that we are self-manifestations of, and one 
with this universal reality of dha=aka_va. In the 
""Mahayanasutralankara"" the doctrine of the Trika_va is 
made explicit: 
The Body of Essence, the Body of Bliss, the 
created Body- these are the bodies of the 
Buddhas. The first is the basis of the two 
others. The Body of Bliss varies in all the 
planes of the Universe, according to region, 
in nam in foxm, and in experience of 
phenomena. But the Body of Essence, unifozm 
and subtle, is inherent in the Body of Bliss. 
And through the one the other controls its 
experience, when it manifests itself at 
will. (69) 
Hence these teachings provided a universal 
response to the religious needs of all sentient beings 
throughout space and time, and at any stage of their 
spiritual development. The scriptural texts encouraged 
human beings to venerate buddhas and bodhisattvas by 
devotion and meditation, paying tribute to them through 
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offerings and invocations. There would seem little 
doubt therefore that the Mahayana world system with its 
avataric revelations of buddhas and bodhisattvas, who 
through their own enlightenment, offer deliverance and 
salvation to lesser mortals, amply qualifies as a 
charter of grace. Through channels of mercy and 
compassion, it grants gratuitous beneficence to 
individuals who would otherwise experience a harsh, 
uncompromising moral destiny. 
No where is this concept of karuna better 
illustrated than in Avalokitesvara, the most popular of 
Buddhist bodhisattvas who is considered: "the All- 
loving All-compassionate Self-born Saviour, the 
Bodhisattva who responds to the cries of the 
wo. rld". (70) Generally interpreted as "the Lord who 
surveys", (71) he is described as releasing sentient 
beings from their purgatories without paying any regard 
to the law of karma. The question arises therefore 
whether Avalokitesvara as the embodiment of compassion, 
had indeed abrogated this moral code and become the 
supreme means of attaining spiritual liberation. 
Acknowledged as the personification of the 
Buddha's compassion, Avalokitesvara is considered to be 
his scriptural archetype. In the "Digha Nika_ya" it 
states that the Buddha, "rising in the morning from the 
attainment of great compassion, suz-veys the world". (72) 
Moreover as a supreme spiritual force, he is considered 
to embody the Buddha's powers of transcendentality. 
The "Sam_yutta Nika_va"' maintains that: 
since a Tathagata, even when actually present 
is incomprehensible, it is inept to say of 
him [---] that after dying that the Tathagata 
is, is not, both is and is not, neither is 
nor is not. (73) 
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Thus as the Avalokitesvara doctrine evolved, the 
Mahayanists merged human and divine aspects together to 
sustain a supreme counsellor who would always listen 
with a compassionate ear. Hence through prayer and 
worship there is a direct channel of communication, 
whereby those who have faith in his universal 
compassion can pour out their woes. Although such 
invocation reverberates with a theistic ring, 
Mahayanists claim that meditation in the forms of 
visualisation and recitation has as its goal insight 
into the realisation of non-self(vipassana). 
A frequently recited prayer is the "Great 
Compassion Mantra"" found in the "Dharani Sutra"" It is 
claimed that mindful recitation one hundred and eight 
times daily for one thousand days would even influence 
the ten directors of King Yama's court. This is a 
colourful and graphical way of indicating that total 
concentration of the mind on positive thoughts 
abolishes the inclination to do wrong deeds or become 
the recipient of the entailed suffering. It is perhaps 
important to heed a basic concept of the Mahayana 
tradition at this juncture in the notion of upaya 
meaning "skilful means". The Avalokitesvara doctrine 
might appropriately be considered as but one practical 
means of providing for different people's spiritual 
awakening. However, without self-determination to 
exercise this skill in means which in due course should 
be laid aside, one would still be karmic bound. 
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Pure Land Providence 
It has been my intention in this chapter to 
illustrate that one of the most significant and 
essential characteristics of the Mahayana tradition is 
the doctrine of the bodhisattva. Consequently the 
notion evolved that bodhisattvas could assume a form at 
will in any realm, and endowed with great wisdom and 
immense compassion for all mortals exert a beneficent 
effect on their lives, becoming a divine saviour: 
His divine eye sees innum ra le beings, and 
he is filled with great distress at what he 
sees, for many bear the burden of past deeds 
which will be punished in puzgatoxy [ --- 1. 
So he pours out his love and compassion upon 
all those beings, and attends to them 
thinking, 'I shall become the saviour of all 
beings, and set them free from their 
sufferings. (74) 
Hence Mahayana Buddhism would seem to support 
doctrines and practices which render this tradition the 
homeland of grace. Nowhere is this cultivated more 
explicitly than in the Sino-Japanese cult of Amitabha, 
which seems to have developed from around the time of 
the early Sanskrit Sutras, and culminated in the 
founding of the True Pure Land Sect by Shrinran in 
1,262CE. In the "Sukhavativyuha" one of the principal 
Pure Land scriptures, a certain bodhisattva called 
Dharmakara who was about to enter the state of nirvana, 
was moved with compassion for all beings suffering in 
the world who were prey to endless cycles of karmic 
existence. He took a vow therefore resolving that: 
If, 0 Blessed One, when I have attained 
enlightenment, whatever beings in other 
worlds, having conceived a desire for right, 
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perfect enlightenm nt, and having heard my 
nam , with favourable intent think upon me, 
if when the time and the moment of death are 
upon them, I surrounded by and at the head of 
nzy cozzmnznity of medicants, do not stand 
before them to kept them from frustration, 
may I not, on that account, attain to 
unexcelled, right, perfect enlightenment. (75) 
According to classical Mahayana doctrine, when one 
attained enlightenment and thus buddhahood, one also 
obtained a "'buddha kingdorff(buddha-ksetra) over which 
one ruled. (76) Thus Darmakara vowed to create a "Happy 
Land"(Sukhavati)when he became a buddha. In Shrinran's 
"Gospel of Grace", the celebrated eighteenth or 
"'Aprimal" vow specified that: 
if after obtaining Buddhahood, all beings in 
the ten quarters should not desire in 
sincerity and trustfulness to be born in my 
country, and if they should not be born only 
thinking of me ten times, except those who 
are abusive of the true Dharma, may I not 
obtain the Highest Enlightenment. (77) 
Hence by sincere recitation of Amitabha Buddha's 
name(the nembutsu chant) at the time of death, he vowed 
by his grace to bring the faithful disciple to the 
realm of the Pure Land. 
Sukhavati is described in the "Sukhavativ_yuha Sutra as 
the Western paradise, "many universes beyond the 
setting sun". (78) Furthermore T'an-luan(476-542CE) who 
summarised the earliest texts declared this "Happy 
Land" to be unconditioned and eternal. It is 
interesting to note that "Sukhavati" is translated as 
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both "Happy Land'" and ""Pure Land". The subtlety of 
this is detected in this sutra: 
[ --- ] one gains the exalted zest and 
joyfulness, which is associated with 
detachment, dispassion, calm, cessation, 
Dharma and brings about the state of mind 
which leads to the accomplishment of 
enlightenment. And nowhere in this world 
system Sukhavati does one hear anything that 
is unwholesome --- feelings which are neither 
pleasant nor unpleasant one does not hear 
here, much less of suffering! (79) 
Although there might seem to be a theistic ring to 
the role of Amitabha, there is no indication in the 
Mahayana sutras that he is regarded as the supreme 
deity encompassing a creatorial function. Indeed 
within the Mahayana scriptures he is not considered to 
be the exclusive Buddha in the universe, for they were 
as "innumerable as the sands of the Ganges". (80) 
However, as the sole Buddha in Sukhavati he is invested 
with absolute power in this Buddha-field, where he 
sustains and cares for all its inhabitants: "May it 
be(zesolved Dazm2akax-a)in my land, that ereryone called 
for what he seeks, will fill his wants fulfilled 
I --- 1". (81) Amitabha, meaning "'immensurable light" is 
also regarded as omniscient, for the light of his 
knowledge extends throughout his realm: ""When that 
light suffuses objects it penetrates from the outside 
to the inside, when that light suffuses the mind, it 
puts an end to ignorance". (82) 
Hence his knowledge is able to disperse the 
existence of dukkha in the world, and his true essence 
as infinite wisdom, further empowers Amitabha as the 
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source of perfect goodness. Thus by placing total 
faith in him, the root causes of dukkha, the selfish, 
craving desires which sustain one's clinging attachment 
to this samsaric cycle of existence, can be 
overcome. (83) Van-luan in his commentary on the 
essence of the "Sukhavati ha Sut-ra" describes rebirth 
in the Pure Land: 
First, one thinks single-mindedly of Amitabha 
Buddha and prays for rebirth in His Land. This 
Buddha's nam and that Land's nam can stop evil. 
Second, that Happy Land exceeds the paths of the 
three worlds. If a man is born in that Land, he 
automatically puts an end to the evils of body, 
mouth, and mind. Third, Ami tabha Buddha 's power 
of enlightenment and persistent tenacity can 
naturally arrest the mind that seeks after lower 
stages of the vehicle. (84) 
Thus Amitabha offered the promise of release from 
the bonds of karma. Although one may have evil karmic 
residues to expiate, with the right devotional attitude 
and sincere faith in the vow of Amitabha, human beings 
could be certain of attaining salvation regardless of 
one's good or evil status. In fact by placing total 
faith in Amitabha all grave karmic consequences are 
transferred to him, and the disciple becomes the 
recipient of all the Buddha Amitabha's accumulated 
merit. (85) T'uan -luan however, explains how necessary 
a devotional attitude is to being reborn in Sukhavati: 
How does one give rise to a prayerful heart? 
One always prays, with the whole heart 
single-mindedly thinking of being ultimately 
reborn in the Happy Land, because one wishes 
truly to practice samatha (concentration). 
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[ --- ] How does one observe? with wisdom one 
observes. With right mindfulness one 
observes Him, because one wishes truly to 
practice vipasyana (insight). (86) 
It is worth noting at this juncture that even the 
Ch'an (Zen)master Hui-neng citing the "Vimalakirti 
Sutra", an important Mahayana text of the second 
century of the common era, is of the opinion that, 
"those desiring to attain the Pure Land must first 
purify their minds, for purification of mind is the 
purity of the Buddha-Land-. (87) Shan-tao the disciple 
of Tao-cho an important early Pure Land figure who 
wrote the "Compendium on the Happy Land', taught that 
it was crucial when chanting to Amitabha to have a 
"calm and unx-uffled mind". (88) Furthermore in the 
Tanni Sho it is confirmed that, "an evil man who 
dedicates himself to the Other Power is above all 
endowed with the right cause for Rebirthl. (89) Hence 
the need for prayerful thoughts and concentration in 
which to develop rightmindfulness and discernment, thus 
generating insight into purifying the mind, is far more 
profound than a mere mechanical recitation of the 
nembutsu formula. 
Nevertheless invocation of the Namu-amida butsu, 
meaning "the name", is regarded as a constant means of 
grace, for recitation of this formula invokes the power 
by which there is certain rebirth into the Pure Lands. 
Thus this formula of praise to Amitabha is understood 
as an act of remembrance, giving rise to thankfulness 
for the "real and sincere heart and mind, " of the 
Buddha. (90) Moreover this injunctive to embrace 
Amitabha's grace, can only be experienced through faith 
in the nembutsu, ensuring that one "enters on the non- 
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retz, og. ressive stage (anagamin) becoming a never- 
retu=er to this world". (91) Hozen Seki a modern Pure 
Land figure, comments about the mechanism of faith in 
the nembutsu, indicating that: 
the nembutsu is radical openness. In it we 
are utterly transparent to the Infinite, 
which shines through. Whether conceived as 
"taking refuge", "relying", "going to", it 
all, bespeaks self-emptying (Namu) so that 
Infinite (Amida) may manifest itself without 
obstruction (in our experience of it) by the 
limitations of individuated discriminated 
self. (92) 
Consequently it is because of the vast power of 
Amitabha, conditioned by the resolutions of the 
bodhisattva Darmakara, that Amitabha has willed into 
existence his own realm over which he has sovereign 
powers. It is said by Van-luan that, "his power and 
resolution go together, in the final analysis they are 
not diffez-ent". (93) Hence it is through Amitabha's 
vows and resolution that his love and compassion for 
all sentient beings is expressed, demonstrating an 
unsolicited act of grace to all who enter the realm of 
the Pure Land. 
Does the exalted "Other Power" of the Pure Land 
however, really provide an "easy path" by which to 
progress to enlightenment? The fourth Chinese 
Patriarch of Ch'an(Zen), Tao-hsin(580-651CE) obviously 
believed this to be the case. He maintained that: "for 
the sake of beings of dull capacity, Buddha had them 
orient them elves to the Western Paradise: this was not 
propounded for people of shazp facu. Ities". (94) 
Similarly another Zen master Hui-hai advocated that one 
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should: "place no reliance upon the powers of other 
Buddhas. As the sutra says 'those vho seek the Dharma 
do not find it zmerely by clinging to the Buddhas"'. (95) 
Huang Po was also very cautious about the Pure Land 
approach, claiming that: 
if you are unable to realise unmindfulness 
and if you still cling to form, you will form 
the demonic karma. Even in your practice of 
the Pure land (school) you will create karma 
called the Buddha-sczeen which veils your 
mind thereby subjecting you to the law of 
causality. (96) This is undoubtedly referring 
to the fundamental Buddhist doctrine of 
trsna, in which one's craving desires 
generate clinging attachment to things, thus 
conditioning further karmic existence. 
The question arises once again, as to whether 
these teachings and practices are indeed claiming that 
karmic reality has been overcome by the power and 
presence of Amitabha's Western Paradise of Sukhavati, 
by means of a personally dispensed mercy and 
beneficence. In fact is it possible to reconcile the 
operation of the moral karmic principle, underpinned by 
the notion of freedom of choice and decision, with the 
Pure Land concept of gratuitous action? It is vital 
therefore to grasp the significance of these doctrines, 
and to explore the possibility that such teachings and 
practices are but "skilful means"' to accommodate the 
diverse needs of human beings. While Pure Land Schools 
maintain the providential mercy of Amitabha Buddha, 
placing total faith in his charter of grace, 
nevertheless they do not claim that it suspends the 
universal law of karma. 
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For the Pure Land devotee, faithful devotion to 
Amitabha acts as a catalyst to the self-awareness of 
their karma bound condition. Thus the nembutsu is 
considered to be more a question of confidence in, 
rather than a grasping attachment to, the formula. 
Shojun Bando, a prominent inter-faith figure suggests 
that it is "replacing our egos with the will of 
Amida". (97) Karmic existence represents the severe 
limitations of the human condition. Thus by total 
devotion to the absolute power of Amitabha, the 
conditions necessary for achieving emancipation from 
the cycle of rebirths in conditioned existence, can be 
achieved. Through right-mindfulness the ignorant 
delusions of one's selfish cravings can be resolved, 
transformed and transcended. 
The Pure Land tradition indicates that the Jiriki 
method can only help to create the conditions under 
which salvation can be obtained. Ji-riki must become 
Tariki to attain true enlightenment, for self-power 
implies belief in one's own achievements, and 
considered as the greatest obstacle to liberation. 
Aashara Saichi, a Japanese poet and prominent Shin 
follower who died in 1933, asserts that, "there is 
neither Tariki nor Jiriki, what is, is the graceful 
acceptance only". (98) In fact, "Amida will extend his 
arm of help only when we realise that our self-power is 
of no account". (99) Although faith is the mechanism by 
which one responds, it is the acknowledgement that 
Amitabha is in and is us, that stimulates a channel by 
which to overcome one's own judgements and opinions, 
and thus defeat the endless karmic activity. Soga 
Ryojin an early twentieth century Pure Land figure 
affirmed that, "AmIcla is not a tz-anscendent Ot]2ez- 
standing opposed to and independent of sentient beings, 
AmIda is inherent in all sentient beings". (100) 
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Suzuki, although a prominent Zen figure, is 
profoundly responsive to the Pure Land tradition. In 
support of the Shin Buddhist doctrines, he argues that 
it is the spiritual reality which the Amitabha 
tradition offers which is the relevant factor. Central 
to Buddhist philosophical teaching is the distinction 
between conventional truth(samvriti-sat_ya) and 
ultimate, definitive truth(paramartha-sat_ya). (101) 
Faith in the nembutsu can therefore operate at a 
practical level of truth in which "praise to Amitabha 
Buddha" is the stimulus to the realm of the 
transcendent and absolute level of truth. Thus this 
metaphysical dimension provides the means to progress 
beyond ""a world built up by intellectual distinctions 
and emotional defilem nt's. (102) Consequently from 
the perspective of ultimate truth everything is as it 
is, an appearance -sun_yata. (103) 
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Summary Comments 
This chapter has aimed to convey that although the 
concept of grace, as demonstrated by classical 
Christian theism as the unsolicited gift of God's 
supreme omnigoodness, is inappropriate from a Buddhist 
world- view. Nevertheless it does sustain a 
comprehensive functioning of gratuitous activity. 
Moreover this functioning of grace is more explicitly 
expressed within Mahayana philosophical thought, and 
distinctly active within the Pure Land traditions. 
Fundamental to the theistic perspective, is the 
necessity to uphold the all sustaining grace of God 
with the belief in human responsible action. The fact 
that God is acknowledged as a supremely powerful 
creator of all things, is not believed to jeopardise or 
expose a weakness in this doctrine in relation to human 
freedom of the will. Although much controversy has 
given rise to various theological arguments, the basic 
premise strongly endorsed is that God's gratuitous 
action provides the necessary resources for 
sanctification. However, it is only through the 
exercise of human free-will that salvation can be 
effectively appropriated. Thus recognised as a free 
gift bestowed on human beings, faith in God generates a 
trusting response through which providential power can 
act as a sustaining, benevolent force. 
The notion of an all-encompassing compassion made 
explicit in the Mahayana tradition, would seem to 
testify to the deep rooted yearning for a merciful 
benevolence toward the human condition, underlining the 
tension between the bodhisattva ideal and the goal of 
the arahat. The bodhisattva practice clearly embodies 
the very essence of gratuitous activity by his selfless 
mercy and loving kindness towards his fellow human 
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beings. Hence the concept of karuna as a practical 
ethic of loving compassion occurs extensively in 
Mahayanist literature. T. J. Altizer in his book 
"Oriental Mystical and Biblical Eschatology"", 
reinforces the profundity of this concept censuring 
some Western evaluation. He states: 
Western criticism that Buddhist tenderness 
never rises above pity, or that Buddhist love 
is simply a means of escape from the self , 
fail to understand the real nature of 
Buddhist compassion. (104) 
There seems little doubt that a notion of grace 
qualifies as a function of Mahayana Buddhology, in that 
it upholds ideals where the force of a sustaining power 
can provide the means to cope with, and rise above 
misfortunes. This is explicitly demonstrated in the 
devotional attitude to, and faith in the nembutsu 
formula. A superficial understanding of the Mahayanist 
doctrines would indicate that the whole edifice of the 
Buddhist tradition is being challenged, making 
universal karmic compensation subservient to a higher 
ideal of gratuitous action. However, the Mahayana 
tradition asserts that the central values of the dha=a 
are safeguarded, while they nevertheless support a 
diversity of teaching methods to accommodate different 
people's needs. 
Hence a more thorough evaluation discloses that 
such teachings and practices act as a catalytic 
mechanism to the self-awareness of one's karmic 
constrained existence. Such "skilful means" can then 
be seen as extremely effective for bringing about 
detachment, dispassion and harmony. However, it is 
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resolutely emphasised that to achieve liberation from 
duhkka and the endless cycle of samsara, self- 
determination to follow one's right path, and a co- 
operative spirit to accept any assistance along that 
path is required. The root cause of trsna (craving) 
cannot be subdued and transcended by solely relying on 
the gratuitous activity of an enlightened being. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
How Relevant is a Notion of Free-will to Both a 
Buddhist and Christian Theistic Perception of Human 
Suffering as Punishment, Test or Discipline? 
Preface 
In the previous chapter I attempted to illustrate 
that God's sustaining grace was an essential concept 
which had shaped the Christian understanding of God and 
consequently its worldview. Buddhism however, denied 
the idea of the gratuitous actions of a supreme power 
with sustaining properties of providential control and 
guidance. Nevertheless within this tradition, it was 
possible to explore specific channels of grace that 
likewise, had shaped the Buddhist understanding of the 
human condition and the nature of existence. Closely 
related to these notions of benevolence and compassion 
is the intensity and universality of suffering as an 
undesirable state, which is acknowledged by both 
traditions as posing an existential problem. 
Although, in a practical context, there would seem 
to be some common awareness concerning this phenomenon, 
divergent orientation of what constitutes the human 
predicament has produced radically opposing conceptions 
of how each tradition approaches the question of 
suffering. Consequently both traditions have responded 
with explanations and proposals which have generated 
practical and theoretical solutions. As a result there 
is a significant contrast between Buddhism's evaluative 
attitude of the human predicament, in which the 
unsatisfactory nature of all things is vitally related 
to the actual conditions pertaining to living in the 
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world, and Christian theism's conviction of sin and the 
consequential suffering, due to spiritual and moral 
estrangement from God. 
In this chapter therefore, I intend to examine 
Christian theism's attitude towards sin and suffering 
revealed in the perspectives of Augustinian divine 
retribution, and the teleological process of moral and 
spiritual growth in the Irenaean-Schleiermacher 
tradition. (1) Hence the notion of free-will as the 
pertinent factor in their justification of moral evil 
and suffering in the world will be evaluated. 
Buddhism's central thesis however, attempts to describe 
the world as dukkha, in which the causes of suffering 
can be effectively eliminated by the removal of 
ignorance. It is my aim therefore to establish that 
this lack of insight supports the retributive 
hypothesis of punishment and reward within the causal 
moral order, and affirms the significance of free-will 
to the self-regulating laws of karmic existence. 
Furthermore I propose to evaluate any possible 
eschatological dimension or soteriological goal offered 
by each tradition, which endorses their particular 
understanding of reality. The eschatological strategy 
which reinforces a Christian soul-making theodicy 
promoted by John Hick, gives positive meaning to the 
reality of suffering by offering compensation for evils 
unjustly suffered, with the hope of an eternal destiny 
beyond the grave. Essential to this hope of 
immortality hypothesis and universal salvation, is the 
retention of personal identity which maintains the 
autonomy of the individual. 
Buddhism claims, that by means of the appropriate 
discipline and practical application, the causes of 
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suffering can be eliminated and the unconditioned state 
of nirvana attained. Hence the Buddhist path to 
enlightenment in the goal of nirvanic realisation, 
provides a soteriological strategy, offering release 
from the bondage of endless existences and the causal, 
moral order. Consequently I regard it as important to 
consider that, although free volitional action is a 
necessary concept to the acquisition of merit and 
virtue, liberation from the karmic existence transcends 
any duality, for the passions which drive our 
individuality are totally eliminated. 
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Divergent PerspectiveS Of the Human Predicament 
Both Eastern and Western philosophical systems 
have reflected at length on the nature of physical and 
mental suffering, together with moral wickedness in all 
its multiplicity. This reflection however, has not 
produced a unified or homogeneous purpose to human 
experience in which the problem of suffering can be 
interpreted. It is crucial therefore to any valid 
enquiry into how this suffering is contemplated in both 
traditions, to have a keen awareness of what 
constitutes the human predicament. Their specific 
orientations of mode of existence will inevitably have 
an impact on whether a notion of free-will is a 
critical issue. 
In Christian theological thought the question of 
human suffering has been debated in respect to belief 
in an omnipotent, omniscient and infinitely good God. 
The previous chapters have revealed that all three 
propositions are essentially part of classical theism's 
position. Hence we focused on this particular 
theological problem, of the apparent inexplicability of 
suffering in the world, and the existence of a deity 
with powers to prevent it. Consequently the primary 
concern for Christian theism is to reconcile the 
attributes of God with the reality of both moral and 
natural evils. 
Thus chapter one attempted to convey that 
intrinsic to any explanation or justification of the 
actions, character or very existence of God, was the 
fundamental belief in the autonomous nature of human 
beings. The theist's free-will responses therefore 
have sought to defend and clarify their proposals. 
Human accountability must be shown to be an essential 
--I 
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component of these proposals. If the argument from 
evil could establish a logical inconsistency with the 
existence of an omnipotent, omniscient and omnigood God 
and the fact of evil, or that the prevalence and 
variety of evils made it improbable that God existed, 
it would be possible to show that the theistic 
worldview was founded upon false premises. (3) 
Although it is Augustine to whom classical theism 
is indebted for his extensive deliberations on the 
question of evil and suffering in the world, the 
dilemma was by no means unique to Christian thought. 
The enigma having a lineage stretching back in Western 
philosophy through Epicurus(341-27OBCE)(4) to Plato, 
who distinctly formulated the problem in his 
"Republic-: '"For good things aze faz fewez with us 
than evil, and foz the good we must assume no othez 
cause than God, but the cause of evil we must look for 
in other things and not in God". (5) 
Augustine similarly speculated that evil did not 
exist without an author or source. Given the belief 
that God was the sole, ultimate power and perfectly 
good, God could not be its source. Since everything 
was made by God, evil could not possess independent 
being as one of the original constituents of the 
universe. Hence evil could only exist in the 
corrupting of good for, "nothing evil exists in itself 
but only as an aspect of some actual entity". (6) It 
was a privation of good, wholly negative and 
destructive, and consequently a defeat in a person 
"Privatio boni". (7) 
In order to account for the discordant nature 
between a universe which was considered to be created 
wholly good, and the reality of the phenomenon of evil 
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and suffering in the world, Augustine suggested that 
moral evil was concealed in the freely acting will. 
his treatise "de Vere Religione" (Of True Religion), 
Augustine maintained that, although there was no 
compulsion to evil action, "yet there is a motive 
within the sinner which leads them astray"; (8) the 
penalty of our evil willing was however, the loss of 
divine graces, causing pain and suffering. (9) 
Hence Augustinian theology sustained the 
conviction that mankind was created finitely perfect. 
However, through cupiditas or ""desire", (10) this 
misapplication of the will destroyed their own 
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perfection. Hence it became corrupted and human beings 
were subsequently plunged into sin and suffering. It 
was this belief of course, which Augustine propounded 
in his concept of a "fall" from original perfection, 
and consequently the doctrine of original sin as an 
inherited moral corruption, from which we suffer as 
children of Adam. (11) There is no doubt that this 
ontological structure developed by Augustine and the 
early Church Fathers, has sustained the major responses 
of theodicy to the present day. (12) Nevertheless 
modern philosophical argument has seriously criticised 
this conceptual framework. 
One such assessment can be demonstrated in the 
critical response to the Augustinian perspective by 
C. A. Campbell. He insists that the religious 
proposition of the intrinsic and inevitable natural 
depravity of human beings, in which sin is conceived as 
a deliberate act of defiance to the will of God, cannot 
be sustained by any rational argument. He asserts that 
the proponents of such a thesis are confusing 
fundamental biological imperfections in human beings, 
which by virtue of this creaturely status has the 
lqq 
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potentiality to sin, with a very di fferent kind of 
imperfection. This is a sinfulness upheld by the 
belief that human beings, because they possess a 
natural depravity, cannot resolve of themselves to do 
anything but sin. (13) This hypothesis must have 
serious implications for how any notion of human free- 
will is to be interpreted. If human beings are 
naturally depraved, then it is difficult to endorse a 
genuine moral responsibility for sinful actions. (14) 
Within a traditional theistic frame-work, it is 
the suffering Christ that is viewed as the paradigm for 
Christian experience. Hence the concept of the cross 
which symbolically defined Christ's experience of pain, 
deprivation and abandonment, has significant 
implications for how theology approaches the question 
of sin and suffering: "The event of golgotha is a 
bearing of the world's guilt, a vicarious immersion in 
suffering for humanity". (15) Thus God in Christ, 
through his perfect sacrifice on the cross, and the 
victory of the resurrection, has conquered evil and the 
oppression of sin. Christ is envisaged as the second 
Adam, the perfect man that human beings were meant to 
be. Thus by suffering for the sake of humanity he has 
enabled mankind to share in his triumph, restoring the 
possibility of joy and happiness to life. 
Consequently human suffering is considered 
inevitable as the medium through which our relationship 
with God can be repaired. Viewed as the foundation for 
a progressive encounter to a closer communion with God, 
suffering provides a freely chosen opportunity to 
strengthen and develop character and virtues. This is 
further reinforced by consideration of an "'after-life", 
in which unjustified suffering will be remedied to 
restore eternal bliss. (16) In this way it is divine 
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authority which embodies the final triumph of 
righteousness over the oppression of evil. Thus the 
pervasiveness of suffering is given a meaningful 
significance by God's redemptive, salvific activity. 
It is relevant at this juncture to briefly 
consider the problem of human suffering from the 
perspective of process theology, and to reflect on any 
view-points which differ from that of traditional 
Christian theism. Process thought, as discussed in the 
first chapter, regards God as personally involved in 
the destiny of his creatures. On account of this God 
cannot be detached from the pain and suffering of those 
afflicted or oppressed. On the contrary he is seen as 
the co-sufferer, "the great companion - the fellow 
suffez-ex- who undex-stands-. (17) Moreover as a co- 
sufferer with human beings, God is also a target of the 
alleged injustices of the natural laws he instituted. 
Hence process theism affirms that the divine power is 
not all-determining, but the primordial, creative 
influence which is the foundation of all reality. (18) 
By accepting God's self-limitations this allows process 
theology to maintain that, although God cannot abolish 
evil and suffering, neither does he sanction the 
injustices. Moreover although God in his relatedness 
suffers with all who suffer, he is not confounded or 
defeated by it. 
Furthermore chapter one also considered how 
process theism supports the notion of a God of 
persuasion, whose achievements in the world depend upon 
the responses of other entities. Thus as agents 
endowed with an internal power of self-creation, human 
beings have the dual capacity for intrinsic goodness 
and evil. Consequently the notion of human autonomy is 
a crucial factor to a God who seeks to transmute the 
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suffering of the world by using his persuasive powers 
to make agents recognise their responsibility. It is 
necessary for human beings to actively choose to 
further God's purposes of overcoming all injustices. 
By way of raising objections to the process 
hypothesis, traditional theism insists that God as co- 
sufferer can only offer a measure of consolation; the 
essential eschatological perspective is lacking. (19) A 
God who can only use coercive and persuasive powers can 
not transform the world. This God is incommensurate 
with the tenets of traditional theology, for he does 
not have the power to act decisively in history by 
inaugurating a new vision for humanity by suffering on 
the cross. There is no discernment of reconciliation 
with God through Christ's sacrificial victory over sin. 
At this juncture it is appropriate to focus on the 
Buddhist perspective of the human predicament. The 
debate in chapter one indicated that the problem 
confronting Buddhism was not a question of how to 
reconcile the existence and nature of God with the 
horror and apparent iniquity in the world. (20) 
Metaphysical evil in the Augustinian sense is 
considered totally illusory to Buddhist philosophical 
thought, in which everything in the universe is 
causally conditioned and under the law of an unending 
chain of cause and effect. (21) Consequently the 
reality of evil and suffering can only properly be 
understood against this background of a realm of finite 
beings within a world of ever-changing flux of 
interdependent causality. 
The Buddha pragmatically accepted the reality of 
both good and evil in a world of conditioned existence. 
His central concern was to examine their causal origins 
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and thereby find a solution as to how to escape from 
this samsaric cycle. The Buddha did not look for 
metaphysical causes to justify the fact of evil and 
suffering, but regarded one's present condition as due 
to ignorance and illusion, not as a result of an 
inherent degenerate nature. He therefore contested the 
theist's claim, that human beings were not capable of 
overcoming evil willing without the grace of a supreme, 
benevolent deity. In the "Dhammapada" the Buddha 
claims that: '"by oneself the evil is done, by oneself 
one is defiled. Purity and impurity belong to oneself, 
no one can purify another". (22) There are clear 
indications here that the fetters of samsaric existence 
are of one's own choosing, in that it is voluntary 
attitude and actions which mould one's future destiny. 
Hence the Buddha's primary concern was an 
existential analysis of life from an every-day 
perspective. (23) The basis of his attempt to describe 
the mode of human existence was a vision of reality 
(_vathabbutam) formulated in the Four Noble Truths. 
Thus these truths or facts (ari_ya-sacca) delivered by 
the Buddha in his first sermon, attempted to explain 
not only the reality of psycho-cosmic origination in a 
world characterised by dukkha, but the ultimate goal of 
release from this all-pervading trademark of human 
existence. (24) It is interesting to note that these 
four truths which apply to the spiritual welfare of 
human beings, are derived from the principles of Indian 
medical science. In the "Yogasutra" commentary we 
learn: "just as the doctor-s code is fourfold: illness, 
cause of illness, health, medicine, so to is this 
fourfold, to wit: samsara, its cause, emancipation, the 
way thereto-l-. (25) 
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It is of considerable importance to grasp the 
significance of this doctrine that sustains not only 
the Buddhist perception of reality, but provides the 
means of explaining the enigmas of human evil and 
suffering. I have purposely refrained until this time 
from identifying the term dukkha with the concept of 
suffering as understood from a western view-point. 
Although the sanskrit term dukkha has generally been 
translated as the English term of "suffering", it is 
not only a misinterpretation but also very misleading. 
(Further implications of this term will be discussed 
shortly). It is noteworthy that no expression in 
Buddhist usage exactly corresponds to the term "'evil" 
in western thought. Similarly it is not insignificant 
that two major Sanskrit-English dictionaries do not 
include the term "'suffering" in their definitions. (26) 
The Pali-English likewise states that: 
there is no word in English covering the same 
ground as dukkha does in Pali. our modern 
words are too specialised, too limited, and 
usuallY too strong [ --- I we are forced 
therefore in translation to use half 
sy-nonyms, no one of which is exact. (27) 
Hence it is essential to appreciate that the 
category of dukkha is principally a descriptive-cum- 
evaluative concept, which entails not only existential 
suffering but such metaphysical beliefs as 
impermanence(anicca), insubstantiality(. anatta)and 
dependent co-arising (paticcasamuppada). (28) 
Consequently it is relevant to recall that the 
preceding chapters have revealed that any reflection on 
the notion of free-will from a Buddhist perspective, 
could only be considered in the context of existence 
viewed as relative, conditioned and interdependent. (29) 
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The Buddha stressed that the root of all evil was 
ignorance(avijja), which could be traced to selfish 
desire, characteristically seen in its three basic 
roots of lobha-greed, dosa-hatred, and moha-illusion. 
It was these manifesting themselves in various ways, 
that gave rise to dukkha and the continuance of 
individual existence in samsara. Although the Buddha 
may have had no metaphysical aims in his instructions 
and has been described as "the complete 
empi. ricist", 00) nevertheless the essence of this 
teaching was the diagnosis of the whole cosmic process, 
thereby sustaining a profound theoretical dimension. 
It was this underlying metaphysical notion which 
carried the concept of dukkha beyond the existential 
category of suffering. 
Buddhaghosa, in his great treatise 
"-Visuddhi=aga-(The Path of Purification) written in 
the fifth century of the common era, distinguished 
three kinds of dukkha. Sankara-dukkha referred 
specifically to the dis-ease rooted in the impermanence 
and insubstantiality of all that was conditioned in the 
realm of relative existence. Hence in the "Sam_yaLLa- 
Nika_Va" we read: 
All formations (of dhax-ma -elements which 
constitute the individual stream of 
existence)are transient; all such formations 
are subject to suffering; all things are 
without a self-substance [ --- I my that which 
is transient is subject to suffering; and of 
that which is transient and subject to 
suffering and change one can rightly say this 
is 1; this is ego. (31) 
Thus this notion of dukkha was identified with the 
actual process of existence, and indicated that it was 
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not merely specific experiences that were 
unsatisfactory, but it was existence itself with which 
we were ill-at-ease. The testifies 
to this underlying, pervasive feature of c7ukkha: "[ --- I 
this state of things, this stability of nature just 
exists, namely, that all conditioned things are dukkha 
II". (32) 
Hence human attitude towards pleasure and 
happiness was considered in the unsatisfactoriness or 
pain of impermanence. Viparinama-dukkha explained 
therefore human tendency to desire that which was 
permanent, and to experience frustration and 
disappointment when enjoyment and happiness proved to 
be only transient. The Venerable Bhikkhu Buddhadasa of 
Southern Thailand discussed this aspect of dukkha in 
his "Handbook for Mankind" explaining that: 
all things whatsoever have the property of 
changing incessantly, they are unstable. All 
things whatsoever have the characteristic of 
unsatisfactoriness; seeing them evokes 
disillusionment and disenchantment in anyone 
having clear insight into their nature. (33) 
Thus even the pleasures of daily life being subject to 
change, were considered ultimately distressing and 
consequently symptoms of dis-ease. 
It is in the context of c7ukkha-dukkha, considered 
in the First Noble Truth as the distinct, concrete 
manifestations of physical and mental pain, which could 
more appropriately be regarded as suffering as 
understood in the West. "Ordinary suffering" was the 
painful sensations intrinsic to our experience of 
living in the realm of samsara. The forms of this 
suffering were so numerous that the First Noble Truth 
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concludes that, "in short the five aggregates of 
attachment are dukkha". (34) Suffering in this way was 
therefore expressed as tanha, or the primordial aspects 
of desire. (35) Consequently the heart of Buddhist 
analysis confirms that it is ignorance(avijja), or the 
not seeing things as they really are, which causes our 
tendency to desire or cling to things. In fact the 
"Dhammapada" maintained that, "ignorance is the 
greatest impurity". (36) 
Accordingly it is not the impermanence of each 
constituent which serves the cause of dukkha, but the 
attachment afforded to these things. Moreover in the 
"Buddhacarita"', the Buddha surveyed the twelve links of 
dependent origination and explained the crucial 
importance of avijja: (37) 
Ignorance is declared to be the root of this 
great trunk of pain by all the wise[ --- I 
therefore, by the stopping of ignorance, all 
the pains of all are at existing beings once 
stopped and cease to act. (38) 
The Buddha identified that the dis-ease of phenomenal 
reality was indeed the result of ignorance, which 
consequently conditioned our finite self-centred 
existence. 
Hence the Buddhist realisation of truth confirms 
that all forms of existence whatsoever are 
unsatisfactory, and even the so-called pleasures of 
life which appear so pleasing, are in fact simply 
varieties of suffering and dis-ease. There can be no 
doubt that a consciousness of the inevitability of 
dukkha must have serious implications for a notion of 
free-will. This emphasis on the universality of 
suffering signifies a specific attitude to the reality 
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of human existence, in which freedom of choice and 
action is likewise conditioned-09) There is a real 
distinction between Christian theism's sinful 
disobedience of human beings resulting in wilful 
depravity, due to a massive perversity and 
disorientation by turning away from God, and Buddhism's 
lack of discernment caused by the fundamental factors 
of avijja, tanha and lobha. 
It is thought provoking to ponder on the claim 
made by Michael Fonner in his paper "Towards a 
Theravadin Christolog_y", in which he suggests that it 
is possible to understand God's presence and activity 
in the world through the perspective of the Buddhist 
categories of dukkha-dukkha and viparinima-dukkha. 
Theologically stated, through Christ, God took into his 
own being all suffering and unsatisfactoriness of 
finite existence. In this way dukkha is a part of 
God's reality in which he continues both to suffer, yet 
victoriously overcomes that suffering. I would venture 
to suggest, that Fonner, in trying to reconcile a 
Christological perspective to the Buddhist concept of 
dukkha, invokes an essentially Process viewpoint of God 
as co-sufferer, while supporting a contemporary kenotic 
theological concern. (40) 
In contrast to this theistic frame of reference, 
the Buddha determined that escape from the afflictions 
of suffering should be our fundamental aim. He 
therefore declared that the causes of suffering could 
be overcome through contemplative discipline. He 
testified that this involved a progressive movement 
away from the compounded world of conditioned 
existence. By application of the appropriate mental 
insight, attachment to all desires could be overcome, 
and the mind concentrated on the attainment of the 
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unconditioned reality of nirvana. (41) Significantly an 
awareness of the comprehensive nature of dukkha is an 
essential pre-requisite to the striving towards its 
cessation. However, while one must freely elect to 
embrace the path which leads to enlightenment, it would 
not be appropriate to desire detachment from all 
conditioned phenomenon, for this in itself generates 
clinging attachment to things, thus conditioning 
further karmic existence. 
It is clear that within the two traditions there 
is a significant divergence of basic ontological and 
existential structure concerning the human condition. 
A descriptive analysis of the nature of human existence 
has provided the framework from which to evaluate the 
significance and purpose of evil and suffering in the 
world, with respect to the relevance of a notion of 
free-will. Hence the next section will focus on the 
specific aspect of punishment as the penalty for human 
wrongful acts. 
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The Notion of Suffering as Retributive Punishment 
have endeavoured to illustrate that within 
Christian theism the Augustinian notion of the "fall" 
of mankind and the doctrine of original sin are central 
to theological discernment and interpretation. (42) 
Closely related to these concepts are the Christian 
views of punishment for sins, divine judgement and 
justice. In an effort to explain the source of 
humankind's guilt Augustine argued that, by reason of 
their relationship to Adam, human beings were part of 
"a cozzupt mass". (43) This he explained resulted in a 
wilful misuse of their God-given freedom, leading to 
alienation from God and thus a denial and exclusion 
from salvation: ""One sin originally inherited, even if 
it were the, only one involved, makes men liable to 
condemnation", (44) and consequently all humanity 
deserved everlasting punishment. 
It was the assertion that humankind had 
purposefully abused this gift of freedom of choice 
endowed by its Creator, that formed the basis of his 
free-will defence to reconcile and justify all the evil 
and suffering in the world. (45) Central to this 
defence was Augustine's theory of divine retribution in 
which God required human beings to suffer for every 
immoral action. In this way God's justice was 
vindicated, for punishment was deserved by any 
unrepentant souls remaining in their sin for, ", supreme 
misezy shall be the portion of the wicked". (46) This 
retributivist perspective was subsequently supported by 
Saint Anselm in the middle ages who argued that, "'God 
demanded satisfaction in proportion to the extent of 
the sin-". (47) 
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However as previously indicated, towards the end 
of his life Augustine stressed a doctrine of limited 
election, in which he asserted that God only 
proportioned his love and mercy to a select number. (48) 
Although he firmly reinforced a belief in the notion of 
human free-will, he nevertheless insisted that God had 
shaped the wills of those human beings he had elected 
to save from their sinful condition. Hence his 
redemptive grace made them capable of choosing to do 
good without consenting to do so, while the remainder 
of humanity was consequently condemned to the eternal 
punishment it justly deserved. (49) 
Augustine had to defend this perspective of 
predestination against those who argued that this had 
far-reaching implications for the doctrine of human 
accountability, for it would seem to render the source 
of moral evil the purpose and responsibility of 
God. (50) Moreover it cast serious reservations on 
divine goodness and mercy if God intended to exclude 
some from the possibility of salvation, while creating 
others for the pain and suffering of eternal damnation. 
However, in his theodicy Augustine asserted that God's 
justice and mercy were distinct, opposing attributes of 
God. Consequently divine righteousness required 
retribution for sin, while God's mercy desired 
forgiveness and reconciliation. 
John Milton in his epic poem "Paradise Lost", 
eloquently depicted these conflicting attributes of God 
as the strife between his goodness and rectitude. 
Milton suggested that it was the death of Christ on the 
cross as the atonement for our sins, which appeased 
divine vengeance. God's perfect justice was then 
satisfied, reconciling the conflict within the heart of 
God: 
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No sooner did thy dear and only son 
Perceive thee puxpos'd not to doom frail Man 
So strictly, but much more pity inclin'd 
He to appease thy wrath, and end the strife 
Of Mercy and Justice in the face discern'd 
Regardless of the Bliss wherein he sat 
Second to thee offerld himself die 
For man Is offence. (5 1) 
Although Augustinian interpretation and 
recommendation still reinforce current theology, there 
is very little authoritative support within 
contemporary Christian theism for a solution to the 
pain and suffering in the world that subscribes to 
deserved punishment, inflicted by God on human kind 
solely because of a creaturely wickedness which merits 
his retribution. Hence the sentiments in Milton's poem 
preserve God's infinite goodness and mercy, while 
sustaining his omnipotence and omniscience. The 
propitiatory act of Christ is perceived as both 
vindicating God's retributive judgement, and 
facilitating reconciliatory forgiveness. Furthermore 
God's justice and mercy are manifested as the 
possibility of restoration to share in his glory: "Thus 
if we confess our sins, he is faithful and just, and 
will forgive our sins and cleanse us from all 
unrighteousness". (52) In this manner human freedom of 
the will is affirmed, supporting the proposal that 
there is no incompatibility between the existence of a 
supreme deity with the presence of evil and suffering 
in the world. 
At this juncture it is appropriate to establish in 
what context the notion of suffering, as punishment for 
wrongful acts, is a significant and meaningful concept 
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from a Buddhist perspective. it is important to 
appreciate that from a Christian viewpoint, the focus 
has been on the notion of punishment for immoral acts 
as sins committed. The use of the term ""sin" as 
postulated within classical Christian theism, clearly 
implied a degenerate human nature and the handicap of 
original sin. (53) It further denoted offences against 
God leading to alienation and exclusion from his 
salvific grace. 
However, the expression '"sin" (papa)(54) is 
conceived very differently in the Buddhist tradition. 
Whilst acknowledged as human misconduct, sin from a 
Buddhist perspective signifies demerit. Philosophical 
reflection does not consider human beings as 
fundamentally wicked, consequently sin is not 
contemplated as due to a basic depravity, nor is a 
Buddhist conscience burdened with guilt as in Western 
theism. In fact the Buddha stated that, "the mind is 
naturally resplendent, though it is corrupted by 
adventitious defilements". (55) 
The first chapter of this thesis considered the 
notion of a world under providential care, and it was 
discerned that in Buddhism there could be no thought of 
attaining salvation through forgiveness of sins by 
means of the grace of an omnipotent deity. (56) 
Moreover Buddhism has no conception of punishment for 
sinful acts entailing exclusion from salvation. The 
Christian concepts of eternal damnation and the 
doctrine of hell consequently have no relevance, (57) 
for all sin is ultimately expiated in the natural 
progression of the samsaric cycle. Thus once run its 
course, there is real potential for liberation from the 
endless sequence of rebirths. 
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As an extrinsic outcome of samsaric conditioning 
however, sin is considered a symptom of human 
ignorance. Avijja, it has been established, is the 
root cause of dukkha (58), which is manifest by our 
involvement in the world as attachment or craving for 
things. Closely related to this notion of ignorance is 
the belief of kammma-vipaka, which is considered to be 
the compelling drive of our volitional actions that 
supports all human endeavour. Hence regarded as the 
natural law of unending cause and effect, the moral 
quality of actions previously performed determines the 
happiness or suffering experienced thereafter. 
Buddhism would therefore make the significant 
distinction that, "we are punished by our sins not for 
our sins-l-l. (59) 
In the "Majjhima-Nikaya-, the Buddha with his 
power of "'seeing a thc)usand worlds-", (60) traced all 
elements of suffering back to their causal origin. 
Thus by verifying the Four Noble Truths, (61) he was 
able to substantiate that, "the whole wheel of 
suffering turns around one causative and motive force 
expressed by the word kax7na". (62) The Buddha further 
declared that ka=a literally translated as "'deeds" 
(63) explained all miseries of human existence. 
Previously the doctrine of ka=a was examined in 
respect to its self-operative structure as the dharmic 
causal order. (64) Although all existence was viewed as 
relative, conditioned and interdependent, ka=a was 
identified not as a mechanical deterministic process, 
but an organic power in which human voluntary action 
had the ability to consciously affect future 
situations. Notwithstanding that all human volitional 
activity was conditioned, and regarded as the result of 
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prior causes, it nevertheless afforded a genuine 
potential for free expression within the causal series. 
Consequently the aim of this chapter is to further 
estimate the potential for free-agency within this 
principle, in its specific context as a retributive 
system of punishment for sins committed and reward for 
good deeds accomplished, which mitigates for the 
consequence of suffering in the world. 
The law of ka=a can be considered as the theory 
of conservation of energy, applied to an ethical 
jurisdiction. All virtuous and impure action, together 
with the subjective motive of the deed, is understood 
to leave a legacy in the shape of a driving 
impulse(vasana). This dynamic stimulus never vanishes 
without leaving some impressions on both the individual 
and social consciousness, (65) until it finally matures 
and exhausts itself in the production of its own 
retribution, either as punishment or reward. 
The process is firstly activated by the morally 
determined kusala (wholesome) or akusala (unwholesome) 
karma, which arises from every act and thought. Karmic 
potentials having then been accumulated, are thus 
passive until they are reactivated at some later time. 
This '"latent karma" was designated in the 
IN A J-. ' 
Abhidharmakosha" by Vasubandhu, as karmavasanas or 
ka=abijas. (66) He explained the maturation process 
analogically, both as the suffusion of perfumes which 
when ""re-exhaled" produced a further impregnation, and 
similarly as dormant seeds stored for future 
germination. When the seeds germinated or maturation 
took place, the passive karma was re-activated(karma- 
phala) yielding its heterogeneous fruits. 
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The maturation process of this moral energy 
therefore is embodied in the interdependency of the 
cause and effect relationship of the samsaric cycle. 
Since the causal law is considered to be inviolable, in 
that for every effect there must have been a potent 
cause, it is inevitable that human beings are 
conditioned by their karmic heritage, in that their 
physical and psychological natures are the fruits of 
previous actions. In this manner ka=a-vipaka carries 
as the retributive imprint the bodily endowment and 
temperamental constitution of the new life, and 
rationally accounts for the diversity of circumstances 
from which human beings can be affected propitiously or 
adversely. 
From this analysis of the karmic principle, there 
would appear to be little scope within the chain of 
karma-vipaka for any possibility of voluntary attitude 
and action. However, Buddhism affirms that while the 
external aspects of the karmic fruition are totally 
accommodated within the karmic causal series, the 
dispositional tendencies are recognised as only 
predisposing rather than determinative. (67) In one's 
present state the will is not entirely bound by 
external causes, but can counteract the inclinations 
imposed upon one's psychological nature. This then is 
the sphere in which the chain of karma-vipaka may be 
interrupted, providing the potential capacity for self- 
expression, in that each individual has the facility to 
"'slough off latent vices" (68) and the curse of 
unwholesome ka=a. 
Max Weber in his 
-'*"Sociology 
of Religion, ", has 
suggested that the Indian doctrine of karma is an 
extremely comprehensive and formal solution to the 
problem of evil and suffering, in that the universe is 
-Iqq 
157 
viewed as a completely connected and self-contained 
world of ethical retribution. (69) Indeed Buddhism not 
only advocates an individualistic interpretation of the 
karmic theory, but considers that the karmic effects of 
moral and immoral deeds once committed, determines not 
only one's own future, but also bequeaths wider effects 
on the social structure. Buddhism is of the opinion 
therefore, that moral deeds performed are not only in 
the individual's self-interest, but that they discharge 
an act of goodwill to the community at large. In this 
way the transgressions of moral laws or the promotion 
of virtue, is retarded or assisted by each generation. 
Consequently the stock ka=a transmitted to the 
succeeding generations matures either impaired or 
augmented. 
In his book "The Law Of Ka=a", Bruce Reichenbach 
has argued that whatever suffering or satisfaction is 
precipitated by another's actions, we function merely 
as the agent, for each individual's fortune or 
misfortune is already determined by their past karma. 
Hence he questions the motivation supporting a social 
conscience, suggesting that it is not genuine concern 
for the community as a whole, but rather the desire to 
avoid accruing unwholesome karma for oneself. This 
analysis may seem rather harsh, but there is some 
support for this view-point in the "Milindapadha" in 
which King Milinda puts the question to the monk 
Nagasena: "can X be responsible for another-s deeds and 
anotherfs suffering resulting from those deeds? " 
Nagasena responds by affirming "just so, great King, 
deeds good and evil are done by this name-and-fox7n and 
another is reborn, but that other is not thereby 
released from its deeds". (70) 
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However, fundamental to a Buddhist conception of 
retributive justice, is that it requires equal 
retaliation in proportion to the degree of moral or 
immoral action. If by one's own personal endeavour the 
causal sequence can be altered, then there are all 
kinds of possibilities and chances for development. 
Moreover one's current responses may not only change 
one's own temperament, and thus significantly affect 
personal future situations, but also the wider sphere 
of the environment and other human beings. 
To have a more coherent appreciation of the karmic 
retributive process, it is necessary to engage with the 
theory of rebirth which took root historically 
alongside it. In the "'Anguttara-Nikaya-, the Buddha 
emphasised that the retributive process entailed both 
visible and future consequences. Practical experience 
showed that an immoral person was not always made to 
suffer for an evil action in this present life, and 
similarly the result of a generous nature might only 
come to fruition in a future existence. (71) There 
might seem to be no obvious empirical connection 
between the moral quality of the present life and the 
immediate fortune or misfortune experienced. 
Nevertheless ka=a as the entail of samsara existed 
throughout rebirths, in that the karmic force or 
dispositions were preserved in subsequent re- 
becomings. (72) 
Reflection earlier in this chapter revealed that 
Buddhism considers all experiences of existence as 
dukkha, the root cause being avijja. Hence the Second 
Noble Truth confirmed that pain and suffering were 
caused by our ignorant desires; the "Dha=apadha" 
stating very clearly that: "men driven on by craving 
run about like a hunted hare. Fast bound in its 
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fetters they undergo suffering for a long time, again 
and again"'(73) This absence of intuitive insight 
(nana) expressed by one's delusion, thus stimulates 
volitional acts, which in turn produce karmic 
dispositions. It is this karmic force generated as 
mental energy at the moment of death, which maintains 
one life-stream to another. Death is therefore 
anticipated as only the end of one waxing period of the 
life-process. (74) Hence while karmic remnants (upadhi) 
remain, a mental force will always engender a linking 
psyche, producing a new waxing phase of the life- 
stream. 
Buddhism asserts that the re-becoming connecting 
psyche is not carried over from one life to another. 
The '"'Abhidhanuna" explained that the linking psyche was 
established by the first flash of consciousness arising 
at the precise moment of conception (patisandhi- 
cit: t: a). (75) This consciousness is undeniably 
conditioned by the cuti-vinnana, the last moment of 
consciousness before death, from which the karmic 
potentials as units of dynamic energy are generated. 
This serves as the "seeds of life"(vinnanabijjam) 
carrying with it all the karmic imprint of the previous 
life. (76) 
In the "Milindapandha", the monk Nagasena 
described re-becoming to King Milinda: 
Suppose a man, 0 King, were to light a lamp 
from another lamp, can it be said that the 
one transmigrates from, or to the other? 
Certainly not. Just so, 0 great King is 
rebirth without transmigration. (77) 
He explained that the original light did not pass from 
one lamp to another, yet there was a causal continuity 
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of illumination by the derived light. Similarly, 
though there was no temporal continuity which bridged 
the gap between death and rebirth, the causal 
transference of karmic energy accounted for a 
continuum. (78) 
Furthermore in the "jataka St: ories"_of the Pali 
Canon, analogy is also used to explain the transmission 
of karmic residues as seeds stored in a dormant state 
for future germination, "our deeds are all like seeds 
and bring fox-th fz-uit in kind". (79) Bruce Reichenbach 
evaluating the karmic-rebirth theory, argues that a 
substantialist notion is being utilised to provide an 
explanation for that which is allegedly non- 
substantial. He maintains that it is difficult to 
retain the seed analogy, understood as the concept of a 
seed as a substance existing over time, if a non- 
substantialist theory of karmic causation is to be 
defended. Although the seeds can legitimately 
represent our potential dispositions, character, 
temperament and consciousness, the analogy cannot 
explain how all these human tendencies can be 
reconciled with the denial of the existence of 
persisting substances. 
Clearly Bruce Reichenbach has highlighted the 
tension reflected in the Buddhist attempt to find a 
middle path between eternalism and annihilation. on 
the one hand the Buddha denied that things newly arose, 
maintaining that there was a sequential cause and 
effect of momentary events. (80) On the other hand he 
asserted that the person reborn was not the same person 
who previously existed, affirming that it was contrary 
to Buddhist metaphysics to posit a transmigration of 
consciousness from one persistent substance to 
another. (81) 
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Nevertheless the theory of re-becoming is an 
intrinsic element in the concatenation of events which 
comprises the samsaric cycle of existence. It would 
appear, that in order to avoid compromising the basic 
principle of universal justice, the law of ka=a 
presupposes that a human being is capable of undergoing 
repeated rebirths. Karmic accountability, therefore as 
a retributive theory, does place its entire 
justification on this universal law of rebirth. In 
this manner Buddhism has contrived to mitigate for the 
present diversity of circumstances in which people find 
themselves, while sustaining a law of retributive 
impartiality in accordance with the dharmic causal 
order. 
It would not be pertinent to consider any 
compensatory theory within this karmic-samsaric causal 
law. Any possibility of compensation for suffering or 
misfortune experienced, would suggest that some karma 
was unmerited. This is totally incompatible with the 
concept of karmic justice, for it would violate the 
purpose of the cosmic moral order. Once again Bruce 
Reichenbach argues that the principle of ka=a has more 
"the flavour of the juridical" (82) than the ethical. 
He maintains that any acknowledgement of moral 
accountability is subsumed by the emphasis given in the 
retributive process to the appropriate reward or 
punishment for merit or guilt. Hence he contends that 
a Buddhist ethical notion is not concerned, as in a 
Christian theistic sense, of promoting virtue by 
repentance and reformation to create a renewed moral 
character. 
However, it must be pointed out that in The Third 
Noble Truth the Buddha spoke of ka-mmannirodha as 
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"'emancipation" from this universal retributive justice. 
This involved following the moral discipline of the 
Noble Eightfold Path as a means of liberation from the 
afflictions of suffering in the bondage of samsaric 
existence. The fact that such a path points to the 
cessation of karmic activity, would seem to be a 
further indication that although one's present 
condition is derived from past karma, the moral 
tendencies which determine one's current modes of 
behaviour remain free voluntary action. In part four 
of this chapter therefore, I shall aim to focus on the 
eschatological possibility of liberation from the law 
of retribution and reward, and thus from the realm of 
evil and suffering. The next section however, will 
concentrate entirely on a theistic theodicy which is 
both ethical and teleological, in that it promotes a 
moral arena for character growth and development. 
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The Notion of Suffering as Trial or Discipline. 
Although an Augustinian legacy of divine 
retribution as punishment for our sins is accommodated 
within a Christian theodicy, there is a very resolute 
contention within theism, that the overall purpose of 
God's creation orientates around the conditions 
necessary to encourage the development in human beings 
of spiritual and moral qualities. It is appropriate 
therefore to examine this theological response to the 
free-will debate in the context of a "vale of soul- 
making" theodicy (83), for it is in this defence that 
mainstream Christianity pronounces its foremost 
mitigation for the adversities of human existence. (84) 
Hence the theologian asserts that it is reasonable 
to presume that a developmental and teleological 
perspective necessitates the occurrence of both natural 
and moral evils. Viewed as an unavoidable means to the 
"Good", (85) suffering caused by sinful acts can then be 
justified as the opportunity to strengthen and develop 
moral characteristics and virtues. Likewise the 
incidence of natural evils cannot legitimately 
contradict God's benevolence and omnipotence, for 
constant miraculous intervention to prevent pain and 
suffering would result in the "'natural laws" (86) 
becoming unreliable. Moreover in this natural-physical 
guise, our reactions to the hazardous circumstances of 
physical hardships and difficulties, are estimated as 
promoting higher spiritual virtues and growth of moral 
knowledge. (87) 
In this context a comprehensive discussion on the 
problem of evil and suffering is derived from John 
Hick's systematic explanation of a soul-making 
theodicy. (88) Hick has advanced not only a free-will 
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defence, but also incorporated a theistic teleology 
supplying a meaningful purpose to suffering. In so far 
as Hick asserts that, "the origin of moz-al evil lies 
forever concealed within the mystery of human freedom", 
(89) there would seem to be little doubt that the 
component of free expression is a very significant 
feature to his thesis, to the extent that it becomes a 
justification for moral evil. 
I believe a brief analysis of his propositions 
need to be considered at this stage, for Hick has 
departed from the traditional Augustinian theology, and 
although he has not embraced the Irenaean- 
Schleiermacher tradition totally, it certainly 
underpins his extensive evaluation of the human 
condition. Preceding the Augustinian doctrine, 
Irenaeus in the second century CE. had promoted an 
evolutionary understanding of human development. (90) 
Mankind was not envisaged by Irenaeus as having first 
lived in perfect harmony with nature and God, but as 
imperfect, immature creatures whose concept of the 
divine was very primitive. Thus there was no "'fall" 
from original righteousness to a profound depth of 
total depravity, but rather a delaying of their 
spiritual development at some early stage in the 
evolutionary process of moral and spiritual growth. 
However, until the early nineteenth century it was 
the Augustinian doctrine of the origin and universality 
of sin which was adopted as ecclesiastical dogma. 
Although the Post-Reformation Protestant scholastic 
theologians had challenged the authenticity of this 
classical Christian doctrine, it was Schleiermacher's 
research which seriously confounded the traditional 
theology. Pursuing the Irenaeus notion, (91) 
Schleiermacher denied an ontological structure of 
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original perfection, and endorsed the view of a gradual 
development of human beings in the natural world. (92) 
Hence sin was considered to be the inevitable result of 
mere temporal awareness, and consequently mankind 
disposed to "the sinful self-assertiveness of 
sense-'f. (93) 
In accordance with the Irenaean-Schleiermacher 
hypothesis, Hick's theodicy supports the notion that it 
is necessary for human beings to be located at an 
epistemic distance from God. He asserts that if it is 
God's purpose for his creation to bring human beings 
from self-centred awareness into a moral and spiritual 
consciousness of the divine, then this has to be in 
circumstances in which God is not overwhelmingly 
evident. In his book '"Evil and the God of Love", Hick 
cites Schleiermacher's conviction that: "the merely 
g. radual and impez-fect unfolding of the powez- of the 
God-consciousness is one of the(necessaxy)conditions of 
the human stage of existence". (94) Furthermore Hick 
maintains that if God is not strongly impressed upon 
creaturely consciousness, then this allows human beings 
to respond to their maker's divine revelation without 
any coercing of the human mind. 
Hence it is Hick's contention that humanity should 
be viewed as experiencing a long process of moral 
development and growth. Thus spiritual and moral 
qualities are engendered by the often costly attempts 
to deal with pain and evil suffered. In this way human 
beings can gradually mature, developing a God-centred 
relationship in which they are moulded into "chilren of 
God", and thus the perfected beings whom God desires of 
his creation. In support of this thesis, Hick claims 
that the achievement of moral virtues is meaningless if 
human beings do not have the freedom to choose to do 
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otherwise. (95) Thus he asserts that the attainment of 
moral perfection in the redeeming love of God requires, 
"personal histories of moral effort, a hazardous 
adventure in individual freedom". (96) 
Moreover if human beings are to become morally 
perfected as intended for them by their divine creator, 
then in some cases moral evil can be a means to moral 
growth in others. In this proposal Hick supports the 
utility nature of evil, for he claims that if it is 
God's intention to provide a logically necessary 
environment for the purpose of character growth and 
development, "evil ultimately serves the good puzpose 
of God". (97) In this context he once again quotes 
Schleiermacher's opinion that: "'sin has been ordained 
by God, not indeed sin in and of itself, but sin merely 
in relation to redemption; for otherwise redemption 
itself could not have been ordained". (98) 
Such a notion is of course entirely contrary to an 
Augustinian premise, for in this judgement sin has 
become instrumental to the fulfilment of God's purpose. 
Hick defends this Schleiermachean hypothesis by 
asserting, that having created human beings in a state 
of imperfection who function autonomously within this 
world system, it is logically impossible for God to 
ensure that moral evil never occurs. Hence freedom of 
choice as the underlying factor to human responsibility 
and moral goodness, signifies that evil and suffering 
is the logical consequence to the real possibility of 
individuals making wrong choices. (99) 
Moreover Hick contends that moral growth and 
spiritual development can only be promoted by an 
environment that offers genuine challenges; dangers to 
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be faced and the possibility of failures. He maintains 
that only in such a world of trial and testing can 
human beings attain final maturity and perfection. 
Hick therefore supports T. R. Tennant's opinion that: 
"since it is only in such a world that moral 
personality can develop at all the creator's goodness 
is vindicated". (100) However, protagonists have argued 
that freedom of choice might account for the vast 
proportion of human cruelty and misery, but it does not 
provide adequate justification for human suffering in 
the circumstances of natural catastrophes and 
disasters, and therefore raises the question of God's 
righteousness and mercy. (101) 
Furthermore it is argued, the opportunity to 
exercise one's free choice as an occasion to learn 
moral accountability, might in theory be a benefit 
worth pursuing. However, there is considerable factual 
evidence to suggest that the degree of suffering and 
the quantity of evil, produces the opposite. In fact 
rather than promoting the intended virtues, hardships 
and difficulties often cultivate their destruction. 
Hence those critical of Hick's theodicy deny that the 
process of soul-making can be considered a reasonable 
hypothesis, if the means used to achieve it generate 
such horrifying and in many cases innocent 
suffering. (102) 
Hick indeed acknowledges the validity of such an 
argument and queries this himself. He states: 
still the question must be asked. Need the 
world contain the more extreme and crushing 
evils which it in fact contains? Are not 
life-'s challenges often so severe as to be 
self-defeating when considered as soul-making 
influences? (103) 
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He admits that although some evils and suffering 
caused, can be reconciled as actively assisting the 
general process of moral development, he concedes that 
excessive misery and injustices, and the worst kind of 
disease and catastrophe are above our rational 
contemplation. 
Thus Hick agrees that much of this moral and 
physical adversity is beyond our human justification. 
He affirms that, "such suffering remains unjust and 
inexplicable, haphazard and cruelly excessive", (104) 
and can actually turn people away from God rather than 
attract them to repentance. However, the final 
component to his soul-making theodicy is an 
eschatological perspective, in that humankind's 
spiritual and moral endeavour to become perfected 
beings in a genuine relationship with God, does not 
cease in this earthly life but continues into the 
eschaton. (105) This signifies that there will be no 
eternal damnation and everlasting torment in hell, for 
all souls will eventually be brought into the heavenly 
kingdom, thereby culminating in the universal salvation 
of humanity. 
Hence Hick maintains that even the most 
outstanding evils and unmerited suffering will be both 
remedied and transformed to eternal bliss in the world 
here-after. He asserts therefore that: 
Christian theodicy must point forward to that 
final blessedness, and claim that this 
infinite goodness will render worthwhile all 
the pain and travail and wickedness that has 
occurred on the way to it. (106) 
Therefore the salvific consummation of this soul-making 
earthly existence, is a conviction that eternal bliss 
can be ours in the life here-after. In this way Hick 
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contends that God's goodness and justice are both 
vindicated. 
Although Hick accepts that one cannot rationally 
justify the "'Idysteleological suffering"(107) in the 
world, recognising that God must ultimately be 
responsible for both the origin and the relentlessness 
of evil and suffering, he does nevertheless staunchly 
defend it. He challenges the argument of those scholars 
who maintain that human moral character should be able 
to develop without the apparent randomness of unjust 
calamity, or the intensity of malice and cruelty which 
is constantly experienced. Hick claims that such an 
assumption infers that an omnigood creator who is 
omnisciently powerful, has the intention of providing 
for finite creatures a pain-free environment. (108) 
He therefore counters this argument by insisting 
that moral virtues, which have been achieved by 
asserting one's freedom to choose within situations of 
trial and testing, are substantially more worthwhile 
than those possessed effortlessly. Moreover it is 
essential to the process of eventual perfectibility as 
children of God, that a necessary aspect of our growth 
and development logically entails an environment where 
disasters and dangers afflict human beings in 
contingent, but random and unrestrained manners. Thus 
it is not reasonable to require God to revoke human 
autonomy when its misuse becomes intolerable to 
us. (109) 
Those critical of Hick's hypothesis concerning 
one's creaturely epistemic distance from God, argue 
that the necessity for God to conceal his presence does 
not logically require the existence of so many severe 
moral and physical evils. God they claim, could have 
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devised other ways to arouse us out of our sinful ways 
and induce repentance. (110) By means of response, Hick 
argues that it is not because of the epistemic distance 
from God that human beings experience so much 
adversity. Separateness from God does not imply that 
human beings are incapable of making rational, 
intelligent moral decisions, only that it is 
contingently true that the evil caused by wrong moral 
choices reinforces this estrangement from God. 
David Basinger in his article "Divine O=iscience And 
The Soteriological Problem Of Evil", stresses the 
tension that appears to exist between the high premium 
Hick places on human freedom, and an eschatological 
component which affirms eventual universal salvation. 
It is argued that compensatory assurances in a future 
life, for pain and misery suffered in this present one, 
can only be justified if God can eventually bring about 
a universal salvation; one in which the entire human 
race freely responds, and the phenomenon of evil is 
absolved. Moreover speculation on the immortality of 
the soul may carry little conviction for those beset by 
severe afflictions. Furthermore it does not entirely 
satisfy one's sense of justice that these misfortunes 
should be considered the consequence of moral 
development of the immortal soul. 
In addition, Hick's critics challenge the issue of 
free-agency in the eschaton. They disparage the fact 
that this soul-making theodicy focuses on the 
individual's capacity to freely accept the gift of 
salvation, or be destined for damnation. The 
protagonist claims, that if the facility of human 
autonomy provided by our separateness from God is lost, 
then God would have violated his soul-making programme 
in order to effect universal salvation. On the other 
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hand, if human freedom was secure, then it would appear 
that a required epistemic distance from God is not an 
arbitrary requirement for a character forming agenda. 
Thus Hick's assertion of eventual universal salvation 
it is claimed, raises the question of the validity of 
this freedom. How is universal salvation to be 
effected if God cannot force his creatures to 
acknowledge and repent of their sins, thereby accepting 
redemption and eternity with God? 
Defending his position, Hick accepts that without 
the eschatological dimension and the conviction of 
eternal bliss in the doctrine of life-after-death, a 
soul-making theodicy could not be reconciled to a 
righteous, good God. Nevertheless given this 
eschatological component, the question of universal 
salvation is a conditional, yet predictable, resolution 
to God's purpose for his creation. Hence it is my 
intention in the final section to this chapter to 
explore the eschatological strategy that reinforces a 
soul-making theodicy, thereby offering positive meaning 
to the reality of suffering. In addition the 
soteriological aspect within the Buddhist tradition 
will be examined further. Concerned primarily with 
bringing about liberation, Buddhism offers a final 
consolation in a salvific realisation. The all- 
encompassing suffering in the realm of samsaric 
existence will then be eliminated, and nirvanic reality 
attained. 
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Eschatological and Soteriological Aspects in the 
Christian and Buddhist Traditions. 
Clearly a crucial element of John Hick's soul- 
making theodicy is an eschatological perspective which 
offers hope of eternal life beyond the grave. This 
eschatology supports a twofold notion: firstly, that of 
progressive sanctification in an intermediate state as 
an ongoing process of purification, by which an 
individual is perfected for ultimate destiny. 
Secondly, the hope of immortality hypothesis, in which 
due compensation in eternal bliss will be one's 
recompense for all the apparent unjustified sufferings 
in this life. Furthermore these proposals allegedly 
support a meaningful freedom with respect to salvation, 
in that the autonomy bestowed on human beings in this 
life is understood to continue in the after life. 
It is Hick's contention that a belief in an 
eventual eternal destiny supplies positive meaning to 
the moral purpose of this life. Moreover he argues 
that the, ""whole earthly travail of faith and moral 
effort is rendered needless"(111) if at the moment of 
death we are "transmuted in the twinkling of an eye 
into perfect beingsff (112) or condemned to eternal 
damnation. He therefore posits an intermediate state, 
arguing that we are not automatically transformed into 
perfect beings. The sanctification begun in this life 
through the pain and suffering of soul-making, 
continues in the after-life until, "being changed into 
his likeness from one degree of gloxy to another" (113) 
we become perfected creatures. Thus Hick rejects the 
idea of everlasting punishment without any hope of an 
eventual reconciliation for the whole of creation. He 
therefore supports the argument of the late Archbishop 
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William Temple(1881-1944) who writes, "there is no-one 
bad enough to go straight into eternal danmation". (114) 
Consequently Hick supports the concept of 
progressive sanctification in an intermediate state 
between death and an ultimate union with God. He 
maintains that he is not merely endorsing a theological 
construct to authenticate an eschatological theory, but 
claims biblical verification for this concept. It 
would appear that the notion of an intermediate state 
was commonly referred to synonymously as "'Abraham's 
bosom". This designation is affirmed in the "Parable 
of Dives and Lazarusff; at the death of the beggar 
Lazarus we are told that he "was cax-. ried by the angels 
into Abraham-s bosom". (115) Traditionally this notion 
is understood to support the concept of Purgatory, and 
has undoubtedly been an indispensable doctrine to the 
eschatology of Christian theology. There is of course 
the well established bloodcurdling imagery of this 
state, as a spine-chilling and hair-raising condition 
in which individuals writhe in torment as a penalty for 
their transgressions. (116) 
Contemporary Christian theism maintains however, 
that such representation is purely superstition and a 
corrupt misinterpretation that needs to be purged from 
the doctrine. This intermediate state should not be 
considered as suffering and torment as some external 
penalty for sins committed. It is a process of 
cleansing, in which the individual experiences 
spiritual death, involving anguish and remorse in a 
painful surrender of the ego-centred self. (117) Hence 
this process of purification provides a movement 
towards reconciliation with God and blissful expectancy 
of a closer union in the final consummation. 
Visualised in this manner, it is argued that the word 
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"purgatory" is an appropriate term for a process by 
which we atone for our sins, and progressively qualify 
for our ultimate destiny. 
In general current biblical scholarship supports 
John Macquarrie's conviction that, "heaven,, puzgatoxy 
and hell ax-e not shaxply separated but form a kind of 
continuum". (118) Hence they indicate that the 
traditional view of an uncompromising separation 
between those ""lost" and those '"saved" is now much less 
dogmatic. In fact for those that defend Hick's theory 
of universal salvation, it is acknowledged that while 
some may sojourn in hell for a very lengthy period of 
time, they will eventually be reconciled to God and 
thus spend eternity in heaven. 
Hell therefore is no longer conceived in an 
Augustinian sense as equal retaliation, in which harsh 
punishment is extracted from the guilty in full 
recompense for their wickedness; a punishment requiring 
everlasting mental and physical torment. This notion 
of eternal damnation in hell, Nicholas Berdyaev 
suggests is: 
hideous and morally revolting[ --- ]when it is 
intexpreted in a legalistic sense. Such an 
intexpretation is common and vulgar and must 
be completely banished from religious ethics, 
philosophy and theology. (119) 
Hell should not be considered as some external 
punishment assigned for sinful actions, but a 
subjective resolving of one's ungodliness, such that 
the distinctly sinful personality of the individual 
undergoes destruction. 
Similarly heaven is not to be understood 
spatially, but as a symbol for the fulfilment of 
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selfhood in the divine consummation. This 
identification with the beatific vision is a direct 
awareness of the immediate presence of God. Thus 
having been purified we are raised by grace to the 
bliss of our eternal destiny. Instead of seeing 
"through a glass darkly" as in this human life, once 
perfected beings, we will see "face to face-". (120) 
David Basinger in his article "Divine omniscience 
and the Soteriological Problem of Evil", examines 
whether the type of knowledge God possesses is 
relevant. In this paper he explores an argument by 
David Hunt who challenges the notion of the eschaton 
and in particular the credibility of a state of 
purgatory. Hunt contends that if God has "middle 
knowledge"(121) as claimed by many traditionalists, he 
could have circumvented the need for an intermediate 
state. God would know who was going to respond 
positively to the gospel and who would reject it under 
all circumstances. There would seem to be no reason 
therefore why those bound for eternal bliss should not 
pass at death directly to the heavenly state, and that 
similarly why those bound for everlasting separation 
from God in hell should not proceed there straightaway. 
In the same article Hunt's response is supported 
by William Craig who affirms that a God possessing 
middle knowledge would indeed know which individuals 
were bound for heaven or those who, "would not freely 
receive Christ under any circumstances no matter how 
much the Spirit of God worked on their hearts-". (122) 
However, Hunt admits that his criticism of an 
intermediate state would not be valid if it could be 
shown that God's intention was essentially to generate 
from a position of purgatory some moral and spiritual 
value in, ", that the elect need to have actual 
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experiences of trials and temptations". (123) This is 
of course the whole essence of Hick's hypothesis of a 
progressive sanctification. 
Nevertheless for many critics the kind of 
omniscience that God possesses is very relevant. The 
question of God possessing middle knowledge has raised 
the problem of human autonomy prompting some theists to 
deny this specific model of omniscience, asserting that 
God did not know before the creative process who would 
respond positively to him or who was ultimately bound 
for eternity in hell. They acknowledge that the 
inherent value of creating a world of individuals with 
significant freedom to freely accept or reject the gift 
of salvation, signifies that for God creation was a 
risk which does not in anyway diminish his power or 
goodness. (124) 
Many censure an eschatological perspective by 
simply denying the intelligibility of a doctrine of 
eternal life. Such a critic is Antony Flew who has 
disputed the credibility of such a conception, claiming 
that it is devoid of assertive meaning, for it cannot 
be judged to be false or genuine. Likewise others have 
challenged this theistic assumption, by claiming that 
many have not had the opportunity to accept or reject 
God's plan of salvation. Hence none of the Christian 
soul-making precepts retain any vital significance if 
severed from a belief in life after death as a 
guarantee of an ultimate blissful destiny. 
Hick has responded to this criticism with a 
proposition of eschatological verification. He asserts 
that the Christian vision contains the potentiality for 
verification in that a believer perceives this life to 
be a preparation for eternal destiny, where indeed 
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there will be the possibility of validation. God is 
believed to act in this world only through human 
responses not by way of direct appeal. While an 
atheist's life can only have meaning and fulfilment 
within the bounds of finite existence, the Christian 
assumes the possibility of consummation only beyond 
this present life. 
The second notion central to Hick's eschatological 
perspective is the hope of immortality. In the 
previous section I endeavoured to illustrate that 
belief in an after life and the fulfilment of one's 
eternal destiny, revolved around the conviction that 
however excessive and apparently undeserving suffering 
had been in this "vale of soul-making", in the life 
beyond the grave there would be just recompense. If 
this thesis is to have any plausibility it would seem 
necessary for there to be some retention of personal 
identity to take account of this compensation for 
earthly suffering. In other words, the individual who 
is to appreciate this blissful consolation in the after 
life, has to be aware of being the same autonomous self 
who suffered in their human existence. (125) 
Consequently it is of fundamental importance to Hick's 
hypothesis to establish the concept of an immortal soul 
as a meaningful notion, for without this potential 
reality there can be no higher purpose to serve. The 
values and goals one is striving freely to cultivate 
will have no meaning if they do not transcend this 
earthly existence to be continued in a richer and 
fuller communion with God as our eternal destiny. (126) 
The Christian claim therefore in the words of 
Saint Athanasius is that, "God became what we are so 
that we might become immortal as he is". (127) 
Nevertheless, the survival of our self-identity beyond 
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the grave is not to be perceived as persisting through 
linear time as a disembodied soul-substance which is 
imperishable. Immortality of the soul has to be 
envisaged as, ", 'a potentiality for existence to be 
realised or lost in the deeds and decisions of this 
I. ife-". (128) Hence the Christian hope of eternal life 
in a heavenly abode is enshrined in this eschatological 
constituent of immortality, which serves to provide a 
worthy ultimate salvation. 
it is appropriate at this juncture to return to 
the Buddhist tradition and consider the soteriological 
implications of liberation from all compounded 
existence in the unconditional goal of nirvana. In 
section two of this chapter it was established that the 
law of ka=a is intrinsically linked with the principle 
of universal justice. Hence this system of retributive 
punishment and reward are central to the illusory view 
of life which constitutes dukkha and the cycle of 
samsara. The law of ka=a therefore functions not only 
to develop moral action in human performance, but also 
to advance the self-realisation that innate in human 
nature, deeply rooted in the ego, is the tendency to 
desire and cling to things. 
Although the Buddha himself said, llwlthcýut 
beginning or end monks, in this round of rebirth", (129) 
his concern was to alleviate the afflictions of 
suffering and the bondage of finite existence. Hence 
he spoke of kammannirodha as emancipation from one's 
present predicament, and the end of all existential 
dis-ease in an eventual transcendental reality. Thus 
the continuous life process is not be regarded as fully 
eternal, for by means of following the Noble Eightfold 
Path and cultivating the right view of life(samadithi), 
the three fundamental truths of anicca, dukkha and 
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anatta are realised. (130) In this way final 
deliverance from samsara can be attained and the life- 
stream can be terminated: "The mind is fx-eed fx-om the 
canker of sense pleasure, from the canker of becoming, 
and from the canker of ignorance-". (131) Furthermore 
the Buddhist sutras confirm that: 
this is peace, this is the highest, namely, 
the calming of all the activities, the 
rejection of all attachment, the destruction 
of craving, the freedom from desire, 
nirvana. (132) 
Given the relevance of the Noble Eightfold Path as 
a means of liberation from the afflictions of suffering 
in the bondage of samsaric existence, I consider it 
desirable to focus briefly on this Buddhist route to 
enlightenment(bodhi), and consequently the 
transcendental reality of nirvana. The fact that such 
a path points to the cessation of karmic activity would 
seem to be a further indication that although one's 
present condition is derived from past ka=a, the moral 
tendencies which determine one's current modes of 
behaviour remain free voluntary actions. 
Buddhism is steadfast in its declaration that 
owing to our ka=a, human existence is charged with 
suffering both potential and actual. Furthermore this 
individual and existential "'unsatisfactoriness" is a 
circumstance of the conditioned co-origination 
pertaining to the causal dharmic principle. However, 
they insist that because its causes are determinable 
they are also removable. (133) The Buddha stressed this 
repeatedly: "And this is the Noble Tx-uth of the Way 
which leads to the stopping of sorrow. It is the Noble 
Eightfold Path". (134) Hence by the application of 
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rightmindfulness(samma-sati)one can cultivate an 
understanding that existence is dukkha. Consequently 
by recognising the world as it is, and nurturing a 
proper mentalistic approach through meditation and 
right action(samma-kammanta), one can not only improve 
the quality of one's present life, but also the hope of 
a better rebirth. The fact that one has to personally 
make a decision to follow the discipline of the Noble 
Eightfold Path, further reinforces the importance of 
free-agency to one's present karmic existence. 
Consequently there is volitional consolation in 
the knowledge that re-becoming is not necessarily 
eternal, for although it might take many life-times of 
effort when the craving and desires are finally 
extinguished, then karma is also exhausted. Without 
the causal conditions of karma there can be no 
possibility of rebirth, for there is no ground for the 
unity of another individual and thus the continuity of 
existence. (135) There is consolation therefore in 
understanding suffering as part of the cosmic scheme of 
things. This holistic perspective provides the 
awareness that suffering is not endless; liberation is 
indeed possible by following the path which leads to 
the realisation of nirvana. Hence Buddhism claims that 
the Path must be considered as a way of life to be both 
followed and practised. Thus the hope of liberation 
involves the appropriate application of meditational, 
contemplative and ethical techniques. Self-discipline 
is integral to one's self-development to stimulate 
moral, spiritual and intellectual achievement. 
Furthermore meditative contemplation on the moral 
virtues embodied in the Noble Eightfold Path, will 
direct the mind to concentrate on the emptiness of all 
things. (136) In this way one can reach the state of 
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non-discrimination and transcend the duality of the 
pleasure and suffering of human existence. It is by 
the shedding of self-centred desires and the awakening 
to egolessness, that one can abandon moral involvement, 
evaluation and judgement. Moreover this detachment 
from all conditioned experiences achieves a unification 
of the mind in which moral perfection is attained, 
which in turn leads to an integration of one's 
personality. In his "Psychology of Nirvana", Rune 
Johanasson comments that: "the whole gamut of Buddhist 
method therefore aims at purifying the citta. if this 
purification is complete, nibbana is attained". (137) 
Gunapala Dharmasiri is of the opinion, that 
attainment of the liberated mind, characterised by the 
four noble qualities of enlightenment, purity, peace 
and compassion, is the culmination of achieving 
intellectual insight. He disagrees with the view-point 
of many scholars that nirvana is a mystical intuitive- 
like experience. (138) Masao Abe for one, claims that 
nirvana presents an harmonious unity which "tends to be 
mystical and ontologicalff. (139) He is supported in 
this opinion by Ninian Smart who asserts, "my 
contention is that Buddhist mysticism[---]can be 
counted pure mysticismff. (140) However, Dharmisiri 
defends his argument by emphasising that within the 
canonical texts, wherever enlightenment is referred to, 
all asavas(defilements)are destroyed by panna(wisdom)or 
anna(gnosis): "Whoever sees this as it really is by 
perfect wisdom his desires for becoming disappear 
r --- ], by the complete extinction of desires there 
is 
dispassion, cessation without remainder, Nirvana". (141) 
He contends therefore, that it is not a theoretical 
knowledge which is being described by the term 
annavamokkha(release from gnosis), but a deeper 
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perceptive wisdom which is necessary for the attainment 
of nirvana- 
I have aimed to illustrate so far, that for anyone 
who effectively follows the Noble Eightfold Path, by 
means of the appropriate self-disciplines necessary to 
achieve detachment from the realm of samsaric 
existence, can eventually attain liberation from all 
compounded things in the unconditioned state of 
nirvana. It is of considerable significance to indicate 
however, that within this context, although free-agency 
is necessary for the promotion of spiritual discipline 
arýd the process of virtues, essentially emancipation 
from one's ka=a is achieved by directing the mind to 
annul all desires and attachments caused by one's ego- 
centred will. A state of passionlessness is thus 
affected; the spontaneity of freedom without volition. 
I believe that it would be useful at this stage 
therefore to reflect on how Buddhism accounts for 
nirvanic reality, and to consider briefly the merit 
given to this salvific goal, in order to appreciate the 
significance of its soteriological role. 
The Buddha when explaining the characteristics of 
nirvana divulged that it could not be viewed as an 
observable permanent state: 
Monks,, there exists that condition wherein is 
neither earth nor water nor fire nor air: 
wherein is neither the sphere of infinite 
space nor of infinite consciousness nor of 
nothingness nor of neither consciousness nor 
unconsciousness, wherein there is neither 
this world nor a world beyond nor both 
together nor moon and sun. Hence, monks, I 
declare is no coming to birth; thither is no 
going(from life); therein is no duration; 
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thence is no falling; there is no arising. 
Xt is not something fixed, it moves not on, 
it is not based on anything. That indeed is 
the end of ill. (142) 
Hence it confounds any conventional classification 
of experience, and cannot be distinguished by a 
straightforward contrast between the profane realm of 
samsara and the sacred condition of nirvana. 
Nevertheless the term "nirvana" literally means the 
extinction of passion, and the Buddha confirmed that 
suffering as the '"dis-ease" occasioned by the 
conditioned nature of phenomenal existence was not 
limitless. It could, by the attainment of the 
unconditioned state, be totally eliminated. The Buddha 
therefore recommended nirvana as "the perfect 
health". (143) Furthermore, he described nirvana as, 
""peace, happiness, security and kindness". (144) Indeed 
we are told in the "Digha Nikaya", that as the ultimate 
aesthetic experience, ""the consciousness of such a 
person is without distinguishing marks, infinite, 
shinning, untouched by material elements". (145) 
It is important to recognise that the Pali Canon 
explicitly reports two kinds of nirvana: "One is 
obtainable in this life with the base remaining, but 
the stream of becoming cut off". (146) This is the 
experience of an empirical, present-orientated 
enlightenment achieved by meditative insight, which 
transcends the duality of all compounded phenomena to 
acquire a liberated mind. However, complete nirvana or 
par. inirvana, (147) "belongs to the future when all 
becomings cease utterly". (148) It is interesting to 
note that while nirvana can be '"achieved" by a person 
in their present physical existence, parinirvana is 
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alleged to ", happen" when that person dies. At one's 
physical death therefore, complete nirvana is the 
termination of the rebirth cycle by which another human 
existence would arise. For those who have already 
transcended this world and attained empirical nirvana 
the base of any further re-becoming is consequently 
removed. (149) 
Pariniva=a would seem to indicate that with the 
physical death of a person who has attained empirical 
nirvana, there is in every respect extinction. Hence 
it is necessary to reflect on how Buddhism interprets 
what happens when an enlightened person dies: in fact 
to consider in what respect salvation is conceivable. 
In the "Sutita Nipata", the Buddha condemned both 
nihilism and eternalism as "wrong views" and proposed 
the middle way between the two. When asked whether one 
who had attained nirvana did or did not exist, the 
Buddha's answer was 'Ina pamanam atthi-"; such a person 
is beyond measure. He further confirmed this by 
asserting: 
monks, there is a not-born, not-become, not- 
made, not-compounded. Monks if that not- 
born, not-become, not-made, not-compounded 
were not, there would be apparent no escape 
from this here that is born, become, made, 
compounded. (150) 
Saeng Chandra Ngarm a contemporary Theravadin 
Buddhist, has discussed the "deathlessness" of nirvana 
in "Life, Death and the Deathless in Theravada 
Buddhism"_where he explores the idea of a '"cosmic 
nirvana". He suggests that while a person's physical 
body disintegrates at death, the mind which had already 
become purified citta merges with the cosmic nirvanic 
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element. Ngarm admits that such an interpretation 
would of course be critically censured by orthodox 
Buddhist doctrine, for his analysis proposes an idea 
virtually analogous to the atman merging with the 
universal soul of Vedantic philosophy. (151) Ngarm's 
interpretation can be seen to develop that of Rune 
Johansson's in which he makes a radical distinction 
between citta(mind) and vinnana(consciousness). (152) 
This according to Dharmasiri could clearly lead to a 
theory of some form of immortality. In his opinion the 
distinction Johansson is making is completely 
unwarranted, for throughout the "Pali Nikayas- "citta" 
and "'vinnana" are used synonymously. Furthermore the 
Buddha had on many occasions insisted that nirvana was 
the extinction of consciousness claiming that, "by the 
extinction of consciousness, there is no origin of 
pain". (153) 
The concept of nirvana as an ontological existent 
reality, in which the saint has some form of 
immortality, is a particularly alien notion to 
Buddhism. If nirvana was to mean further existence of 
the enlightened individual it would necessarily be 
attached to another form of perduring entity. (154) 
Hence the Buddha explained that what happened to a 
liberated individual after death had to be treated as 
an unanswerable question because, "form, feelings --- I 
cannot be taken as the saint". (155) He maintained that 
there could be no being to exist or be annihilated. 
When the conditioned five-fold aggregates that 
constituted the psycho-physical person ceased to exist, 
then there was no enduring entity which could come in 
contact with a permanently existent reality. (156) 
Hence the Buddha in order to clarify the question of 
nirvana after death explained that: "those whose minds 
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are unattached to any future existence are destroyed of 
their seeds and their desires do not increase. The 
wise extinguish like this lamp". (157) 
In seeking to account for the soteriological 
aspect of nirvanic salvation, it is apparent that this 
Buddhist unconditional goal can only be considered as 
the transmutation of the enlightened individual into 
the inconceivable. It is not appropriate therefore to 
conceive of this transcendental reality as existence 
orientated, as the karmic existence that drives the 
passions is totally eliminated and consequently the 
thirst for self-identity. Thus a notion of free-will 
is a meaningless concept to this passionless state 
which transcends all such duality. 
There is no doubt that both Christian and Buddhist 
traditions affirm a particular salvific dimension in 
order to offer the hope of deliverance from all 
existential suffering. However, a Christian would 
argue that the absence of a notion involving some form 
of immortality of the individual is an obstacle to the 
intelligibility of a nirvanic salvation. Conversely, 
from a Buddhist perspective the hope of immortality as 
a meaningful concept establishing a permanent enduring 
soul, is totally opposed to the basic tenets of their 
philosophy. Nevertheless although expressing 
significantly divergent orientation both in concept and 
attitude, the need to account for the reality of evil 
and suffering in the phenomenal world has generated 
responses which both traditions claim provides a way or 
path to salus, meaning ""health" or '"wholesomeness" 
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Summary Comments. 
The aim of this chapter has been to reflect upon 
the relevance of a notion of free-agency while 
exploring how each tradition accounts for the reality 
of evil and suffering in the phenomenal world. 
Initially focusing on the aspect of punishment for sins 
committed as a means of explaining human suffering, it 
was stressed that within the Christian tradition the 
doctrinal consequences of sin were a burden shared by 
all humanity. Moreover the effect of this 
psychologically determined sin was the essence of an 
Augustinian theory of divine retribution. His 
perspective supported the notion that God's opposition 
to sin required that human beings suffered punishment. 
I have attempted to convey that contemporary 
Christian theism no longer prescribes to a simple 
retributive theodicy as a means of explaining the 
reason for human suffering. It is generally considered 
that a world in which a purely retributive system is 
believed to operate reflects a tension between God's 
moral attributes of mercy and justice, and does not 
reveal the possibility of forgiveness of sins and 
reconciliation with God. Such a world is viewed as 
greatly inferior to one in which uncertain and 
contingent state of affairs provides the impetus for 
spiritual and moral growth. 
Hence one of the foremost defences of the justice 
and righteousness of God in the face of evil and 
suffering is provided by John Hick's "'*vale of soul- 
making" theodicy. He presents a sustained thesis of 
soul-making in which he posits the hypothesis that this 
world serves as an arena for moral endeavour. He 
explains that hardships and adversities are 
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indispensable features for the moral discipline and 
purification of human beings. Furthermore Hick gives 
positive meaning to evil and suffering by reinforcing 
this vale of soul-making, with the proposal of future 
compensation for unmerited suffering in the hope of 
immortality in a life beyond this historical existence. 
Moreover he claims that this eschatological strategy 
further confirms the continual process of humankind's 
transformation into complete personhood. This then 
culminates in God's purpose for his creation by 
consummating their pedagogical maturity in eventual 
universal salvation. 
It is particularly instructive to identify that 
philosophical theology recognises the relevance of the 
notion of a cognitive freedom in relation to God and 
the theological problem of suffering. Christian theism 
maintains that it is an infinitely significant factor 
to the understanding of the human condition, and also 
the means of vindicating God from responsibility for 
creaturely actions. It would seem that without this 
component of free-agency a soul-making theodicy would 
be unintelligible and Christian theism unable to 
sustain a plausible argument. 
Although it has been revealed that Buddhism 
subscribes to a retributive theory of punishment for 
immoral action, it is not appropriate to consider the 
term "'sin" in an Augustinian sense as implying offences 
against God. Sin from a Buddhist perspective was 
identified as demerit for wrongful actions. Thus moral 
sanctions are explained by the doctrine of ka=a, as an 
impartial theory of retributive justice by which good 
deeds are rewarded and immoral actions punished. As a 
basic factor of the cosmic causal law, karmic force 
once activated has to work out its own fruit, hence 
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giving intelligibility to any present situation or 
experience. 
It was established that karmic activity as 
individual moral action grounds the universal law of 
rebirth. It is this twin principle of ka=a and rebirth 
which mitigates for any personal pain and suffering, 
while reinforcing the notion of a universal justice 
within an impartial cosmic causality. However, the 
Buddhist path calls for the cessation of all that 
purports towards the dis-ease of phenomenal reality; 
the goal being a progressive movement away from all 
compounded existence. Hence Buddhism's salvation is a 
liberation from all duality in a spiritual freedom, it 
is considered to be ', ', a vision of the identity and 
intex-dependence of all things in the univezse". (158) 
Hence it is interesting to consider the 
soteriological consequences of the two traditions. 
Buddhism relegates suffering to the relative truth of 
the empirical world in which a notion of free-will can 
operate in "'conventional" existence, at the level of 
ultimate truth all suffering and free-agency is negated 
along with all fixed standpoints, for freedom in 
nirvana cannot be attained without the realisation of 
the emptiness of all things. However, within Christian 
theism God is considered ultimate truth and our eternal 
destiny an ontological reality. Freedom of the will 
remains a positive concept intrinsic to God's purpose 
for his creation. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
This will be discussed with reference to the 
scholarship of John Hick. 
See chapter one, the section: Theistic Attributes 
of God. Pages 19-24 and chapter two the section: 
Theocentric Providence. Pages 78-79 
The deductive argument from evil has been 
discussed by way of the atheological reasoning of 
Flew and Mackie in chapter one, where they set out 
to demonstrate the positive irrationality of the 
several parts of the theological doctrine. The 
inductive argument will be addressed more 
comprehensively in this chapter with reference to 
the teleological theodicy promoted by Swinburne 
and Hick. 
Epicurus' formulation of the theological problem 
is probably the oldest expression: "Xs he willing 
to prevent evil, but not able? then he is 
malevolent. Xs both able and willing? whence then 
evi 1? -" 
5 Plato. The Republic 379C. 
Socrates is absolving Zeus from all wrongdoing in 
the ills that befall human beings. 
Saint Augustine. Enchiridion chapter 4. 
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7 
8 
9 
The notion of privatio or %, privation" of good as 
the metaphysical source of evil, meant that good 
was seen as positive having priority over evil, 
which was necessarily considered to be negative or 
inf erior. 
Saint Augustine. de Vere Religione. 
The question of divine justice is addressed later 
in this chapter. See the section - The Notion of 
Suffering as Retributive Punishment. 
Pages 150-162 
10 It is interesting that Buddhism also considers 
cupiditas or '"desire" as the factor common to the 
root cause of evil. However, this is stressed as 
avijja or "-ignorance" rather than a misapplication 
of the will in the turning away from the ""Good". 
11 The doctrine of Original Sin as introducing a 
depravity into our nature has been discussed more 
comprehensively in chapter one see the 
section: Creator-Creaturely Relationship. 
Pages 25-31 
12 An evolutionary understanding of moral evil as a 
pre-requisite to moral development and growth as 
supported by Irenaeus of the second century CE. 
was not considered a serious alternative until put 
forward by Schleieremaker in the nineteenth 
century. This is to be discussed later in the 
chapter. See the section: The Notion of Suffering 
as Trial or Discipline. Pages 163-171 
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13 See C. A. Campbell. On Selfhood And Godhood 
Page 276. 
14 The question of what constitutes moral 
responsibility and accountability for one's 
actions is discussed at length in chapter five. 
15 Von Balthasar, H. "Meditation 11: Attempt at an 
Integration of Eastern and Western Meditation" 
Quoted in Kehl, Medard ed. The Von Balthasar 
P, =.: p rq, ý -r- 
16 The notion of strengthening one's character and 
the development of virtues, together with 
consideration of the possibility of eternal bliss 
with God, is discussed in subsequent sections of 
this chapter. 
17 Whitehead, A. N. '"Process and Reality" Page 532. 
Quoted in Surin, Kenneth. Theology and the Problem 
of Evil. Page 90. 
18 A discussion of process theism's response to the 
theistic attributes of God is to be found in all 
sections of the Christian tradition in chapter 
one. 
19 The eschatological dimension in respect to 
salvation is discussed later in this chapter. See 
the section: Eschatological and Soteriological 
Aspects in the Christian and Buddhist Traditions. 
Pages 172-186 
20 In chapter one see the sections: Buddhist Non- 
Theistic Perspectives. Pages 32-34 and Nirvana- 
Beyond The Will. Pages 40-42 
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21 This causal principle which operates in every 
sphere of existence has been discussed briefly in 
chapter one. It will be constantly alluded to 
throughout this thesis, and analysed in 
considerable depth in chapter five. See the 
section: The Doctrine of Paticcasamuppada. 
Pages 307-310 
22 Dhammapada ch. Xll. v. 165. 
23 It would be misleading to suggest that reflections 
on these questions did not produce an extensive 
scholarly analysis from which immense intellectual 
satisfaction was derived. Indeed, academic 
scrutiny indicates that the sophistication of this 
contemplation subsumed the main purpose of the 
Buddha's empirical exercise. See Sharma, R. P. The 
Problem of Evil in Buddhism. Page 311. 
24 Thus summarised: 
The First Noble Truth(c7ukkha)- the all pervading 
trademark of individual existence. 
The Second Noble Truth(samuda_va)- the origin of 
dukkha which is due to our desire for, or grasping 
after things. 
The Third Noble Truth(nirodha)- the cessation of 
dukkha in the release of desire and attachment to 
all things. 
The fourth Noble Truth(marga)- recommends the path 
necessary to overcome the origin of dukkha. 
25 YocfasuLra Commentary ii, 15. Quoted in 
Rhys Davids, C. A. F Buddhist Psychology Page 79. 
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26 a)Apte. The Practical Sanskrit-English Dictionary 
b)Monier-Monier Williams, Sir Monier. A Sanskrit- 
English Dictionary Quoted in Ryuei, Takeda. 
Pure Land Buddhist View of Dukkha 
27 Rhys-Davids, C. A. F. Pali-English Dictionary 
Page 159-161. 
28 These profound ideas essential to Buddhist thought 
will be explained more comprehensively in my 
evaluation of dukkha. The doctrines of anatta and 
paticcasamuppada are discussed at length in 
chapters four and five respectively. See in 
particular the sections in chapter. four: Does A 
Person Have A Soul? Pages 228-244 and 
Philosophical And Ethical Implications. Pages 
245-256 
Chapter. five: The Doctrine Of Paticcasanmppada. 
Pages 307-310 
29 See note 20 
30 Zaehner, R. C. At Sundrv Times Page 95. 
31 SamvuLt: a Nikava 21-2. 
32 Angut: tara Nika_ya: "Catukka Nipata" 
33 Venerable Bhikkhu Buddhadasa. Handbook for Mankind 
Page 27. Quoted in Fonner, Michael Towards A 
Theravada Christology' Page 5. 
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34 Samyutta Nikaya "Khanda samyutta" V. 421. 
The five aggregates or components of the psycho- 
physical person are discussed in detail in chapter 
four. See the section: What is the Concept of a 
Person? Pages 218-227 
35 Tanha can take three forms or aspects: "Kama 
tanha" is the desire for something via sensual 
contact. "Bhava tanha" is the desire to become 
something, and ""vibhava tanha" is the desire to 
purge oneself of anything unpleasant, ugly or 
mean. 
36 Dhammapada V. 243. 
37 A more comprehensive analysis of the "twelve 
links" is explained in chapter five. See notes 21 
and 28. 
38 Ashvaghosa. The Buddha Carita 14: 62,63. 
39 Free-will has been discussed in chapter one in the 
context of the potential for volitional activity 
within the causal series. In this chapter free- 
will is discussed from the specific viewpoint of 
the karmic law as a retributive system. See the 
section: The Notion Of Suffering As Retributive 
Punishment. Pages 150-162 
40 See Fonner. Op. Cit. Page 7. 
Christian theology has always recognised a 1, self- 
emptying" God where union with a physically 
limited humanity in Jesus is accepted as God's 
creative love for humankind. Thus the experience 
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41 
of the suffering Christ is particularly emphasised 
in process theism's belief in God as co-sufferer. 
Also see earlier comments on Process theism's 
perspective in this section. 
This has been discussed in chapter one, see the 
section: Nirvana-Beyond The Will. Pages 40-42 
This concept is explored repeatedly throughout 
this thesis. 
42 This Augustinian conception has been discussed in 
both chapters one, and earlier in this chapter. I 
do not intent at this juncture to elaborate 
further on this classical doctrine, although I 
shall in subsequent sections of this thesis return 
to it. 
43 Saint Augustine. 
44 Ibid. 
Enchiridion_ch. XlV. Section 50 
45 This was discussed fully in chapter one, see the 
section - Creator-Creaturely Relationship. 
Pages 25-31 
46 Saint Augustine. City of God XX. ch. l. 
47 Saint Anselm. Cur Deus Homo ch. 21. Quoted in 
Talbott, T. Punishment, Forgiveness and Divine 
Justice Page 158. 
48 This doctrine has been discussed more 
comprehensively in chapter two. See the 
section: Augustine On Grace. Pages 83-89 
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49 Augustine's doctrine on the election of the saved 
is found in Echiridion ch. XXV. 
50 This aspect of Augustine's doctrine is discussed 
in more detail in chapter five. See the 
section: Theistic Evaluation Of The Debate. 
Pages 323-330 
51 Milton, John Paradise Lost Book iii. 403-410. 
52 1 John. ch. l. V. 9. 
53 1 am referring to the discussion in subsequent 
sections of this thesis on the doctrine of the 
fall. See note 11, and comments made in the 
previous section of this chapter. 
54 Sin can be classified into two types: 1) reaction 
to external standards; moral failure as violation 
of the Buddhist precepts(vipatti). 2) reaction to 
internal awareness of human nature; moral failure 
as the sin of ignorance. 
55 Jayatilleke, K. N. The Message of The Buddha 
Page 255. 
56 Although this is the doctrinal viewpoint, popular 
Buddhism can exhibit a contrary picture. Thus 
according to popular Chinese Buddhism the chanting 
of liturgies, repentance, meritorious actions, 
would all produce the forgiveness of sins. 
57 These concepts are discussed and analysed in a 
subsequent section of this chapter. See 
Eschatological And Soteriological Aspects In The 
Christian And Buddhist Traditions. Pages 172-186 
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58 This was discussed earlier in this chapter. See 
the section: Divergent Perspectives of the Human 
Condition. Pages 137-149 
59 Humphreys, C. Popular Dictionary of Buddhism 
60 Majjhima Nikaya 1.213. "Sachassam lokanam 
voloketi" 
61 See Sam_vutta Nikaya V. 421. 
Digha Nika_va 1.84 and 11.308. 
62 Verdu, Alfonso. Early Buddhist Philosophy 
Page 67 
63 ka=a or sanskara comes from the sanskrit root kr; 
"to do "; "to make "; "to perform"; "to effect"; "to 
produce". 
64 See chapter one, the section - Buddhist Non- 
Theistic Perspectives. Pages 32-34 
65 The aspect of individual karma in which it effects 
the community at large is discussed later in this 
section. 
66 The Abidha=akosha was compiled by Vasubandhu in 
Kashmir in the fifth century C. E. It is a 
fundamental work of the Buddhist school in China 
and reflects the transition from Hinayana to the 
Mahayana viewpoint. Reference to maturation 
causality in Verdu. Op. Cit- Pages 79-90. 
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67 See chapter one, the section: The Karmic Causal 
Fornm1a. Pages 35-39 The idea of dispositional 
tendencies viewed as inclinations is discussed in 
this same section. See also K. N. Jayatilleke's 
support for this theory. Also such talk on 
dispositional tendencies has some analogy with the 
Vijnananavada concept of latent "', seeds". 
68 Hastings, James ed. Encyclopaedia of Religion and 
Ethics Page 534. 
69 Weber, Max. Sociology of Religion. Page 145 
Quoted in Herman, A. L. The Problem of Evil in 
Indian Thought:. Page 252. 
70 Milindapadha 72.7. 
71 Anguttara Nika_va 1.38-39. With the exception of 
five specific deeds which regardless of whatever 
other karma has been accrued would lead to a 
hellish existence in the immediately following 
rebirth(ie. matricide, patricide, arharticide, 
intentional shedding of a Buddha's blood, causing 
a schism within the Sangha)all other deeds could 
lie quiescent for a long time before they ripened. 
72 "'Rebirth" is often termed as '"re-becoming" to 
denote a progressive structure and to prevent any 
suggestion of a permanent soul-type entity. 
73 Dhammapadha V. 342. 
74 In fact Buddhism views the whole of this life span 
as in a similar flux of waxing and re-becoming 
every micro-second. 
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75 In other textual sources the linking psyche is 
referred to as a mysterious being. Hermann Beckh 
(1875-1937) interprets gandhabba as being equipped 
with six senses and capable of interacting with 
the environment. 
76 This idea is consistent with the analogy of the 
ka=abijas to explain latent or passive karma. 
77 Milindapandha 71.16. 
78 The re-becoming process is discussed further in 
chapter four in connection with the implications 
of the anatta doctrine. See the section: 
Philosophical And Ethical Implications. 
Pages 245-256 
79 iatakas 222. 
80 Abhidhamma Buddhists consider events as momentary. 
These momentary events although connected 
sequentially, the cause and effect are not 
contemporaneous with each other. 
81 This theme is taken up again in chapter four, see 
note 78. 
82 Farquhar, J. N. "Ka=a: Its Value as a Doct-rine of 
Life" (Hibbert Journal 20. P. 20.1921-1922) Quoted 
in Reichenbach, B. R. The Law of Ka=a Page 51. 
He further expands this argument on page 161. 
83 It was John Keats in his letter to George and 
Georgiana Keats on the 15th. April 1819 who used 
this phrase. M. B. Forman ed. Letters of John Keats 
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84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
I am using the term "mainstream Christianity" to 
denote the prevailing Catholic and Protestant 
channels of belief. Also see my comments in the 
Introduction. 
am using this as developed by Augustine in that 
God as the sole, ultimate power was perfectly 
good. The aim of the Christian life was therefore 
to overcome the opposition between good and evil 
and to move towards the Good as in Romans 
ch. 12. v. 21. 
I am using this term as in the philosophical sense 
that descriptive laws of nature are supposed to 
hold with a necessity and therefore cannot be 
broken. 
In this context see also R. Swinburne's perspective 
in chapter one, the sections: Theistic Attributes 
of God. Pages 13-16 and Christian Theism's Free- 
will Defence. Pages 29-35 - his '"choice of 
destiny" theodicy. 
John Hick's account is to be found in Evil and the 
God of Love. Any reference to Hick's exposition 
will be from this book. 
Hick, John. Philosophy of Religion Page 43. 
He was the Bishop of Lyons in the second century 
c130-c202 . 
Although Schleiermacher(1768-1834)was looking for 
credible alternatives to the classical theology, 
it is not clear that he consciously intended to 
revive the earlier doctrines, in fact he does not 
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quote Ireneaeus but on a number of occasions 
refers approvingly to Augustine. 
92 This was the beginning of the scientific 
evolutionary hypotheses, but before Darwin's 
Origin of the Species. 
93 Scheiermacher, F. Der Chrisrliche Glaube 
Para. 69.3. Quoted in Wyman, Walter. E. Jr. 
Rethinking the Christian Doctrine of Sin. 
Friedrich Scheiermacher and Hick's "'Irenaean 
Type". 
94 
95 
96 
97 
Schleiermacher. Op. Cit. Para. 81.4. 
Quoted in Hick. Op. Cit. Pages 235-6. 
The original German text does not include the term 
"necessary". 
The precise meaning of this phrase "freedom to do 
otherwise" is a central theme in chapter five. 
The various notions of how this is related to 
moral freedom are vigorously defended and 
contested. 
Hick. Op. Cit. Page 256. 
Ibid. Page 237. 
98 Schleiermacher. Op. Cit. Para. 81.3. 
Quoted in Hick. Op. Cit. Page 237. 
99 See the criticisms of the Free-will Defence in 
chapter one, the section: Christian Theism's Free- 
Will Defences. Pages 43-53 Flew and Mackie 
challenge the notion that an omnipotent, 
omniscient omnigood God could not have created a 
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world in which human beings were free agents who 
always chose to do good. They therefore dispute 
that it is a logical necessity to have a world in 
which real possibilities of evil and suffering in 
all their number and diversity actually occur. 
100 Tennant, F. R. "The Origin and PropagaLion of Sin". 
Page 202. Quoted in Hick. Op. Cit. Page 254. This 
is also the position of R. Swinburne. His thesis 
has been discussed briefly in chapter one see the 
section: Christian Theism's Free-Will Defences. 
Page 43-53 Swinburne's theodicy will be discussed 
more fully in chapter five in the context of moral 
responsibility. See the section: The Notions Of 
Moral Freedom. Page 298-306 
101 See the note above. Eleanore Stump's critique of 
Swinburne's position is also briefly commented 
upon. 
102 One of the most profound and effective attacks 
against the extreme and innocent suffering of 
children and babes is to found in Dovstoyevsky's 
novel The Brothers Karamazov. In this epic book 
he asks whether the price of freedom is indeed too 
high. 
103 Hick. op. Cit. Pages 365-6. 
104 Ibid. Page 371. 
105 This eschatological perspective is essentially of 
the Irenaean -Schleiermacher tradition. 
106 Hick. Op-Cit- Page 376. 
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107 Ibid. Page 371. 
108 This argument as Hick points out is succinctly and 
persuasively debated by David Hume in Dialogues 
Concerning Natural Religion. Part XI. 
109 Hick's stress on human autonomy is not emphasised 
to such an extent by Schleiermacher. For him the 
central role is divine grace. Hick's exposition 
has been accused of sounding Pelagian in that the 
freedom of the will was a divinely given power in 
human beings to choose good and reject evil. 
110 See Peterson, Michael. L. "Recent Work On The 
Problem of Evil" in the American Philosophical 
Quarterly. It is G. Stanley Kane's critique which 
is being advanced. 
111 Hick. Op. Cit. Page 283. 
112 Ibid. Page 383. 
113 2 Corinthians ch. 3 v. 18. 
114 Temple, William. Nature Man and God Page 464. 
Quoted in De Silva, Lynn. 
in Buddhism and Christianit 
115 Luke ch. 16 v. 22. 
The Problem of the Self 
' Page 116. 
116 This is acknowledged as an Augustinian legacy 
where everlasting physical torment is to be 
endured by the wicked. See Cit_y of God Bk. XX. 
ch. 1- 
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117 This surrender of the ego-centred self cannot be 
considered as in Buddhist terms, for this 
Christian notion involves the submission to a God 
orientated perspective. 
118 MacQuarrie, John. Principles of Christian 
Theology Page 328. 
The language is recognised as descriptive and 
provisional rather than ontological and absolute. 
119 Berdyaev, Nicholas. The Destiny of Man Page 279. 
Quoted in De Silva. Op. Cit. Page 115. 
120 1 Corinthians ch. 13. v. 12. 
121 God's omniscience is conceived as '"middle 
knowledge" by those who believe that God knows not 
only what has happened, is happening, and will 
happen in the future, but also what each human 
being will freely chose to do in every situation. 
It is crucial to David Hunt's argument to 
emphasise the notion of God possessing "middle 
knowledge" as opposed to ""simple foreknowledge". 
His assumption is that God with "middle knowledge" 
would know before the actualisation of this world 
who would, or would not respond positively to his 
world or natural revelation. 
122 Craig, William. L. The Only Wise God 
Pages 145-151. Quoted in Basinger, David. 
"'*Divine Omniscience and the Soteriological Problem 
of Evil: is the Type of Knowledge God possesses 
Relevant"? Page 12. 
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123 Hunt. op. Cit. Page 9. 
Quoted in Basinger. Op. Cit. 
Basinger goes on to highlight the tension caused 
by the issue of young children, and traditional 
theism's belief that they are not subjected to 
this intermediate state but go straight to eternal 
bliss with God. 
124 The tension of God's prescience is discussed 
further in chapter five, see the section: Theistic 
Evaluation of the Debate. Pages 323-330 
125 1 do not intend to discuss this concept of the 
continuity of self-identity at any length in this 
chapter, as the notion of how it pertains to a 
doctrine of an enduring soul will be discussed 
more comprehensively in chapter four. My 
intention at present is purely to highlight the 
significance of this theory as intrinsic to Hick's 
eschatology, and thus the claims of Christian 
theology. 
126 It is interesting to note that William James in 
The Varieties of Religious Experience, maintains 
that until this century in terms of commitment to 
Christianity, belief in God primarily mattered as 
providing some form of immortality. 
127 Saint Athanasius. Oration Bk. 1 ch. 39. Quoted in 
Badham ed. Op. Cit. Page 38. 
128 Macquarrie. Op-Cit. Pages 323-324. 
Hick's ""replica theory" as to how self-identity 
persists beyond the grave is discussed in chapter 
four, see the section: Can a Notion of Immortality 
be Defended? Pages 257-269 
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129 Majjhima Nikaya "Culahattipadopama-SuLta" 1.184. 
130 The Third Noble Truth teaches that the cessation 
of dukkha is nirvana while the "Fourth Satyas" 
recommends the "'Sublime Eightfold Path" as the 
necessary means of terminating the origin of this 
suffering. See the section in this 
chapter: Divergent Perspectives Of The Human 
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133 
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Predicament. Pages 137-149 
Majjhima Nikaya OP. Cit. 
Angut-tara Nikaya 1.110. 
The nature of human existence was discussed fully 
earlier in this chapter. See the 
section: Divergent Perspectives Of The Human 
Predicament. Pages 137-149 
Sam_yuLt: a Nikaya 5.421. 
135 The question of individual identity in respect to 
rebirth is discussed fully in chapter four. See 
the section: Philosophical and Ethical Implications 
of the Anatta Doctrine and the Theories of Karma 
and Rebirth? Pages 245-256 
136 This was discussed in chapter one see the 
section: Nirvana-Beyond The Will. Pages 40-42 
This is also the Mahayana concept of Sun_yata. 
The contention that spiritual freedom in nirvana 
cannot be attained without the realisation of the 
essencelessness of all things. 
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137 Johansson, Rune. The Psychology of Nirvana 
Page 30. Quoted in Badham eds. Op. Cit. Page 136. 
138 Dharmasiri is using the word "intellect" as 
synonymous with the functions of the mind. 
Therefore an active rather than passive 
experience. See Dharmasiri, Gunapala. 
A Buddhist C-ritique of The Christian Concept: 
ofGod. Pages 202-204. 
I would disagree with Dharmasiri to the extent 
that the Buddha taught the value of knowing(nana) 
with seeing(passa). This can be both an active 
and passive experience. 
It is also interesting to note that Daisetz Suzuki 
claims that, "seeing is not just an ordinary 
seeing by means of relative knowledge; it is the 
seeing by means of a prajna-eye which is a special 
kind of intuition enabling us to penetrate right 
into the bedrock of Reality itself". (MVsticism: 
Christian and Buddhist) Page 28 
139 Abe, Masao. 
140 Smart, Ninian. 
Zen and Western Thought: Page 273. 
Reason and Faith Page94. 
141 Khuddaka Nikaya "Udana" 33. 
142 The Minor Anthologies of the Pali Canon vol. 11. 
P97-98. 
143 Majjhima Nikaya 1V. Page. 511. 
144 Sam_vutta Nikaya 1V. Page. 368. 
145 Digha Nikaya "-Mahaparinibbana Sutta" 
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146 Khuddaka Nikaya , -Tt: 
ivut: t: aka Sutta" Page. 38-9. 
147 Pari- meaning "completely blowing out" or 
"'extinction". 
148 
149 
Khuddaka Nikaya. Op-Cit. 
Empirical identity(the five khandas)as it pertains 
to karmic conditioning and dependent co-arising is 
discussed in chapter four. See the section: What 
Is The Concept of a Person? Pages 218-227 
150 The Minor Anthologies of the Pali Canon vol. 11. 
Page 9 8. 
151 The idea of a ', "cosmic nirvana'"also has echoes of 
the Dharmakaya in Mahayana Buddhism, in which the 
true nature of a Buddha is one with the absolute 
and identical to transcendental reality, which is 
the essence of the universe. See chapter two, the 
section: The Development Of Mahayana Buddhology. 
Pages 73-75 
152 This constitutes the basis of the Yogachara School 
and the concept of alaya-vijnana, the '"mind-only" 
doctrine and the central notion of storehouse 
consciousness. 
153 Khuddaka Nikaya "Sutta Nipata" 734. 
154 There is an idea of semi-immortality in the 
Mahayana bodhisattva ideal who live on through an 
infinite number of lives, and complete nirvana 
will only happen after all beings have attained 
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salvation. See chapter two the section: The 
Bodhisattva Ideal. Pages 97-103 
155 Samyut-t: a Nikaya 111. P. 111. 
156 The refutation of immortality of a permanent 
entity is discussed further in chapter four, see 
the section: Can A Notion Of Immortality Be 
Defended? Pages 257-269 
157 Khuddaka Nika_va. Op-Cit. 
158 Yu, Chin-fang. "'Chinese Buddhist: Responses to 
Contemporary Problems" Page 67 
This is of course a Mahayanist perspective on the 
soteriological aspect of sunyata as nirvana. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
How Relevant to Buddhist and Christian Conceptions of 
Individual Identity is the Notion of Free-will Given 
Their Differently Focused Worldviews. 
Preface 
It is not a matter of idle speculation to address 
the question of what constitutes the nature of personal 
identity, for both traditions have shaped their 
philosophical theories and principles by answers to 
this enquiry. Although the Buddha acknowledged that an 
individual could direct his or her own will so as to 
free oneself from the causal chain of samsaric 
activity, he also claimed that "the self" was a 
fiction. Christian theology however, has generally 
responded to the question of individuality by positing 
some notion of an enduring entity which accounts for 
the complexity of ""one's" inner life and character. 
Hence this chapter will explore how both 
traditions have responded to this question of 
individual identity: on the one hand expounded as the 
Buddhist doctrine of anatta and the denial of - the 
self" , and on the other through Christian theism's 
confirmation of the uniqueness of " selfhood" affirmed 
in a concept of the soul. Furthermore it is relevant 
to consider how closely related the issue of free 
agency is to their concept of personal identity, and 
the philosophical ramifications precipitated by these 
precepts and convictions. 
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In the previous chapter(l) I attempted to 
establish that the Buddha's whole vision of reality was 
a preoccupation with the human condition, and his 
teachings reflected this solicitude. The Buddha's 
concern with the practical implications of one's 
individual experience gave rise to a formulation of 
personal existence, which while making full use of a 
concept of personhood, ultimately denied all 
metaphysical suppositions of an enduring "self" as a 
psychological reality. 
The Buddha would have emphatically denied the 
suggestion that feelings could be regarded in any way 
as substantiating the idea of a ""self". In the 
"Mahaniclana Sutta" the Buddha asks the monk Ananda, 
"how many ways aze there in which (a man can) z-egard 
self? -" Ananda replies, "myself feels, myself has the 
attz-ibutes of feelings". (2) Feelings and sensations the 
Buddha declared, were attributes of the empirical human 
being that condition passion and desire, promoting a 
strong ego instinct. He brusquely disclaimed that 
these properties could indicate an enduring entity. 
In the formulation of the Four Noble Truths, the 
Buddha explained not only the predicament of human 
existence subjected to dukkha which underlay all 
experience, but also the doctrine of the Noble Eight- 
Fold Path as a way to its cessation and release. I have 
indicated in earlier chapters that although Buddhism 
considers human beings to be conditioned by their ka=a 
(kamma-ni_yama), the human will is not bound by these 
inherited dispositional tendencies. Human self- 
determination is therefore a significant feature in 
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counteracting the inclinations imposed upon one's 
psychological nature. 
Hence to espouse the notion of ""non-self" would 
seem to make nonsense of the doctrines of ka=a, 
rebirth and ultimately liberation, as personal identity 
appears to be very relevant to these principles. If 
the same person is not the recipient of the subsequent 
experience, then how is it that the "non-self", 
receives the results of its own volitional actions? 
Salvation it is affirmed, must be worked out through 
one's own efforts. Hence free agency is considered as 
a necessary spiritual discipline with which to follow 
the Noble Eight-Fold Path as a means to enlightenment. 
What therefore constitutes the personal identity of the 
one seeking liberation from the afflictions of a life 
characterised by clukkha? Moreover if there is no 
enduring individual "self" to claim this deliverance, 
what then is the nature of this salvation? 
Consequently to encourage the right view (drsti), 
Buddhist philosophical thought presented a distinction 
in methods of thinking and discourse which expressed 
the idea of a higher and lower knowledge of 
understanding. Thus by progress through the Four Noble 
Truths, the more enlightened person realises that the 
concept of a ""self", in an absolute sense, is 
ultimately illusory. Hence to appreciate the Buddhist 
principle of anatta it is essential to penetrate this 
profound relationship between conventional and ultimate 
truth. This is explicitly stated by Nagarjuna in the 
"Mulamadh_vamakakarika Sutra": "those who do not know 
the distinction between the two truths cannot 
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understand the profound nature of the Buddha's 
teaching". (3) 
Clearly Western concepts and assumptions about 
human individuality are profoundly different from a 
Buddhist perspective. The notion of an ego or self 
which has a variety of different experiences but 
remains the same over and above these particular 
experiences, has been expressed by H. D. Lewis as the 
existence of the "elusive self". The fact that we have 
a firm feeling that we possess a unique "self" he 
suggests, "is sui generis[ --- I without which we would 
not exist". (4) This idea is further supported by Ian 
Crombie who believes: 
our willingness to entertain the notion of a 
being outside space and time(of what X shall 
call spirit)is perhaps fundamentally based on 
our ability to accept with complete 
contentment the idea that we ourselves normal 
spatio-temporal objects. (5) 
Christian theism has steadfastly promoted 
conscious awareness of the I-Thou or Creator-creature 
relationship with God. This was explored in the 
previous chapter as the Irenean-Hick soul-making 
theodicy involving the growth and development of one's 
individual personality. The underlying factor in this 
character formation being the facility of freedom of 
choice, whereby one is then morally accountable for the 
spiritual and ethical qualities engendered. By 
continually striving to confirm the purpose of God, the 
human person could thus become the perfected being 
which God desired. The assumption of an enduring 
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personal "'self" therefore is of great significance to 
Christian theism's "'vale of soul-making" doctrine. How 
is the perfection of this morally responsible 
individual to be attained if it does not necessitate a 
deeper understanding of the '"self" as a persistent 
entity? 
Moreover the eschatological proposal and its 
soteriological consequences have crucial implications 
for a soul-making theodicy. Continuity of "self- 
identity" constitutes a question of supreme importance 
to the hope of immortality and the goal of salvation as 
eternal life. Without a concept of an abiding "self" 
or soul, there would be a fundamental obstacle to the 
autonomy bestowed on the individual in this life, being 
carried over into a life there after. Similarly if 
"self-identity" is not maintained, how can the process 
of soul development in the after life continue to 
transform that individual into a perfected being? 
There is no doubt that following the Anglo- 
American empiricist tradition in Western philosophical 
thought, there has been a trend of thinking which 
supports Buddhism's claim that the immediacy of "self" 
is the inevitable product of a convenient designation, 
useful in accessing particular aspects of the world of 
human experience. Hume writing in the seventeenth 
century denied that we could address the question, 
"what is the nature of the self? " He considered the 
"self" to be an imaginary construction, fabricated from 
memory out of a number of separate, particular ideas or 
impressions, which succeeded each other in a continual 
flux of change and movement. He therefore states: 
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For my part,, when I enter 
into what X call Imyselff 
some particular perceptio. 
never can catch myself at 
perception, and never can 
but the perception. (6) 
most intimately 
X always stumble on 
a or other [ --- Ix 
any time without a 
observe anything 
Many contemporary philosophers have supported this 
notion that the term "I" is a very ambiguous pronoun; 
that it is only an acquisition of language which is 
regularly used to refer to a human being. The concept 
of a "'self" it is declared, cannot be based on 
grammatical observations merely because it is used to 
link a particular human being as the subject or ""I" to 
certain thoughts and actions. Wittgenstein too, saw 
this problem as hypothesising an ontological meaning 
from the utilisation of everyday language. He 
expresses this opinion in his "Philosophical 
Invest: igaLions": "Philosophy is a battle against the 
bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language". 
I --- I ", 'Say what you choose, so long as it does not 
prevent you from seeing the facts-,, '. (7) He claimed 
therefore that linguistic access is ultimately about 
nothing other than what is expressed, to which some try 
to give an ontological or metaphysical reality. 
Consequently this basic question as to what 
constitutes the nature of individual personal 
existence, proves to be more enigmatic than simply 
answered, and gives rise to the most strenuous 
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intellectual demands. Moreover it is reasonable to 
suppose that the issue of free agency is closely 
related to this speculation about human personality and 
one's innermost nature. The fact remains however, that 
both traditions use the term '"I" which suggests that in 
some sense there is a spontaneous understanding of 
%, self" in the immediacy of a subject. 
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What is the Concept of a Person? 
It was crucial to the Buddha's analysis of the 
human condition that his disciples understood that 
terms referring to ""a self" were merely conventional, 
arbitrary agreed terms of speech, which carried no 
meaning beyond a purely practical efficiency. He 
insisted that it was only in a phenomenological sense 
that the idea of an "I" could imply a truth 
corresponding to a subject. It was in fact only an act 
of utterance, a conventional linguistic designation. 
Moreover the Buddha declared that all despair and grief 
could be traced to a naive understanding of the grammar 
of "I". In the "Potthapada SuLta" of the ""Digha 
Nika_ya-, the Buddha was highly critical of the 
assumption that a useful referential term should be 
given philosophical acclaim supporting an essence 
corresponding to the language: 
Just so Citta,, when any of the three modes of 
pex-sonality is going on, it is not called by 
the name of the other. Foz these Citta, aze 
me. relY names, expx-essions, tuzns of speech, 
designations in the common use of the wozld. 
And of these a Tathagata makes use indeed, 
but is not led astzay by them. (8) 
Nevertheless the Buddha never imposed a rigid 
taboo on speaking about ""the self", and in linguistic 
terms atta and puggala (self and person) are naturally 
and freely used in the Pali Canon in a number of 
contexts. However, these lexical terms that express 
the conventional belief of personal individuality are 
lacking in any psychological notion of it as a 
substantival entity. An acceptance of subjective 
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immediacy is only admissible when the right attitude is 
posited towards the subject of experience. It is a 
false belief or fetter which converts all action and 
experience to the "conceit of I am", (9) and thus to 
evidence of a metaphysical theory of a '"self". 
Hence the sense of a ""self" as a phenomenological 
reality is considered an expression of conventional 
truth necessary for the unenlightened. In the 
"Sut: ralankara" of the Mahayana tradition this is firmly 
asserted, "a person should be mentioned as existing 
only in designation but not in reality". (10) 
Nevertheless the Buddha intent on explaining personal 
existence in practical and experiential terms, 
maintained that what we normally call a human person is 
merely an impermanent conglomerate of constituent 
parts. He declared that in reality there was no 
permanent "self", but a group of events which proceeded 
in succession according to the causal principle. 
Buddhist philosophical theory has therefore analysed 
the human being into the five khandas. What we 
ordinarily call the "', self" the Buddha argue , is a 
number of impermanent states of physical and 
psychological elements that grouped together form the 
individual. (11) 
Hence Buddhism proposed that what we observe as an 
individual is in fact at any moment of experience 
analysable into mental(nama) and physical(rupa) 
phenomena. (12) It is necessary therefore to consider 
more closely how Buddhism accounts for this mind-body 
relationship which constitutes a psycho-physical 
personality. In the "PaLthana SuLta" of the 
"'Abhidha-mma", there is a very detailed account 
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confirming the mutual relationship of nama and rupa. 
Neither name nor form exhibit sufficient effective 
power singularly, but are seen as an interdependent, 
interactional process between mental and physical 
processes. (13) 
Moreover throughout one's life the mental states 
consolidate the physical factors which have already 
arisen by producing the conditions which facilitate 
activity. Thus such mental processes which act as 
conditions for physical events would include desire, 
energy, thought, volition and meditative trance. In 
this way the mind acts as intermediary to vocal(vaci- 
vinnatti) or bodily intimations (ka_va-vinnatti) . (14) 
Although the mental processes are considered to be 
normally conditioned by physical factors, nevertheless 
the mind is regarded as a strong causal factor capable 
of control and development. Thus the mind can be tuned 
by meditative concentration to alter the normal process 
of interaction, which accordingly produces super-normal 
capacities and powers. (15) 
However, the fact that the mind acts as a post- 
nascent condition for the physical does nor mean that 
it can be thought of in terms of a persisting principle 
of identity. The proficiency of the mind and mind- 
consciousness(16) the Buddha emphatically affirmed, was 
necessarily conditioned by, and dependent on the 
physical body, and could not exist independently. 
Furthermore, he maintained that this faculty was not in 
fact one entity, but a group of dynamic activities 
essentially transient in nature. The Buddha declared 
therefore that it was not appropriate to consider mind 
or consciousness as the abiding "self", for all 
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psychical phenomena were subject to change even faster 
than the physical body. Any "self-belief" would be 
consequently constructed out of an ever-changing 
process. Nevertheless, because our subjective 
experience of being conscious or "self-aware" suggests 
a continuous process, this does give rise to a view of 
individuality. (17) 
Consciousness of "self" focusing on the mind is 
therefore a necessary utilitarian function to the 
existence of personhood; to judge, reason and 
discriminate data. It is also vital from the point of 
view of memory to be able to organise and unify 
experience, and thus make decisions about one's future 
destiny. It is obviously crucial to be self-conscious 
of the process whereby one's karmic heritage is 
conditioned by one's state of mind. To account for 
this association between conscious-awareness and karmic 
process, Buddhism adopted a category of mental 
construction (. samkhara-the fourth aggregate), in which 
the "active tendencies" of impulses, volitions and 
dispositions operates within the matrix of mental and 
attitudinal conditions. 
Thus a human being is characterised by a 
"volitional wholeness", and as such these active 
tendencies are regarded as the group which organises 
the individual into what constitutes a personal 
identity. This underlines the fact that conscious 
volitional decisions are the immediate determinants of 
a person's actions, and as such the crucial act basic 
to the principles of karma and rebirth. (18) Hence it 
is vital to appreciate that this category of 
attitudinal conditions characterised as a "volitional 
222 
wholeness", supports the idea of a unitary self who is 
actively engaged in intentional, purposeful thoughts 
and actions. It is this ability to use ideas; to act 
as one thinks fit, which provides for an element of 
initiative and freedom in an environment that is itself 
causally conditioned and interdependent. 
Thus at a level of ""self-consciousness", an 
individual is aware of personhood and the ability to 
act as a free agent. However, "'self-awareness" at this 
level not only provides the ability to make decisions 
and therefore control one's destiny, but also acts as 
the mechanism by which one's samsaric cycle is 
regenerated. Although the Buddha's teachings confirmed 
that there was no "'person substance", and that through 
contemplative application the '"I" was evidence of 
ignorance and reification, he was aware that in the 
practical mode of living in the world as a moral agent, 
this involved an awareness of oneself as an autonomous 
individual. 
Within Western philosophical enquiry the enigmatic 
problem of the nature of personal identity and the 
intrinsic relationship of the "'self" to the body has a 
heritage stretching back to pre-Socratic thought. Plato 
had endeavoured to rationalise the problem by his 
doctrine of the Forms, while Aristotle rejected this 
idea on the basis that it could not reconcile the 
difficulty of individuation, and promoted his theory of 
substance as formed matter. (19) By the seventeenth 
century debates on the nature of personhood were 
provoking lengthy discussion. The problems of "-self- 
identity" through time being the principal question for 
speculation; am I the same person to day that I was 
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yesterday and subsequent days? A metaphysical dualism 
as a noumenal and phenomenal "'self" was defended by 
some philosophical thought. Hence giving positive 
cognition to a being which is distinct from the states 
in which it expresses itself, and is also identical 
with itself throughout these experiences. The "I" 
could then be explained as a substantival entity; a 
spiritual being of which a corporeal body is intrinsic 
to its essence. (20) 
However, certain contemporary theorists have 
challenged such assumptions, maintaining that the 
uniqueness of the body is sufficient to give rise to 
the idea that one's experiences are owned or possessed 
by some individual entity which we call ""myself". Thus 
this possessor of experiences, the "self" or "*ego" 
stands in a special relationship to the body's 
experiences, functioning as the owner for these 
experiences. P. F. Strawson, who expounds this ""no- 
ownership" concept of the ""self" in his book 
"Individuals", maintains that this theory gives rise to 
a dualism of body and subject or ego. The most this 
dualistic explanation can achieve he argues, is to 
assert that all experiences stand in a special 
relationship to the body. It does not account for the 
fact that we ascribe states of consciousness to 
something which has these experiences. 
Furthermore Strawson claims that there is no way 
of identifying the individual subject of experience as 
a separate, unconnected entity, nor can we ascribe 
independent, individual consciousness to a thing that 
is inextricably bound up to a corporeal body. He 
believes that it is easier to comprehend ourselves as a 
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""person" if we acknowledge that, "we act, and act on 
each other, and act in accordance with a common human 
nature". (21) A. J. Ayer, commenting on Strawson's 
analysis of the "'no-ownership" theory of the self 
maintains that: "merely to say that a person's 
experiences are causally dependent on the state of 
hislher body is rather too vague-l-. (22) The nature of 
this causal relationship would need to be specified so 
as to support a causal dependency. We could then say 
that an experience was '"mine" if some state of "my" 
body was causally sufficient for its occurrence. By 
claiming an experience as "mine" I am presupposing my 
ownership of this particular body and not any other. 
Other theorists have accounted for this notion of 
"-self-relatedness", by proposing the idea that there is 
a common relationship within the different experiences 
regarded as ""my" experiences, which explain the '"I" of 
"self-consciousness". C. A. Campbell argues that a 
relational way of describing self-identity can at the 
best only provide a sense of cognitive association 
which is the function of all '"self-conscious" 
experiences. However, he continues, the fact that a 
subject conscious of itself throughout a diversity of 
experiences in both a temporal and qualitative manner, 
is the reason that we feel with such assurance the 
immediacy of the "'self". (23) Even though we may be 
ignorant as to the constitution of our essential 
nature, there is a confidence that "I" exist. There 
would seem to be little doubt therefore, that our 
experience of ourselves as a person exhibits a sense of 
wholeness with all the immediacy and directness of the 
""I" which this entails. 
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Derek Parfit in his book "Reasons and Persons-, 
defends what he calls a reductionistic viewpoint of 
personal identity. He ascribes physical and 
psychological continuity to the existence of a person, 
but believes that any analysis of ""persons" is totally 
reducible to discussion of "R-relations" which he 
defines as, "psychological connectedness andlor 
continuity, with the right kind of cause". (24) Hence 
Parfit maintains that personal identity is accounted 
for without claiming that these experiences ascribe to 
the reality of an essential essence we call "the self". 
However, it is interesting to note that Campbell 
is of the opinion that it is because we are aware of 
%%ourselves" in both bodily and mental processes, that 
this accounts for the fact that we are conscious of 
"ourselves" as a particular nature, and aware of 
"myself" as the subject which experiences. He 
maintains that the idea of a transient "self" as the 
subject of ever-changing experiences does not seriously 
jeopardise the concept of the '"self". Although we 
accept that our psycho-physical unity is in a continual 
state of flux, we consider this ever-changing 
relationship to belong to the same personal identity: 
X as a self-conscious subject cannot doubt 
that X who now hear the clock strike a second 
time am the same being who a moment ago also 
heard the clock strike, even though X must 
become different in some respects in the 
interval. (25) 
He emphasises therefore that "', self-consciousness" does 
not reveal the physical body to be an intrinsic 
necessity of "selfhood", arguing against those 
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theorists that insist that all organic sensations are 
experienced as bodily functions. (26) 
Undoubtedly many modern theorists have come to the 
conclusion that personal identity consists solely of an 
intrinsic body/mind relationship. Nevertheless the 
Christian theological tradition has not abandoned the 
notion of the essential ""self" within this 
relationship, and talk freely of the possibility of 
survival of what we call the ""soul" in an after life. 
Supporting the metaphysical opinions of a Platonic- 
Cartesian dualism, the Christian theological tradition 
has customarily conceived of the person as composed of 
two separate elements; the body corporeal and 
perishable, and the soul or mind as incorporeal, 
intangible and positively substantive. Sustaining this 
dichotomy has been the notion that the soul or 
spiritual essence constitutes the rational being; the 
"real person". (27) 
Furthermore, fundamental to the mind/body 
relationship within Western thought is the relevance of 
the psychological nature of volitional activity. 
Traditionally the two great faculties of the mind, the 
intellect and the will, have been regarded as its 
cognitive and volitional capacities. Consideration of 
this volitional capacity as a faculty has promoted the 
notion of a locus of voluntary and intentional 
activity, encouraging the pursuit of personal ideals 
and self-discriminative goals. The structure of the 
human will it is argued, is what separates human beings 
from other species. Although they might have the 
capacity for desires and emotions, and the ability to 
make choices, what seems to be a peculiar human 
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characteristic is the activity of reflective self- 
evaluation. (28) 
Moreover it is this volitional motivation of a 
human being's effective desires which indicates a 
notion of qualitative evaluation, and the potential for 
"self-reflection" which thereby generates a category of 
accountability for one's actions. Thus implicit in this 
close relationship between the capacity for evaluating 
our desires, goals and purposes, and the idea that this 
advances the notion of an essential "self", is the 
particular element of free-will. (29) Hence within 
Christian theistic philosophy this correlation between 
freedom of the will and the concept of a person has 
provided a very special area of human experience; one 
in which a structure of "'self-definition" has 
implications for communion and union with God. 
Consequently it is the philosophical opinions of 
each tradition concerning the reality of an "essential 
self" which must be the next focus: namely Christian 
theism's support for a concept of a soul as the locus 
of '"self-identity", and Buddhism's denial of such a 
metaphysical or spiritual focus of "selfhood". 
Moreover their notions of what constitutes the essence 
of individuality would seem to have decisive 
implications for the nature of salvation. 
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Does a Person Have a Soul? 
Christian theology has in general responded 
positively to the belief that brain function and mental 
activity are not identical, and that consciousness can 
exist independently of the body. This position is 
expressed by Keith Campbell in his book "Bod_y and 
Mind-, who refutes the opinion that mind activity is 
purely a phenomenon of the brain state, and supports 
the theory that the mind has capacities that far exceed 
the brain activity. He asserts therefore that 
parapsychological activity such as telepathy adequately 
demonstrates this: 
Parapsychological phenomenon, by definition, 
demonstrate capacities which far exceed any 
capacities of brain. The brain is receptive 
only to information that arrives by neural 
pathways and so is confined to perception by 
way of the senses [--- 1. Xf some people are 
receptive to the content of the minds of 
another by some more direct means such as 
telepathy, then those minds are just not 
brains. (30) 
Thus there is substantial support for the notion 
that although a person is identified through their 
physical characteristics and behaviour patterns, there 
is an "I" or ""self" which underlies these mental 
activities. Consequently personal identity is 
considered far more significant than the empirical 
psychophysical being. This element in human beings has 
traditionally been represented in the concept of the 
soul. Declarations of both a metaphysical and 
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ontological nature have been utilised by philosophical 
and theological reasoning to give credibility to such a 
theory. However, there is no doubt that constant 
reflection over the course of time has promoted varied 
speculation as to the construction of this element. 
Hence it is essential to consider why Christian theism 
has in the face of biological, physiological and 
psychological critical analysis continued to embrace 
this metaphysical dimension. Furthermore it is 
relevant to assess the significant factors sustained by 
this theological concept of the soul, and to reflect on 
the implications such ""self-definition" has for the 
notion of human free-agency. 
In this context, it is necessary to briefly 
consider the historical legacy of a doctrine of an 
"abiding self". Apparent even in the works of 
Heraclitus and Aeschylus, at the emergence of Western 
philosophical ideas in the sixth to fifth century BCE, 
the notion of the essence of a person was linked to the 
theoretical understanding of existence, and identified 
in Platonic metaphysics as the ""psyche". Plato 
regarded this element in human beings as the superior, 
finer dimension of a person, and thus evolved the 
notion of the ""substantial soul". This theory 
supported the belief in the soul as the principle 
element which was capable of existing independently of 
the body. Furthermore Plato represented the psyche as 
having pre-existed its union with the body and was 
hence immortal. (31) 
Nevertheless within Greek philosophical thought 
Aristotle represents a contrasting theory of the soul. 
He denied that the soul was definable except as 
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incorporated into the corporeal body as a psychosomatic 
unit. (32) The soul was still regarded as the vital 
principle but as the "form of the body", which as the 
formal cause of life, stimulated the functioning of 
bodily existence. It is interesting to note that 
embedded in these theories of Antiquity, is the pre- 
disposition to conceive of an independent will power 
which is intrinsic to this spiritual or soul element of 
personal identity. 
It is in the metaphysics of Augustine that the 
significance of this reflection matured, and the future 
standard for Christian orthodoxy established. In 
response to the philosophical controversy at the time 
as to what constituted the soul, Augustine emphasised 
its unique character. In a letter to Jerome in 415 CE. 
he states: "Although it is difficult to convince those 
who are slow to understand that the soul is 
incox-poreal, X am certain of it". (33) He insists in 
the "Confessions", 'I'IX the soul, am one alone-, (34) that 
although this spiritual substance is united to the 
material body, it remains a separate component. The 
soul is "esse, nosse, velle"; existence, knowing and 
willing, and indeed constitutes life. (35) 
Medieval scholastic thought which crystallised in 
the philosophical concepts of Aquinas, were more 
inclined to advocate an Aristotelian attitude to the 
soul in that it was regarded as united to the body, 
dependent upon it, yet should not be identified with 
it. Nevertheless Aquinas supported the Augustinian 
notion of the soul's immortal destiny in that he 
asserted that a soul was not always embodied, but 
necessarily involved an incorporeal nature. He 
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insisted however that, "the soul will not be forever 
without the body-11. (36) Clearly there was in the 
philosophical contemplations of Christian theologians 
by this time a distinct perception of the soul as a 
unique substance. It was considered to be the essence 
of a person, the principle element of life which was 
morally accountable for good and bad actions. Moreover 
belief in its incorporeal nature, in that it was a 
separate entity, emphasised the possibility of 
damnation or salvation as the soul's immortal destiny. 
However, by the seventeenth century, theories as 
to the essential essence of human nature were brought 
under Cartesian scrutiny. Descartes subjected the 
prevailing ectoplasmic and substantial notions to 
strong criticism, arguing that it was not feasible to 
postulate the soul's immortality if it was dependent on 
the body, given the certainty of bodily disintegration 
after death. He was not inclined to abandon the 
concept of the soul however, but sought to restore it 
along the lines of his scientific principles. Thus by 
applying his dualistic theories of mind and matter 
Descartes was able to equate the soul with the mind. 
Earlier in his philosophical contemplations, he 
had hypothesised that it was possible to reject the 
existence of everything which he had the slightest 
reason to doubt: "X am not wholly certain of any of my 
activities except one: thinking". (37) Hence he 
conceived of the mind as an irreducible, thinking 
entity which did not involve the corporeal body. In 
the '" Meditations- he claimed, "'-strictly speaking then, 
X am nothing but a thing that thinks-that is, a mind, a 
soul, intellect or reason". (38) Thus one's "essential 
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self" was associated with the mind as the subject of 
conscious experience. By postulating that the mind was 
synonymous with the human soul, he accordingly 
conjectured that the soul's, "entire nature or essence 
is simply to think and which needs no space to exist 
in, and does not depend on any material thing". (39) 
Hence Descartes was confident that he had shown 
the soul to be a pure, non-physical substance declaring 
that, "the soul being a thinking thing, is in addition 
to thought, a substance which thinksff. (40) In this way 
Descartes believed, that not only had he defended the 
possibility of disembodiment, but had also provided a 
thesis which supported Christian theism's belief in the 
immortality of the human soul. Although Christian 
theologians were of the opinion that identifying the 
soul with the mind was incompatible with traditional 
philosophical principles, (41) there is little doubt 
that owing to Cartesian influence during the eighteenth 
century, the meaning of soul and mind was brought much 
closer together as the essential constituent of the 
human person. 
While Christian theology remained encumbered by a 
metaphysical understanding of the soul as the essential 
nature of a human being, scientific analysis and 
enquiry subsequently challenged it. Evolutionary 
biology denied any dichotomous nature and emphasised a 
unitary psychophysical being. Knowledge of the 
intimate body-mind relationship between specific brain 
function and mental activities further discredited any 
dualistic notions. Scientific understanding of the 
anatomical and neurophysiological development of 
conscious awareness has precipitated further rejection 
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of any *, %soul,, theory. It is steadfastly asserted that 
what defines the limitations of a human being is our 
genetically programmed psychochemical constitution; 
that all personal experience and emotions constituting 
"self-awareness" are intrinsically linked to our body 
chemistry. 
However, while any notion of the ", self" as 
essentially a "'soul" in a metaphysical or spiritual 
sense has been discredited and thus abandoned by many 
contemporary thinkers, it is evident that current 
theological speculation on this issue has sought to 
retain to some degree the notion of a unique entity as 
the essence of human nature. While certain 
philosophical reflection has rejected the concept of 
the soul as incompatible with modern scientific theory, 
Christian theism has attempted to absorb the evidence 
that accounted for the physiological-psychological 
relationship of a human person without relinquishing 
the belief in an "abiding self". There is much 
emphasise on endorsing the complementary nature of the 
body and soul as God's creation, in which the entity of 
personality is intimately woven together. (42) 
A less orthodox interpretation has been put 
forward by John Macquarrie who rejects any traditional 
rendering of a soul concept, but nevertheless analyses 
the meaning of "', selfhood" from an existential position. 
His starting point is an Aristotelian paradigm in which 
he asserts that the notion of ""self" as form is not 
fixed or substantial as from a Platonic perspective, 
but has the potential for growth, change and 
development. Macquarrie therefore suggests that a 
personal being can be better understood as: "a peculiar 
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and complex temporal nexus in which the three 
dimensions of past, present and future are brought 
together into a unity". (43) He postulates that it is 
the forging together of the three dimensions of 
temporality into an intimate relationship, which makes 
the existence of a person possible and creates the 
potential for '"selfhood". In this way the '"self" 
cannot be considered as something which is "ready- 
made", for there is as much potential for disruption 
and loss as for unity and gain. 
Not withstanding Macquarrie's less orthodox 
interpretation, the Christian concept of the soul 
clearly establishes a metaphysical dimension to the 
idea of "'selfhood" expressed as the notion of a 
spiritual personality. Influenced by its Cartesian 
heritage, one's essential nature as a thinking being 
provides the capacity for free volitional activity. 
Furthermore it is this potential for intentional 
activity and thus moral accountability, which provides 
the human being with a perception of moral knowledge 
necessary to the soul's spiritual growth and 
development. (44) Thus within this frame of reference, 
ethical appraisal of the soul becomes a pre-condition 
of the properties of personality which characterise the 
human being. Knowledge of one's essential soul 
purports to the ""self-awareness" of one's moral and 
spiritual progression throughout this earthly life, 
which emphasises a redemptive, salvific dimension to 
the religious quest. (45) 
Consequently not only does the concept of an 
essential personality expressed in the notion of a soul 
seek to justify the principle of a free moral agent, 
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but it also confirms the autonomous nature of "self- 
definition" while defending the soul's essential 
affinity with God. It is considered the human person's 
fundamental destiny to seek union and ultimate 
surrender to the divine Creator. For such a structure 
to flourish it is essential for an increasing awareness 
of the relationship between the individual and God 
necessitating a distinct cognitive "'self- 
definition". (46) Thus Christian theology firmly 
asserts that this God-given capacity of free-will 
power, enables human beings to become more conscious of 
both "selfhood" and "Godhead"; thus re-defining the 
processes of ""self-communion" of God and with God. 
While Christian theism's quest to identify a 
person's ""true self" has resulted in the postulation of 
the soul as the permanent, inner nature of a human 
being which could survive the reality of this existence 
as an independent entity, 
analysed the notion of a 
Buddhism has critically 
""persistent self" or "soul" 
and refutes that this deep-rooted feeling of an "I" is 
any more than the empirical being. (47) The empirical 
"self" the Buddha contended, consisted of the five 
aggregates; the interdependent, interactional process 
between mental states and physical factors, which were 
subject to insubstantiality and transitoriness 
according to the causal principle. Persistent character 
traits which accounted for the development of 
personality as an individual, and thus the notion of a 
"self" the Buddha insisted, were merely due to the 
repeated occurrence of certain mind-sets. However, 
these mental events were also conditioned by 
successive, momentary states, such that nothing 
unchanging, unitary or identical could be found to 
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function as an enduring soul. Hence the Buddha could 
give no meaning to the concept of the atman as a 
permanent, independent entity. 
Consequently the Buddha promoted the doctrine of 
anatta in his dialogues. This important teaching 
introduced in his second sermon is the content of the 
"Anattalakkhana Sutta". in which the Buddha asks in 
support of his argument: 
what do you think monks, is body permanent oz 
impex-manent? 
Xmpermanent, Siz. 
Xs what is impermanent satisfactoxy of 
unsatisfactox-y? 
Unsatisfactoz-y, Siz. 
Xs it fitting to zegazd what is impermanent, 
unsatisfactoxy and subject to change (in this 
way) "this is mine.. this X am, this is 
myself"'? 
Nd,, Sir . 
So monks, whatevez body has come to be, 
whether past, future, or present, gzoss oz 
fine, in oneself or without [ --- I must be 
seen as it really is, with the right insight, 
thus, "this is not mine,, this X am not,. this 
V (4 8) my self". 
The Buddha was very aware that his anatta teaching 
could be easily misunderstood and misinterpreted. From 
an etymological point of view, anatman might logically 
suggest that the exact opposite of a ""self" was being 
promoted, but in fact the very distinctive meaning of 
this theory could not be conveyed merely from the 
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linguistic designation. With this in mind, the Buddha 
chose to keep silent when questioned by the wanderer 
Vacchagotta as to whether a self did or did not exist. 
His disciple Ananda was puzzled by the Buddha's 
reluctance to explain the doctrine of anatta but the 
Buddha replied: 
Ananda, when asked by Vacchagotta, the 
Wanderer: "'Xs there not a self? " had X 
replied that there is not, it would have been 
more bevildex7nent for the bewildered 
Vacchagotta. For he would have said: 
'"Formerly indeed X had a self, but now X have 
not one any more". (49) 
Hence to understand more fully the Buddha's 
exposition of a "no-soul" theory to his followers, it 
is necessary to appreciate the historical context in 
which it was conceived. The prevailing Hinduistic 
philosophy of the Brahmanical system promoted a 
metaphysical theory of the atmavada. This permanent 
entity was identified as immanent with the world soul 
or supreme brahman, and therefore viewed from the 
totality of all things. The Buddha was very critical 
of these Upanishadic theories which maintained the soul 
to be an independent, spiritual substance, and strongly 
rejected the notion of vignataram, which declared the 
soul was located in the consciousness of the mind. 
The Buddha emphasised that the soul viewed as a 
permanent, substantive principle was not capable of 
change. on the other hand one could clearly detect the 
quickness by which the mind changed. Moreover 
consciousness could not originate without the causal 
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conditions necessary to the arising of the mental 
states which facilitate mind consciousness. Hence by 
equating mind and soul the Buddha maintained that the 
soul theorists had got themselves into a paradoxical 
situation. He stated therefore: 
If anyone should say, [ "Mind is self"[--] 
"Mental states are self I "Mental 
consciousness is self" "Impact on the 
mind is self ", that is not fitting [ --- I in 
this way mind is not-self, mental states are 
not-self, mental consciousness is not-self, 
impact on the mind is not-self. (50) 
Crucial to the Buddha's rejection of this 
Brahmanical metaphysical structure was its denial of 
the universal laws of causation. The framework that 
supported the Atman-Brahman theory was one in which the 
process of being endorsed a one-dimensional, one- 
directional focus to a static reality. The Buddha 
maintained that the nature of existence as found 
encapsulated in the doctrine of co-arising genesis, was 
in fact a far more complicated phenomenon. (51) He 
urged therefore that through careful analysis one 
should come to appreciate that the real nature of 
existence, including the functioning of the human 
person, was to be discerned in terms of a continuous 
process of changing, conditioned phenomena. 
Consequently the Buddha's fundamental philosophy was 
built upon a prajna-intuition principle. He maintained 
that the answer to such a question as "what constitutes 
the self? " could not be solved by abstract theorising 
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or postulation. It required a certain insight which 
could only be achieved by applying an existential 
method of analysis. 
Frequently in his teachings the Buddha reminded 
his followers that the doctrine of dependent co- 
origination was intrinsic to the notion of the "no- 
self". To realise that the mental and physical 
aggregates were in a continual state of flux was to 
dispel the notion that there was anything hidden which 
could function as an enduring soul. The Buddha when 
instructing the monks on the dhamma firmly emphasised 
this aspect: 
But monks, an instructed disciple of the pure 
ones., [ --- ] whatever view with causal 
relations says: "This the world this the 
self, after dying I will become permanent, 
lasting, eternal, not liable to change, I 
will stand fast like unto the eternal, " he 
regards this as: This is not mine, this am 
not 1. this is not myself'. He. regarding 
thus that which does not exist, will not be 
anxious. (52) 
The Buddha was quick to emphasise that not only 
did the no-soul theory have to be viewed in relation to 
anicca, which stressed the transient nature of all 
things, but also to the realisation that the 
insubstantiality and inherent decay in all things had a 
direct bearing on the principle of dukkha. (53) He 
asserted therefore that anything subject to change and 
the discord of dukkha could not constitute a persistent 
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"ideal self". Hence by revealing the manner in which 
all things existed, he confirmed that it was the 
conceit of "I amý' producing the delusion of a permanent 
entity, which was the root cause of dukkha. By 
establishing that the five khandas were themselves 
subject to this process of changing, conditioned 
phenomena, it was evident that the will or volitions 
included in the fourth khandas, must like all mental 
activity be conditioned. 
Consequently the Buddha insisted that what 
constituted the continual round of becoming in this 
samsaric existence, was caused by the way we 
perpetually thought of ourselves as independent 
entities, which in reality was entirely causally 
contingent. It was only when this knowledge of the 
interdependence of all things dispelled any false 
notions, that we would see things as they really were 
and no longer think in terms of a permanent, "self- 
existing I". The Buddha explained that we would then 
cease asking irrelevant questions about a "self- 
identity": ""what am I? How am I? This 'being' that is 
'1' where has it come from where will it go`? ' (54) 
Nevertheless it is important to reflect upon the 
fact, that to seek deliverance from a world 
characterised by suffering, impermanence and 
insubstantiality, a person has to be free to make 
choices to attain '"non-self consciousness". 
Consequently autonomy has to be asserted to seek 
release from the realm of samsaric existence. Hence to 
comprehend that clinging to a personality belief is not 
conducive to enlightenment, the individual has to exert 
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his or her free will power to halt this causal 
progression, by following the Buddha's teaching of the 
Noble Eightfold Path. However, although the Buddha 
acknowledged that a person could search for "self- 
knowledge" by following the Noble Eightfold Path, this 
did not presuppose that such training would result in 
the discovery of a "real self". In fact this "self- 
knowledge"(attabhava) was merely considered the "self- 
state" of the individual in a particular life span. 
The Buddha maintained that it was only by knowing 
oneself that a person could relinquish any of the false 
notions of a self, which gave rise to mannitam- a form 
of conceit which consequently resulted in egoism 
(asmimama). 
Hence the Buddha's sole purpose in his analysis of 
the "empirical self", was to make people aware that the 
false notion of an abiding soul was accountable for all 
the unsatisfactoriness in this world. (55) He 
maintained that it was the assertion of a "self" or 
"'ego" which gave rise to attachment and craving, which 
stimulated a thirst for existence and selfish desires. 
So long as these conditions were generated the five 
khandas would always be manifested, bound by a 
conditioned existence in the samsaric cycle. This is 
clearly described in the "". Sam-yutta Mika_va"' where it 
states: 
the arisings, px-esence and manifestation of 
mateziality, feeling, perception, formation 
and consciousness, is but the azising of 
suffex-ing, the pz-esence of maladies, the 
manifestation of decay and death. (56) 
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The Buddha explained that it was only when our basic 
attitude to personal identity was relinquished that the 
desires and attachments which fuelled the cycle of 
rebirth would be destroyed: it was this cessation of 
thinking in terms of self which would lead to 
enlightenment. 
The Buddha refuted the metaphysics of the soul 
therefore, contending that a theory which supported a 
permanent, substantial entity was essentially 
detrimental to enlightenment, for all wrong ideas of 
the self produced spiritually harmful results. In the 
""Majjhima Mika_ya" the Buddha explained this point: 
Whatever is this self for me that s eaks, P 
that experiences and knows, [ --- ] it is this 
self for me that is permanent, stable, 
etez-nal, not subject to change, that will 
stand fi= like unto the eternal. This 
monks, is called going to wrong views, 
holding wrong views, the wilds of wrong 
views, the wriggling of wrong views, the 
scuffling of wrong views, the fetters of 
wrong views. (57) 
However, the Buddha was aware that the concept of 
a soul was a deep-rooted psychological idea, and one to 
which people clung as a means of consolation. Belief 
in an immortal soul prompted the idea of self- 
preservation conceived as an eternal soul with an 
eternal destiny. The Buddha insisted that there was no 
rational explanation for such a theory, and belief in 
the ""self" could only then be traced to an emotional 
bias at work. Any grasping of emotions the Buddha 
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rejected as blatantly inconsistent, for by their 
erratic nature they could give no sustaining statement, 
and were essentially an inappropriate guide to any form 
of enlightenment. Thus the Buddha stated: 
[ --- ] Whatever is desire, whatever is 
attachment, whatever is delight, vhatever is 
craving, for all types of consciousness as 
eye-consciousness and for all the mind, 
mental states, mental consciousness with 
mental states cogizable through mental 
consciousness [ --- ] (these are called to be) 
dogmas, emotional biases, tendencies'. (58) 
At an intellectual level it is not difficult to 
appreciate that the attainment of "non-self 
consciousness" involves "'self-awareness"; an awareness 
that belief in "I am" is evidence of ignorance and 
reification in the round of becoming. However, it is 
not so easy to reconcile in the practical mode that a 
true understanding of one's situation requires just 
such a "self-awareness, ", which is nevertheless 
considered to be detrimental to one's liberation from 
the false notion of a self. However, just such a 
paradox would appear to contribute to the Buddhist 
philosophical ideas of the distinction between ultimate 
and relative truths. 
It was the Buddha's explicit intention to give an 
insight into an understanding of reality which 
constituted a non-soul interpretation. Thus within the 
conventional world, in the mode of "person-awareness" 
the individual can exert free-will power to make "'self- 
conscious" decisions, for it is an integral 
characteristic of the conditioning law of retributive 
244 
justice. However, it is only when this '"self- 
awareness" leads to "self-understanding" that "self- 
consciousness" is then reduced to the dhammic reality 
characterised by the Three Marks of Existence. At this 
ultimate level of reality each fleeting human 
experience is an instance of dependent genesis and the 
notion of free-will a chimerical concept. 
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Philosophical and Ethical Implications of the Anatta 
Doctrine and the Theories of Karma and Rebirth. 
It has now been established that the Buddha based 
his doctrine of no-soul upon the existential reality 
which constituted human existence and consequently the 
human condition. (59) In the preceeding chapters of 
this thesis I have illustrated that the essential 
elements of his analysis of the human condition were 
the theories of ka=a and rebirth. (60) It is thought 
provoking therefore to reflect on the serious 
implications the doctrine of anatta could have for the 
karmic-rebirth process, given the fact that the concept 
of the five khandas removes any presupposition of a 
permanent and enduring '"self". This clearly begs the 
question, if there is no substantial agent of action, 
then who is the recipient of the subsequent karmic 
consequences if the results are not experienced by the 
same person who caused them? 
Moreover the karmic principle hinges on the 
premise of moral accountability, this too could have 
serious ramifications for the doctrine of anatta. The 
Buddha firmly asserted however, that what distinguished 
the "individual" was the consequences of previous 
karma. (61) Hence it was this causal sequence of 
conditioned dispositions which accounted for personal 
continuity and moral responsibility. Thus a person was 
conscious that his or her individuality was both 
revealed and constrained by this ka=a. As long as the 
karmic forces were successively generated, a resultant 
aggregation of the five khandas would constantly bring 
into existence a conventional human person. 
Buddhism emphasises that the doctrine of ka=a has 
to be understood in functional terms both of continuity 
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and cessation of experience, and that it is far more 
than an expedient, materialistic process which accounts 
for a principle of retributive causation. The Buddha 
had constantly stated that, "[ --- I karma is intention 
(cetana); having willed, one acts through thought, word 
and deed". (62) Furthermore Buddhaghosa in the 
I "Visudhimagga", had commented that essentially karma 
was a dynamic activity: "For the activities are causes 
through commission of the deeds, not because they are 
existent or non-existent". (63) Hence it is because 
karma is the consequence of one's own intentions and 
desires that this law has ethical implications, and 
moral responsibility is firmly placed on the 
individual. 
Nevertheless it is far from clear how the notion 
of the no-self does indeed function in this causal 
relationship. on the one hand Buddhism claims that 
between consecutive sets of khandas there is not total 
disparity, yet on the other hand confirms that the five 
khandas neither individually nor collectively 
constitute a ""self". However, it seems implausible to 
consider that the Buddha, intent on teaching this 
ethical principle of moral responsibility for one's 
actions and intentions, would simultaneously be 
promoting a specific notion that there is no referent 
for these actions. Yet the problem remains, who is it 
that performs actions and experiences the results? 
This is effectively stated in the '"Sam-yut: ta Nika_ya": 
"So then you say that body is not the self; that 
feeling is not the self [ --- ]. Then what self can 
those acts affect which are not self-wrought". (64) 
The Buddha realised that this enquiry was a very 
natural one, and when petitioned by several monks he 
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reminded them first of the fundamental Three Marks of 
existence: 
This situation exists, monks when some 
foolish man here, not knowing, ignorant,, with 
his mind in the grip of craving may deem to 
go beyond the Teacher's instruction [ --- ] 
monks have been trained by me(to look for) 
conditions now here, now there, in these 
things and in those. (65) 
The starting place for any probing into the nature of 
human existence the Buddha asserted, was to confirm 
that the combination of physical and mental aggregates 
were in reality functioning in a flux of momentary 
interdependent causality, and contained nothing 
substantial or permanent. 
These implications have found expression in the 
"Milindapanha- when the monk Nagasena explained to King 
Milinda the nature of personal continuity: 
Just so 0 King is the continuity of a person 
or thing maintained, one comes into being, 
another passes away; and the rebirth is, as 
it were simultaneous. Thus neither as the 
same nor as another does a man go on to the 
last phase of his self-consciousness. (66) 
Continuing this discussion later, the King asked the 
monk to clarify whether it was the same psycho-physical 
aggregation which was reborn. Nagasena explained: 
'No: but by this name- and- form deeds are 
done, good or evil, and by these deeds(this 
kax7na) another name- and -fox7n is rebornf. 
'If that be so,, Sir, would not the new being 
be released from its evil karma-? 
The Elder replied: 'Yes, if it were not 
reborn. But just because it is reborn, 0 
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King,, it is therefore not released from its 
evil kazma -. (67) 
Nagasena emphasised the point that it was only 
through the karmic continuum, that the present 
combination of the five khandas constituting the 
conventional person, could reflect subsequent psycho- 
physical aggregations. Hence he declared there was no 
true subject of ""self-same" enduring entity, only a 
dynamic process in which the individual found 
expression as his or her karmic receiver(da_Vada). This 
causal concatenation was sufficient to allow ascription 
of both personal continuity and moral accountability to 
subsequent agents. Thus agent and action were 
continually in a state of karmic succession, and 
consequently there was no persistent entity in a "self" 
to be grasped. 
How then is the self-determination of the 
individual acting within the karmic framework, to be 
judged from the viewpoint of the autonomy of that 
person and the doctrine of non-self? In assessing the 
implications this has for the notion of free-agency, it 
is important to reflect upon the Buddha's claim that 
human beings were only conditioned by their past ka=a, 
and it was these conditioning factors which accounted 
for the psychological, environmental, physiological and 
ideological conditions of the present individual. 
However, it was also emphasised by the Buddha the 
necessity for each person to take responsibility for 
themselves. Hence by the exercise of one's free 
volitional capacity, one could act in such a way as to 
influence the course of karma both in this present life 
and future rebirths. (68) 
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Buddhism's response to any alleged disparity 
between the doctrines of anatta and karma has been to 
assert that each individual is responsible for the 
consequences of their karmic actions. It is through 
free volitional activity while engaging with the world, 
that one's actions and decisions control one's moral 
destiny. Moreover the karmic law presupposes the 
notion of anatta, for it is in this area where the no- 
self is both disclosed and confined. Consequently 
there can be no experience of the psycho-physical being 
but through this law. Karma is therefore demonstrated 
in anatta as the explicit form of "non-self". 
Buddhaghosa summarises this notion in the 
Visuggh3-macrcra 
So fruit is not in kamma or out of it, 
Kanma is devoid of (fruit) 
Nor is the fruit in Kamma to be found, 
But it is Kanma and nought else 
By which the fruit is reproduced. (69) 
Hence Buddhism asserts that there exists a harmony 
between the doctrine of ka=a and the theory of the 
non-self, in that the "self-awareness" of ka=a 
coincides with the revelation of anatta. Thus there is 
no reconciliation to be made between the causal 
mechanism of karmic continuity and the moral 
accountability of the non-self theory. 
One can argue therefore, that the issue crucial to 
the Buddhist concept of personal identity is the 
question of the ontological status of the karmic 
principle. Although the Buddha sought to explain the 
nature of existence in terms of being, and therefore 
would argue against any such ontological thesis, 
nevertheless, a pre-condition for the origin and 
development of an individual would seem to be 
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constructed from the metaphysical premise of the 
universal law of causation, in which this causal 
genesis supports an ontogenic statement. (70) 
Furthermore the entire edifice of Buddhist 
philosophical thought hinges on the law of universal 
causality revealed in the formula of paticca- 
samuppada. (71) Thus to what degree an individual can 
be said to be self-determined, given the fact that the 
cause for the arising of all phenomena is the effect of 
previously conditioned causes, and does not therefore 
exist beyond its causes and conditions, would seem 
paradoxical. This enigma is discussed in the 
"Selasutta" when Mara questions the nun Sela: 
By whom was this puppet made? 
And where is the puppet's maker? 
Wherefrom, again, does it arise? 
/V And where will it cease , 
Sela explains thus: 
This puppet is not made by itself, 
Nor are its misfortunes made by another. 
Conditioned by causes it arises, 
Upon the destruction of its causes it 
ceases. (72) 
It would seem appropriate at this juncture to 
consider how Buddhism accounts for the nature of 
continuity in the rebirth process. The question 
arises, that if nothing exists beyond its causes and 
conditions, how can there be a re-becoming(punabbhava) 
without a substantive self or soul that is reborn? 
Moreover the denial of any spatial interrelationship 
between successive lives, must have significant 
implications for a notion of ""self-determination". 
Once again there appears to be a paradox between the 
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view of an individual as a series of successive events, 
and the theory of rebirth. 
Buddhism insists however, that the notion of non- 
substantiality is not tantamount to a denial of 
continuity. They assert that the concept of continuity 
through cycle of lives is not logically inconsistent 
with the theory of causal co-arising based on karmic 
succession. Moreover it is the karmic continuum which 
accounts for consecutive sets of khandas, for there is 
no rebirth link which could answer for any "'self-same" 
identity. The Buddha repudiated the suggestion that it 
was an abiding consciousness that was transferred, 
which then accounted for continuity of memory and 
experience. He explained that rebirth had to be 
understood in terms of causation. At death a person 
consisting of the five khandas dispersed, and a fresh 
sequence of psycho-physical events reassembled 
conditioned by karmic causes in the previous existence. 
Thus it was the ignorance and desire contained in the 
past life, predisposed to karmic activity which caused 
a new consciousness to arise. (73) 
In the "Visuddhimagga", Buddhaghosa vividly 
explained this relationship between personal identity 
and rebirth: 
here let the illustration of this 
consciousness be such things as an echo, a 
light, a seal impression, a looking-glass 
image, for the fact of its not coming here 
from the previous becoming(birth) and for the 
fact that it arises owing to causes that are 
included in past becomings. For just as an 
echo, a light, a seal impression, and a 
shadow have respectively sound etc. as their 
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causes and come into being without going 
elsewhere, so also this consciousness. (74) 
Buddhism maintains therefore that there is neither 
total distinction nor discontinuity in successive 
rebirths. Hence each set of khandas condition 
subsequent aggregates conditioned by former karmic 
dispositions and tendencies. Buddhaghosa continued his 
explanation of this point: 
And with a stream of continuity there is 
neither identity nor otherness. For if there 
were absolute identity in a stream of 
continuity, there would be no forming of curd 
from milk. And if there were absolute 
otherness, the curd would not be derived from 
milk [ --- 1. So neither absolute identity nor 
absolute otherness should be assumed 
here. (75) 
Although Buddhism contends that it is the karmic 
continuum which accounts for the re-becoming of 
consecutive sets of khandas, and denies any rebirth 
link in the form of continuous consciousness, they 
nevertheless affirm that this causal continuity is 
sufficient to attribute moral responsibility to the 
present individual for past actions. This question of 
moral accountability in relation to the notion of 
anatta was raised as problematic during the time of the 
Buddha when he was asked, ", then what self do deeds 
affect that are done by not-self? "(76) We find the 
same question being put to Buddhaghosa in the 
"Visuddhimagga", ""whose is the fruit since there is no 
experiencer? "(77) 
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Hence Buddhism has to account for both the 
mechanism and the rationale, whereby the individual who 
is reborn is held to be morally responsible for actions 
of a prior birth, and moreover experiences just 
retribution or reward for that activity. In the 
"Questions of King Milinda", the monk Nagasena 
illustrated this reasoning by means of an analogy. A 
man whose lamp had set one house on fire, was then held 
to be responsible for the burning down of the entire 
village, for it was considered to be from the 
consequence of the first fire that further fires were 
then produced. Nagasena explained: 
Just so,, great king,. it is one name-and-foxm 
which has its end in death, and another name- 
and- fox7n which is reborn. But the second is 
the result of the first, and is therefore not 
set free from its evil deeds. (78) 
Thus the concept of moral accountability inherent 
in the rebirth system does not simply inspire "self- 
interest", but encourages a "self-denying" compassion 
for all creatures. In the I'Sam_yutta Nika_va- this 
sentiment is expressed: "The body is not to be seen as 
belonging to any self-it is neither 'yoursf nor 
'others, '- but as(a product of) previous karma as 
something constructed and willed (into) existence". (79) 
Buddhism contends therefore that the concept of rebirth 
supports a far greater psychological principle than 
solely a moral retributive structure. Incorporated in 
this system is the notion of a qualitative idea of 
identity encompassing a dimension of altruistic 
behaviour. 
However, Frank J. Hoffman in "Rat: ionality And Mind In 
Earlv Buddhism", comments that rebirth has remained "a 
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conceptual grey area-". (80) In its conceptual years 
Buddhism's preoccupation was focused more on achieving 
enlightenment by ending attachment to the realm of 
klesas. Consequently the notion of rebirth received 
little theoretical reflection, possibly because it 
could provoke inconsequential speculation not 
constructive to the reality of human existence in the 
world. There is no doubt that the underlying aim was 
to emphasise that name and form did not designate a 
real and ultimate fact. Hence Buddhism was resolute in 
confirming that any rebirth link had to be understood 
as impermanent, supporting the notion of a continuity 
without identity. 
Many scholars agree(81) that although the Buddha'a 
dialogues give a consistent perspective to the question 
of continuity, it is a historical viewpoint and not a 
logical one. Critics argue therefore, that regardless 
of the interpretation given in the Buddhist 
philosophical texts, the ascription of an ethical 
obligation requires the theory of a psychic sequence. 
It is disputed whether mere causal continuity without a 
continuous element is in truth sufficient to provide 
the basis for blameworthiness. Nevertheless it is 
essential to recognise that the numerous questions 
which arose from the Buddha's teachings of the karmic- 
samsaric belief system and its simultaneous denial of 
an enduring self, rendered all discourse concerning the 
notion that the reborn was neither the same nor 
different, to the distinction between ultimate and 
relative truth. 
This precept is thoroughly illuminated in the 
well-known lamp analogy offered to King Milinda by 
Nagasena: 
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'Suppose a man, 0 king, were to light a lamp, 
would it burn the night through-r.;, 
'Yes, it might do so'. 
'Now., is it the same flame that burns in the 
first watch of the night, and in the second'. 
'No'. 
-, Or the same that burns in the second watch 
and the third-,.: ' 
1 No ',, 
'Then is there one lamp in the first watch, 
and another in the second, and another in the 
third "? 
'No. The light comes from the same lamp all 
the night through'. 
"Just so,, 0 King,, is the continuity of a 
person or thing maintained. One comes into 
being, another passes away; and the rebirth 
is, as it were, simultaneous. Thus neither 
as the same nor as another does a man go on 
to the last phase of his self- 
consciousnessf. (82) 
Consequently at a level of ultimate truth, the 
sequence of flames expressed the notion of continuity 
without absolute identity, since the flame was ever- 
changing yet continuous. However, from the relative 
level of conventional understanding, just as a 
continuous sequence of flames was produced from the 
same lamp, so in the same way the receptacle of a body 
was necessary for the karmic continuum of desires to 
exist. Thus the unliberated could envisage 
"themselves" in this continuous "flame" sequence of 
sI am. q.: 3 
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When reflecting on the implications continuity 
without "'self-same" identity could predictably have on 
the notion of free-agency within the rebirth process, 
it is significant to note that Buddhism considers that 
each new life is more than the product of hereditary 
and genetic stock. They assert that a dynamic stream 
of consciousness interacts with the formation of 
the(new) psycho-physical individual to reveal 
temperament and personality characteristics, mutually 
conditioned by both psychological karmic consequences 
and those bequeathed from parental extraction. The 
integration of the new personality is described in the 
"Sam_yutta Nika_Va"`: 
Just as much as two bundles of reeds are to 
stand erect supporting each other, even so 
conditioned by the(hereditax-y)psycho-physical 
factors is the consciousness, and conditioned 
by the consciousness are the psycho-physical 
factors. (83) 
Hence this enquiry penetrates the very essence of 
the karmic-rebirth system. Clearly it is the element 
of free-agency integral to the aggregation of the five 
khandas, which is the dynamic influence that initiates 
the karmic continuum and the resultant re-becoming of a 
psycho-physical person. The consequence of this free- 
volitional activity encourages enlightened "self- 
interest", and thus controls one's moral destiny. It 
is this ethical accountability furthermore, which is 
held to answer for the continuity which is obtained 
between subsequent existences. Thus autonomy and 
freedom as the determining factor of decision making is 
viewed as responsible for the deluded idea of selfhood, 
which reveals and constrains one within the karmic 
causal sequence of continuity. 
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Can the Notion of Immortality be Defended? 
Traditionally the Christine doctrine of human 
destiny has hinged on the affirmation of an abiding 
soul in which the notion of immortality is 
defended. (84) For this to be a tenable belief, 
proponents of personal immortality have had to account 
for the nature of this continuity between the person in 
this life and the identity of the resurrected life in 
eternity. Although the notion of an immortal soul, as 
the essential essence of human identity, is firmly 
embedded in Christian thinking, this concept of human 
destiny has nevertheless proved a problematic paradigm. 
Thus Christianity has constantly had to respond to the 
discrepancy between a conception of life beyond death 
based on the biblical doctrine of resurrection of the 
body, as opposed to an essential Platonistic notion of 
immortality of a self-existent soul. 
To obtain a more comprehensive notion of this 
philosophical enigma, as to how personality survives 
death, it is necessary to review its historical import. 
Early patristic understanding of the resurrection of 
the body was based on the biblical teachings expressed 
in the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo, whereby God 
breathed his spirit(ruach) into humankind. (85) Mankind 
is therefore subject to God's creation, and as 
creatures of flesh liable to a natural mortality. 
Although the Hebrew word nephesh has commonly been 
translated as "soul", it is more accurately interpreted 
as '"man", which indicates that the ancient Hebrews 
would not have conceived of the human being as 
possessing a disembodied soul, for at death the nephesh 
"goes out"; it ceases to exist. (86) 
258 
It was probably during the time of the inter- 
testamental literature, which was influenced by the 
Greek understanding of a pre-existent immortal soul, 
that a concept of life after death was encouraged. In 
the "Wisdom of Solomon" we find such compromise, yet 
immortality remained essentially providential, confined 
to the good: 
The souls of the just are in Godfs hand, and 
tox, ment shall not touch them. Xn the eyes of 
the foolish they seem to be dead [ --- 1. But 
they are at peace [ --- I they have a sure hope 
of immortality. (87) 
Hence at its inception, the biblical notion of 
salvation supported a holistic doctrine of the 
resurrection of the body: it was in one's entirety that 
one was saved for eternity. There was no belief in the 
Platonic notion of the body as a tomb encasing the soul 
that survived the body's destruction. 
This same unitary concept was expressed in Pauline 
thought through the "pneumatic body" with the idea of 
the spiritual being. Paul spoke firstly of the carnal 
self the psyche, using this term in the same way as 
nephesh, as the whole psycho-physical person. (88) 
However, he believed that the hope of human immortality 
lay not in an escape from the body, but in a 
transformation of it. Thus while ps_Vche expressed the 
corporeal self, the pneuma connoted the spiritual 
being. This spiritual self was not separate from the 
psyche, but was the dimension of the "self" which 
depicted life derived from God. Hence Paul was 
convinced that at the death of the material bodily 
life, another type of body was resurrected, a spiritual 
one which was adapted to a life in eternity. The 
earthly body might disintegrate into nothingness, but 
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the pneuma would rise up to preserve a perfected, self- 
expression of the physical identity. (89) 
It was the philosophical deliberations of Saint 
Augustine that undermined this biblical understanding 
of immortality as the resurrection of the body. In his 
". On The Immortality of The Soul", Augustine propounded 
his essentially Platonistic notion of the soul, and 
consequently this doctrine became integral to Christian 
theology. Although Augustine had expounded the theory 
that body and soul constituted the human being in such 
a way that this union could not be severed, he also 
taught that the spiritual properties of knowledge, 
truth and reason were eternal. Hence he argued, that 
the soul as the facilitator of these qualities must 
also be immortal. It was clear that these virtues 
could not exist as integral to the body in the same 
way, or they would perish with bodily dissolution. 
Augustine was of the opinion that death separated body 
and soul only temporarily, for in eternity the soul 
would be re-united with the resurrected body. Karl 
Barth protests that this dualistic notion of human 
nature is essentially non-biblical and laments that, 
"it was disastrous that this picture of man could 
assert and maintain itself for so long as the Christian 
picture-l-'. (90) 
Moreover Descartes built upon the Platonistic- 
Augustinian heritage to assert that one's essential 
identity was the mind as the subject of conscious 
experience. As an irreducible thinking substance, he 
argued that the mind was, "a thing which so exists that 
it needs no other thing to exist". (91) Descartes was 
confident that by identifying the soul as a spatio- 
temporal substance, he was providing Christian theism 
with a credible hypothesis on which to base their 
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traditional belief in immortality. Not only did his 
thesis support a theory in which soul or mind could 
exist independently in a disembodied state, but in 
contrast to Augustine who had envisaged this as only a 
temporary state, Descartes believed that this essential 
essence in human nature was indestructible and 
therefore eternal. (92) 
However, with the erosion of an earth-centred 
perspective of the cosmos, Christianity's traditionally 
formulated doctrine of eternal life is considered by 
many to be no longer a plausible concept. Biological 
and psychological sciences, together with biblical 
criticism, have rendered the belief in the resurrection 
of the body, or a disembodied soul which survives 
death, as an otiose notion. Should we consider 
therefore, that the traditional theological statements 
concerning personal immortality have been severed from 
their established frame-work of ideas, and the 
accustomed Christian hope discarded as part of the 
religious language in which it was formulated? 
Moreover there is no doubt that a correlation between 
the concept of an ""inner self" and the notion of free 
agency has contributed to a very significant area of 
human experience. How then does Christian theism 
support a structure of autonomy as the distinguishing 
mark of the human condition which necessarily 
transcends the temporal life? 
There have been various attempts to reconcile some 
form of resurrection or immortality belief with a 
modern world view. Richard Swinburne in "The Coherence 
of Theism", firmly asserts his belief that our personal 
identity is not essentially identified with any 
indispensable corporeal entity. He alleges that it has 
been the case that in terms of memory claims, the 
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identity of disembodied persons can be checked. He 
assumes therefore that the possibility of re- 
identifying a person as the same individual who has 
previously had a particular experience, legitimate 
enough reason to maintain that, "we may use bodily 
continuity to reach conclusions about personal 
identity". (93) 
Terence Penelhum objects to Swinburne's 
speculative assumptions, and argues that much of his 
debate is purely hypothetical response to his criteria 
of personal identity. Hence Penhelum declares: 
beyond the wholly empty assurance that it is 
a metaphysical principle which guarantees 
continuing identity through time, [ --- I its 
irrelevance [ --- I is due to its being merely 
an alleged identity f --- I guaranteeing 
conditions of which no independent 
characterisation is forthcoming. (94) 
Antony Flew supports Penelhum's sentiments, arguing 
that although traditional Christian theism has endorsed 
the concept of substantial, incorporeal souls as both 
coherent and conceivable, this assumption of 
immortality cannot adequately give assurances that we 
will be aware of the '"self-same" identity in eternity 
as in this life. He submits therefore that it is this 
notion which must be the essence of any doctrine of 
personal survival. 
However, such protagonists as A. J. Ayer repudiate 
any hypothesis that supports a disembodied state. He 
believes that there is an a priori requirement to 
conclude that personal identity is referenced to an 
empirical psycho-physical self, and that states of 
consciousness are naturally dependent upon physical 
processes. Ayer therefore rejects any suggestion that 
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individual experiences can be identified except by 
reference to the physical body. He contends that if 
all experiences are dependent on the conscious subject, 
there can be no principle by which "self-awareness" 
separated in time can be the experiences of the same 
%, self". 
Ayer is familiar with the argument propounded by 
those who suggest that memory serves as the principle 
by which ""self-conscious" experience accounts for the 
"self-same" awareness over time. He denies that this 
is plausible as memory indicates remembering, and this 
implies thinking which signifies a conscious experience 
of the subject. He also points out that many scholars 
agree that the key to personal identity is provided by 
human action. As action must partly be attributed to 
physical events, then the notion of a "'self-identity" 
surviving in a disembodied state is a meaningless 
concept. (95) 
Notwithstanding such critical polemics, it is 
important to reflect upon the theory expounded by John 
Hick in "Death And Eternal Life", in which he attempts 
to elucidate the biblical Pauline doctrine of the 
resurrection of the body. (96) He explains that the 
unity of the person was not to be understood as a 
transformation of the earthly identity which survived 
death, or as a spiritual entity which continued after 
death. In what he calls his "'Replica Theory", he 
suggests that we can understand Paul's proposal with 
regard to the resurrection of the body by considering 
the spiritual body as, "an exact psycho-physical 
Ireplicaf of the deceased person". (97) Hick emphasises 
that if we consider the psycho-physical body as a 
codified message, then the resurrected being can be re- 
created or translated back from the encoded form of the 
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material body. Through its transmission in this way, 
the pneuma (or spiritual being) as a "replica" is 
nothing other than the original identity. 
Paul and Linda Badham in 111=ortalit 
_v and 
Extinction" believe however, that it is primarily 
because we always relate the grammatical "I" to a 
subject who has feelings, sensations and desires, 
creating a strong sense of "'self-awareness", that we 
are inclined to believe that our disembodied survival 
is plausible. Moreover reflection on our mortality 
leads to a yearning for "self-preservation" and the 
desire to survive death. Thus such religious language 
and imagery which reinforces a linguistic dichotomy 
between the soul and the body, is expressing human 
attitudes and values which can sustain this desire for 
immortality. 
Christian theology claims however, that the 
expression of immortality as eternal destiny gives 
particular importance to the language of the soul, 
which then becomes more than a proposition supporting a 
truth claim. It creates the channel by which God's 
salvation can be striven for; that which was temporal 
and corruptible can be made incorruptible and eternal. 
Moreover the notion of the soul is not only conducive 
to spiritual and moral progress, but also promotes the 
means by which the salvific process commenced in this 
life can continue in a life everlasting. (98) 
Clearly the capacity for free volitional activity 
which promotes the ethical appraisal of human 
behaviour, advances the notion of the "essential self" 
in the concept of an abiding soul. Moreover Christian 
theology maintains this allows human beings to become 
more conscious of both selfhood and Godhead. 
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Consequently a prominent feature to the redemptive goal 
is the idea of assuming responsibility for one's 
future, and the perfecting of that "self-expression" in 
a new and better life in eternity. Hence within a 
concept of personal survival, the "essential self" 
which has the ability to choose freely in this life, 
will be experienced by a particular state of 
consciousness belonging to the same soul in a future 
existence. Furthermore immortality is not a state 
imposed on the soul, but one that the continuing self 
has to freely secure. (99) 
Hence while Christianity seeks to affirm both 
selfhood and Godhood as the means by which human beings 
can be made conscious of their eternal destiny, 
Buddhism aims at the extinction of the "self" in which 
to realise their liberation. This ethical-religious 
system through which salvation is offered would seem to 
be the antithesis of the Christian spiritual path. Not 
only has salvation to be achieved through one's own 
efforts, but moreover, there is no conception of a 
creator God whose intervention of redemptive providence 
and grace provides the channel by which this salvation 
can be effected. (100) Furthermore, the notion of 
anatta denies the existence of an individual soul, and 
thus the supreme goal of nirvana is said to be attained 
by an individual to whom selfhood is disclaimed. 
Once again the doctrine of anatta would appear to 
pose a problem, for it is certainly puzzling to talk 
about the goal of salvation if there is no soul to be 
saved. In the Pali Canon there is considerable 
evidence that the Buddha was frequently questioned as 
to who attained nirvana if there was no-self: "does a 
liberated being exist after death or not? Or does he 
neither exist nor not exist". (101) Although the Buddha 
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refuted all ideas of personal immortality, he firmly 
asserted that it was the illusion of "self" which 
prevented true enlightenment. In this context 
therefore, the final undertaking of this chapter is to 
consider how Buddhism reconciles the doctrine of anatta 
with the salvific goal of nirvana, and hence to 
contemplate the relevance such disclosure has for the 
notion of free-agency. 
When pressed to explain the nature of human 
identity in relation to nirvana, the Buddha stated 
quite categorically that such questions were not 
conducive to the goal of liberation. Any answers of an 
ontological nature could only be speculative and 
therefore liable to be misinterpreted. He emphasised 
that to theorise about a persistent, transcendent soul, 
or even the non-existence of an enduring self was to 
have mistaken views, for these queries only served to 
distract from the primary concern of freeing the 
individual from the continual cycle of becoming. It was 
through the application of right mindfulness that one 
could comprehend nirvana: 
There is this one way, monks, for the 
purification of beings, for the overcoming of 
sorrows and griefs, for the going down of 
sufferings and miseries, for winning the 
right path, for realising nibbana, that is to 
say, the four applications of 
mindfulness. (102) 
The Buddha declared his objections to the doctrine 
of an enduring soul were not merely against the 
metaphysical argument, but were also from a practical 
concern. The idea of individual immortality encouraged 
a "'-self-attitude" of permanence, which the Buddha 
contended could not be the case since one could not 
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escape the fact that decay was inherent in all things, 
and thus all people subject to ageing and ultimately 
death. He appreciated that the teachings of anatta 
might make people nervous of their own transience, but 
unequivocally denied that nirvana could be thought of 
in terms of eternity for an enduring entity after 
death. In the "'Alagaddupamma Sut: ta"" the Buddha 
discusses the folly of this: "This the world this the 
self, aftex- dying X will become pez-manent,, lasting, 
eteznal, not liable to change, X will stand fast like 
unto the etex-nal- is not this, monks, absolute folly? " 
(103) 
The Buddha continually stressed that his central 
concern was to reveal to human beings the cause of the 
human predicament, and recommend the eradication of the 
illusion of a "self". Salvation he declared, was 
seeing the world and one's "self" as they really are. 
The Buddha continually defended his advice by 
confirming that all the khandas were subject to dukkha, 
and consequently there could not be any permanent 
entity to support the notion of an immortal soul. 
Human beings he pointed out, have this false notion of 
an enduring self because of the desire to exist or re- 
exist. It is thus the attachment to tanha, the root 
cause of the unsatisfactoriness of all things, which 
not only generated a conception of a unitary entity, 
but the prospect of an immortal soul. 
Thus one could only become truly liberated by 
understanding the real nature of the human condition in 
the elimination of this thirst for "self-identity". 
Hence the Buddha explained that it was by understanding 
the concept of dependent genesis, that such 
comprehension would promote liberation, which was the 
freedom to realise nirvana: 
267 
Monks.. the instructed disciples of the pure 
ones, seeing thus, disregards material shape, 
disregards feeling, disregards perception, 
disregards the habitual tendencies, 
disregards consciousness; disregarding he is 
dispassionate; through dispassion he is 
freed; in freedom the knowledge comes to be 
that he is freed, and he comprehends. (104) 
The Buddha, anxious to avoid any misinterpretation 
of his teachings,, deliberately emphasised that both 
conditioned and non-conditioned things were subject to 
the notion of non-self. Hence the four paramattha 
dhammas, nirvana included, had the characteristic of 
anat, ta. This idea essential to the Buddha's 
instructions are succinctly expounded in the 
"Dhammapada-" where it is stated: "All conditioned 
things are impex7nanent: All conditioned things are 
dukkha: All dhammas are without self". (105) It is 
significant to note that whereas "conditioned" 
(samkhara) is used in the first two verses, in verse 
three the more comprehensive term of 1, dhamma- is 
employed. In this way the Buddha illustrated that it 
was not only those things conditioned and relative 
which were subject to anatta, for even the non- 
conditioned nirvana was not excluded from this concept. 
However, despite the apparent doctrinal 
substantiation of the notion of anatta, the unitary 
characteristic of the human being in the conventional 
world has generated many beliefs and practices which 
confirm that personal survival as an enduring "person" 
is a fundamental feature of popular custom. This 
attitude towards continuity in rebirth has produced a 
system of transference of merit, whereby religious 
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rituals are performed for the deceased in order to 
assist their karmic reckoning in the hope that they 
will be reborn in more fortunate circumstances. (106) 
Nevertheless this practice should not be seen as 
denoting an entirely different belief system, once 
again it has to interpreted as representing the 
categories of conventional and ultimate truths. Thus 
the idea of transference of merit can be absorbed 
within the karmic truth as the notion of "donor" and 
"recipient", while the nirvanic truth denotes the 
refined absolute reality. It is this nirvanic 
certainty which aims at the ultimate liberation of the 
individual. Hence it is only by progression along the 
route which sees that all personal experiences of a 
"self" as impermanent and the root cause of all 
unsatisfactoriness, that the intentions and acts which 
compose a coherent "I" are dissolved into their true 
constituent, impersonal elements: into the reality of 
nirvana which is salvation. 
In all his teachings the Buddha clearly endorsed 
the belief that ", self-identity" was not conducive to 
enlightenment. Furthermore it is obvious that the 
Buddhist salvific goal cannot subscribe to a notion of 
free-agency as a legitimate path to personal 
immortality. Although the facility of free volitional 
activity is necessary to the following of the path 
which leads to liberation, the Buddha declared that 
true insight into the nature of reality could not be 
attained by the resources of '"self-determination". 
Volitional activity not only fuelled passions and 
desires and the illusion of a "'self-identity", but this 
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craving for "'self-existence" caused further samsaric 
continuity. In fact, whenever the notion of a "self" 
existed there would inevitably be the notion of freedom 
of that will, and it was only when this co-operation 
ceased that nirvanic reality was attained. Hence it was 
only by the power of the intellect to control and 
eradicate all volitional activity, that spiritual 
enlightenment was possible. 
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Summary Comment s 
An initial analysis and evaluation of the concept 
of personhood has revealed that this basic question of 
what constitutes the nature of individual personal 
existence, has proved to be more enigmatic than simply 
answered. It has troubled many Western philosophers 
that to explain the immediacy of the '"self" by the use 
of the term "I" must be significantly meaningful. Why 
else they insist, do we ascribe a variety of different 
thoughts and activities to ""my" experiences to give 
reference to the concept of a person? Christian 
theology has generally responded to this enquiry by 
promoting the notion of the "'essential self" which 
underlies the psycho-physical activities of an 
individual. Moreover the notion of a "'self" is further 
enhanced by the specific capacity of human beings for 
self reflective evaluation. Volitional motivation as a 
distinctive element of one's essential personhood 
therefore, plays a significant part in defining our 
innermost nature. 
The Buddhist doctrine however, is unequivocal in 
insisting that the ""self" is merely a mode of 
expression by which we function in the common-sense 
world. They deny that there is any objective "self" 
other than the immediacy of the subject which is 
experiencing: there is no substantive essence other 
than what we can observe. Hence the nature of personal 
identity is explained in the Buddha's teachings of the 
five khandas, which not only confirmed how a person 
functioned, but reinforced that these constituent parts 
were mutually conditioning. Thus a sense of autonomy 
is generated by the presence of volitional tendencies, 
themselves conditioned as samsaric phenomena, which is 
the pre-condition of existence. 
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The Buddha contended therefore that any concept of 
a permanent, substantive "'*self" had no empirical 
justification or value, and hence was only a nebulous 
feature of the human being. The entire aim of his 
anatta doctrine was to promote a cognitive awareness of 
the actual nature of reality. The Buddha confirmed 
that the truth about the nature and destiny of human 
existence was explained in terms of causal genesis. 
Consequently he verified that the whole of existence 
was relative, conditioned and interdependent. 
Nevertheless, within this causal system a notion of 
self-determination was necessary to make self-conscious 
decisions to seek release from the realm of samsaric 
existence. 
Within philosophical theism the espousing of an 
abiding ""self" guaranteed that the soul was regarded as 
a unique substance; sui generis. This notion of an 
essential '"self" in a metaphysical sense thus provided 
justification for the principle of human moral 
accountability, and consequently God's divine 
redemptive and salvific purposes. Moreover belief in 
personhood as essentially a spiritual entity, has been 
effectively utilised to defend the notion of 
immortality as humankind's eternal destiny. It is 
apparent that Christian theism has employed this 
particular religious language to characterise a 
definitive description of reality that has in Western 
Christendom become integral to our cultural attitudes 
and values. 
Buddhism rejects a seemingly fundamental incongruity 
between the karmic-rebirth principles and the doctrine 
of anatta, and emphasises that the philosophical 
implications of the doctrine are to stress the 
practical aspect of the "no-self", which is bound by 
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its karma and can have no reality separate from it. 
Hence the "no-self" is neither the lack of something, 
or the affirmation of a discrete entity: it is the 
clinging to such a way of thinking which should be 
denied. Hence Buddhism continues to insist that one 
should not be concerned with such queries as '"what am 
I, and what am I destined to become when I die if my 
karmic inheritance subscribes to a future individual 
which is neither totally dissimilar or identical? " 
Such questions are merely a manifestation of "the 
conceit of I am". 
It is quite obvious that the Buddhist salvific 
goal cannot prescribe to a notion of free-agency in the 
same sense as Christian theism. Whereas Christianity 
affirms the notion of a "'self" as the decision-making 
element within a metaphysical system of eternal 
destiny, Buddhism is not conscious of the idea of 
responsible freedom in a comparable manner. Salvation 
certainly pivots on an ethical structure in which moral 
accountability is confirmed as a functional requirement 
supporting the causality of dependent co-arising, 
nevertheless, the notion of an individual personality 
within this system is not considered to be appropriate 
to the path of enlightenment. 
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offers the analogy of the chariot wherein this 
term is shown to be but a conventional designation 
and name for the functioning of parts; pole, axle, 
wheels, chariot body, and banner-staff: ""Just as 
it is by the condition precedent of the co- 
existence of its various parts that the word 
%chariot, is used, just so is it that when the 
skandas are there we talk of a 'being'". 
(I'Lakkhana Panha" Bk. 2 ch. 1: 28. ) 
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Rupa-the living organism of the human body which 
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Vedana- physical and mental sensations. In an 
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passions for they are considered more than 
sensations of the sense organs. 
Sanna-perceptions, the cognition of physical and 
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tendencies and volition. It is this volitional 
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person's actions and the bearer of ka=a. 
Vinnana-consciousness; the awareness or response 
to both physical and mental phenomena. It is this 
faculty which organises, judges and reasons 
supporting and assimilating all external and 
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personal experience. 
13 In the "Pat: t: hana Sutra- of the Angut: tara Nika_ya, 
vol. 1 ch. 1-7 provides details under which 
conditions nama and rupa are mutually related: 
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1)dependent 2)co-nascent 3)conditioned 4)supported 
5)associated 6)co-joined 7)investigations. 
Anguttara Nika_va "Dhammasangani" section 636. 
Part one analyses all states of consciousness into 
their constituent factors. 
Meditative concentration can temporarily produce 
anomalous states such as telepathy and psycho- 
kenesis. 
In a comprehensive perspective consciousness is 
the mental activity encompassed by the idea of 
"mind". 
The English word ""consciousness" would seem to 
infer a continuous entity. "Con"-a differentiated 
variant of ""me" and "science"-demonstrating or 
proof of-therefore "conscious"-demonstrating 
awareness of "', me". 
Volitional tendencies are motivated by both 
physiological and psychological causes, the 
quality of the volitional action is dependent on 
the force of the activity. 
While Plato's conception of reality consisted of 
both the world of senses and the world of ideas, 
reality for Aristotle consisted of the unity of 
form and substance. The '"substance" being what 
things are made of and "form" its specific 
characteristics. 
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21 
I am deliberately not addressing the subject of 
"'self" as "'-soul" at this stage. This aspect of 
""self" will be investigated later in the chapter. 
Strawson, P. F. Individuals Page 108. 
22 Ayer, A. J. The Concept of a Person Page 118 
23 C. A. Campbell's exposition suggests that it is 
memory that accounts for the fact that the subject 
is conscious of its identity throughout the 
diversity of its cognitions. 
24 Parfit, Derek. Reasons and Persons Page 262. 
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PI/Tl and P2/T2 then a person Pl existing at a 
given time Tl is the same person as P2 at a given 
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are experienced as body-feelings based on 
analogical inference, but interpreted so speedily 
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The implications of this Platonic-Cartesian 
dualism conceived in the doctrine of the soul are 
the subject of part two of this chapter. See: Does 
a Person Have a Soul? Pages 228-244 
This is the function of "second order desire". 
""First order desires" which many animals have is 
simply the desire to do or not to do something. 
It can be argued that freedom of the will is not 
necessarily undermined by being deprived of 
freedom of action. The fact that a person is 
capable of intentional actions means that they are 
free to will even if they are not in a position to 
translate their desires and choices into actions. 
By subjecting these desires and choices to self- 
evaluation and reflective judgement, a person can 
be considered to be exercising free-will. The 
implications of when a person can be considered 
morally responsible for their actions are the 
focus of chapter five. 
There is a case for including unconscious mental 
activity here also. However, this is probing the 
depths of deep psychology and not necessarily 
appropriate to the point I am making. 
Although Plato stressed the autonomy of the soul 
from the body, he believed the soul was also 
composed of desires and passions which had to be 
counter-balanced by the principle of reason. 
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psycho-physical constitution of a human being, 
Aristotle nevertheless believed that reason as the 
principle part of the soul could exist 
independently of the body. 
33 Evans, G. R. Augustine on Evil Letter 166. Page 41 
Augustine was unequivocal in reinforcing the 
incorporeal nature of the soul, its essential 
spiritual essence and thus its immortal destiny. 
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chapter as explanation and mitigation for moral 
evil and suffering. See the section: The Notion of 
Suffering as Trial or Discipline Pages 163-171. 
The idea of the soul's moral and spiritual growth 
as an assurance for one's eternal destiny has also 
been discussed in chapter three. See note 44. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
To What Extent Does the Notion of Moral Responsibility 
Within the Christian and Buddhist Philosophical 
Traditions Imply Freedom of the Will? 
Preface 
There is little doubt that both Christianity and 
Buddhism have linked together a concept of moral 
awareness and the accountability of the individual with 
a notion of human free-will. However, as to their 
precise relationship, the nature of this association is 
far from self-explanatory. Hence the first objective of 
this chapter is to establish how the term "moral 
responsibility" has been interpreted by both 
traditions, and to what extent this implies a notion of 
human free-will. Secondly, consideration must be given 
to the philosophical arguments encompassing these 
concepts which constitute what has been called the 
"causal problem". While many scholars assert that a 
universal causal principle with a resultant determinism 
can only negate moral responsibility in human action, 
critics of this paradigm have maintained that it is 
conceptually incoherent to apply causal relationships 
to the sphere of human conduct. 
Within the Western philosophical tradition, and a 
heritage extending back to Aristotle, it has generally 
been accepted that human free-will is a necessary 
presupposition for holding anyone morally responsible 
for their actions. By defining accountability as: "one 
in which the initiative lies with the agent who knows 
the particular circumstances in which the action is 
288 
perfoxmed", (1) Aristotle precipitated critical 
discourse throughout the history of Western thought. 
Hence classical philosophers and Christian theologians 
have extensively explored a complexity of theories to 
ascertain to what extent, and in what sense, moral 
responsibility implies human free agency. The basic 
imperative being to determine under what conditions an 
agent can be said to be praise or blameworthy for 
actions they have performed. 
Christian theism has traditionally supported the 
claim that human beings possess genuine freedom of will 
with the ability to make choices that are not wholly 
imposed upon them by their nature, heredity or 
environment. Theologians therefore have affirmed that 
within a Creator-creature relationship the fulfilment 
of human destiny is fellowship with God, which requires 
a response to one's Creator that has been freely 
chosen. (2) 
Despite Augustinian assertions that human beings 
were themselves morally responsible for their 
transgressions, his teachings on the prescience of God 
precipitated a controversial aspect to this moral 
imperative, challenging the actus elicitus; whether we 
are free to will or choose those things which we wish 
to do? If the doctrines of God's foreknowledge and 
predetermination were admitted, then moral 
responsibility must ultimately be the prerogative of 
God. 
It is this philosophical problem of God's 
omnipotence with the assertion of human moral 
responsibility, which constitutes the enigma of 
theism's position. This religious dilemma is 
succinctly expressed by Antony Flew: 
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Nobody, certainly, will deny that the idea of 
the existence of an omnipotent, just, and 
omnibenefient personal God is able to accord 
man solace, help and guidance; [ --- I But, on 
the other hand, there are decisive weaknesses 
attached to this idea in itself, which have 
been painfully felt since the beginning of 
histoxy. That is, if this being is 
omnipotent then evexy occurrence, including 
evexy human action, evexy human thought, and 
evex-y human feeling and aspiration is also 
his work. How is it Possible to think of 
holding men responsible for their deeds and 
thoughts before such an almighty Being? (3) 
Thus the standard theological response to this 
problem has been designed to show that determinism and 
divine providence are consistent with human moral 
accountability. It is this philosophical dilemma which 
is the religious analogue of the secular debate of 
free-will versus determinism, and although it is not my 
intention to enter the arena of this immense debate to 
any degree of depth, the nature of this philosophical 
enquiry demands that certain fundamental implications 
are confronted. The meaning of free-will where it is 
attributed to an action considered worthy of moral 
judgement, is a dispute in which the compatibilists and 
the incompatibilists have argued with ever increasing 
rigor, to ascertain the exact sense in which moral 
responsibility implies free agency. 
Furthermore, crucial to this dispute is the claim 
made by many philosophers that the question of free- 
will is an ontological enquiry about the reality of 
human nature. Consequently whether the principle of 
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causal determinism is upheld against indeterminism, is 
not a question of moral judgement but a metaphysical 
issue. Thus moral responsibility is considered a 
normative enquiry, examining the question of moral 
judgement, affirming the injustice of holding 
responsible those who lack free-will. 
In the Pali Canon, the teachings of the Buddha 
present a comprehensive study of ethical concepts 
relating to human conduct. The doctrines which formed 
the basis of the Buddha's recommendations, namely the 
karmic-samsaric principles, encouraged the belief in 
the autonomy of human agency. Not only did the 
Buddha's attitude to ka=a commend and support 
individuals taking responsibility for their own 
destiny, striving towards moral perfection and ultimate 
enlightenment, (4) but he defended these doctrines as 
intrinsic to a morally ordered and meaningful world. 
The Buddha therefore promoted the principle of moral 
causation disclosed in his formula of paticcasamuppada, 
denying wholesale determinism. This special theory of 
causation supported individual moral accountability for 
one's actions, offering the possibility of 
transcendence from the samsaric cycle of existence in a 
world that was rule-governed and predictable. 
For many scholars both in the Eastern and the 
Western philosophical traditions, these fundamental 
Buddhist teachings support a paradoxical thesis which 
present irreconcilable problems. They maintain that on 
the one hand the Buddha's teachings promote the strict 
necessity of the causal laws; that everything is 
"dependently originating", nothing therefore arising 
without a cause, while on the other hand, the necessity 
of retribution within the karmic principle affirms 
freedom of the will in one's ethical endeavours. 
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K. N. Jayatilleke points out that it is because of their 
failure to understand the intrinsicity of the doctrines 
of causation and ka=a, that they have concluded that 
any conception of human free agency and moral autonomy 
is illogical and inconsistent. 
While some scholarship has concluded that the 
Buddha's teachings present these insurmountable 
difficulties, and have used moral determinism to deny 
human free-will, other scholars support the argument 
that there is no fundamental contradiction in the 
Buddha's teachings, and maintain that the affirmation 
of free agency and moral responsibility can be 
reconciled with the doctrine of causality. (5) There is 
no doubt that these philosophical arguments, pertinent 
to an understanding of moral responsibility and free- 
will within the Buddhist tradition, can be formulated 
in terms of the "'causal problem". However, to assess 
this claim it is essential to penetrate the Buddha's 
teachings on universal causation with particular 
reference to the psychological experience of moral 
causality. Any discussion of moral determinism versus 
free-will will have to be justified within this 
philosophical frame of reference. 
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The Nature of Moral Responsibility. 
Within Western Culture, an etymological evaluation 
of the term "'responsibility" reveals that its origin 
lies in the Latin verb respondere, "to answer". The 
meaning of responsibility therefore, is generally 
acknowledged as accountability for one's actions. In 
this context the notion of accountability demands 
decisions in which we have the capacity to actively 
evaluate our actions. What emerges from the ability to 
reflectively self-evaluate, is the resolution to value 
one course of action or choice as more worthy than 
another. It is in this sense that choice or decision 
is regarded as the condition necessary to attribute 
moral liability to an agent, in that they are capable 
of being judged praise or blameworthy for their 
actions. 
Significantly, a deeper etymological analysis of 
the term responsibility reveals the Greek word meaning 
"promise", conveying a sense of reliability or 
dependability. The notion of moral responsibility 
therefore, is considered to accommodate not only the 
conditions necessary for imputability, but also the 
sense of the reputable nature of the agent. This 
dimension to the term contributes to a self- 
understanding and moral awareness in which there is a 
self-analysis of one's failure or success. This 
phenomenon, or mode of disclosure, is popularly 
considered to be our conscience; the "oughtness" of the 
situation. 
In theistic terms this phenomenon is frequently 
explained externally as divine influence in the "voice 
of God" making himself known to human beings. 
Christian theology therefore, stresses that human moral 
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responsibility has to be understood in relation to God 
as creator and sustainer of creatures whose existence 
is one of dependency, in which humanity has an 
obligation and responsibility to God. Creaturely 
status is bestowed by divine grace as the gift of God. 
Moreover, the divine creator not only sustains but also 
empowers human beings with an autonomous nature, to 
freely relate to, or reject, the possibility of a 
relationship with God. (6) 
This freedom to take responsibility for one's own 
choices and decisions, is an active response to the 
creator's intentions for his world, and God as the 
final arbitrator will judge accordingly. The capacity 
to make moral judgements emphasises the notion of 
commitment within this morally obligatory action, in 
the sense that one is fulfilling one's pledge to God as 
the source of all moral knowledge in the universe. (7) 
Thus the Christian ethic of moral responsibility 
appeals both to a notion of imputability, whereby human 
beings should discern the will of God and freely obey 
it, and to the notion of a promise; a response as 
dedicated commitment in which to make a reliable 
undertaking. 
Hence from the perspective of Christian theology, 
the demands of moral liability refers primarily to the 
subjective state of a human agent, being intrinsically 
bound up with the doctrines of creation, eschatological 
redemption and reconciliation. The standards and 
principles by which secular society must assess the 
value of a moral action, demands the objective criteria 
of ascertaining whether the agent was conscious of 
choosing or acting independently; of using his or her 
own initiative. Within philosophical discussion there 
is little serious dispute to the claim that awareness 
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of responsibility also assumes consciousness of 
freedom; that the agent might have acted otherwise if 
he or she so wished. However, there is distinct 
disagreement as to how this free-agency should be 
interpreted. 
This is particularly apparent in the area of 
Christian theology which supports the doctrine of free- 
will as a precondition of moral responsibility, yet 
advocates a belief in a God who is omnipotent and 
omniscient. The theistic viewpoint that human beings 
are autonomous creatures, is therefore strongly 
disputed by those who believe that this negates human 
nature as being anything but determined by divine 
control. Thus it is this challenge to theism's 
position which is the essential import of this chapter. 
How do they reconcile this inconsistency between the 
notion that human beings are identified as morally 
blameworthy, with the belief in a Deity that is the 
ultimate author of all creation? 
Before this line of enquiry is pursued further 
however, it is appropriate to consider the nature of 
moral accountability as prescribed by the ethical 
concepts and theories concerned with human behaviour 
within the Buddhist tradition. The Buddha's principle 
aim of analysing the human condition, was the 
foundation of a spiritual path in which moral and 
spiritual values would contribute to the overcoming of 
dukkha. The basis of the Buddha's ethical teachings 
therefore revolved around the kammic framework. The 
kammic nature of the world encouraged human beings to 
take seriously their general moral disposition, and to 
give careful consideration to the important 
consequences of each moral action. Hence one's moral 
destiny was determined by the ethical quality of the 
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intentional act. Thus decisions were meaningful in 
that they placed responsibility squarely on the 
individual, explaining a person's destiny in terms of 
personal endeavours. (8) 
The inexorable nature of one's kammic consequences 
meant that one could not escape this moral 
accountability, which would in some respect determine 
the quality of future rebirths. (9) Accordingly the 
Buddha's discourses confirmed the notion that 
essentially the only effective punishment was that 
which one inflicted upon oneself, if not in the present 
then in a future existence. Hence the ethical 
teachings for lay-people expounded in the "Sigalavada 
SuLta" did not support punitive punishment, dwelling on 
any arduous duty to state legislation or laborious 
obligation to political or civil affairs. (10) The 
Buddha instead emphasised that the key feature in moral 
virtuous behaviour, was a sense of commitment to 
reducing suffering for oneself and those with whom one 
interacted. 
Throughout the Pali Canon there is a strong 
emphasis on the personal nature of kamma. In the 
"Sam_yut: t: a Nika_va,, ' it says, "each must be an island unto 
himself, working out his own salvation, -'. (11) However, 
the Buddha was concerned to stress the interrelated 
dimension of the kammic principle between the 
individual and society. He emphasised that, 
"protecting oneself one protects others, and protecting 
others one protects oneself". (12) Thus he sought to 
indicate that a morally virtuous action contributed to 
a better social order for oneself and for others. 
Moreover the doctrine of anatta, in which individual 
identity was perceived as a combination of impermanent 
states of physical and psychological elements, 
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supported the Buddha'a claim that one's personal 
concern of minimising the effects of dukkha, was not 
essentially different from reducing these effects for 
others. In the "Udana Sutta" he explained: ""since the 
self of others is dear to each one, let him who loves 
himself not hax7n another". (13) 
Hence the general principle of kamma supported the 
claim that morally good acts promoted the material and 
spiritual well-being of humankind. Consequently the 
policy of universal justice advanced by this moral 
code, created the incentive to perform virtuous deeds 
and to avoid blameworthy action, as one's own well- 
being could not be gained at the expense of others. 
Bruce Reichenbach however, queries the underlying 
motive for this virtuous action, questioning whether it 
is in fact purely self-interest which drives any 
altruistic action. He claims that since the principle 
of universal justice operates in a totally objective 
fashion, it can neither encourage nor discourage 
benevolent behaviour. Yet there is an incentive to 
performing meritorious deeds for the welfare of fellow 
human beings, in that the quality of our experiences in 
this and future lives are determined by the 
consequences of our kammic residues. Thus by ascribing 
moral accountability to our intentional actions, it is 
obviously in our advantage to create wholesome 
kamma. (14) 
Reichenbach points out how Theravada and Mahayana 
thought have differed concerning altruism. While the 
Theravadins have promoted a very individualistic goal, 
in that each person must follow their own path and way 
of attaining salvation, the Mahayana tradition in the 
Bodhisattva ideal of active compassion for the welfare 
of all humankind, has created a truly altruistic 
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attitude. By sacrificing the merit they have attained, 
their unselfish approach aids and benefits all those 
who continue to struggle for liberation from the cycle 
of samsara. (15) However, the Buddha's teachings on 
moral responsibility were neither mandatory or 
injunctions, they were purely descriptive, in that he 
recommended a way of life and a pattern of conduct in 
which to avoid doing evil deeds and suffering the 
unpleasant consequences either now or later. Through 
the moral instruction of the Noble Eightfold Path he 
encouraged right action, promoting the skills of good 
habits and self-analysis as a way of achieving ultimate 
liberation. 
The cardinal doctrine of ka=a therefore, 
supported a testament of self-determination and moral 
liability. The potency of human effort and the 
capacity for autonomous decision being maintained 
according to the principle of moral causation. In this 
way, free-agency was stressed as a factor in the 
samsaric cycle, while still preserving the sanctity of 
causal events from which one could be liberated. 
However, by endorsing the efficacy of the moral will 
implied by personal effort, the kammic framework 
emphasised a non-mechanistic universe which opposed any 
notions of divine predestination or election for the 
purpose of salvation. I intend to return to the issue 
of moral causation and the indictment that this 
promotes a strict deterministic perspective in a 
subsequent section of this chapter. Having discussed 
the nature of moral responsibility in both traditions, 
consideration must now be given to the implications 
these notions have for their concepts of free-will. 
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The Notion of Moral Freedom 
It is a widely accepted assumption in the Western 
philosophical tradition that an analysis of moral 
judgement and responsibility reveals in some sense the 
necessity of free-agency. There is a strong consensus 
of agreement that free-will is at variance with any 
actions which are compelled or determined, and of which 
it would be illogical to attribute moral accountability 
to the agent. Hence it is only to agents who are 
capable of rational choice and decision that the 
concept of free-will can be ascribed, and the notion of 
praise or blameworthy deemed appropriate. 
Although the notion of free-will is acknowledged 
as a necessary qualification of moral agency, there is 
considerable dispute within the philosophical tradition 
as to how this link should be interpreted. It is not 
denied that factors such as heredity and environment 
exert certain influences upon human moral conduct which 
affect the nature of moral judgement. What is disputed 
is whether the phrase, "'could have acted otherwise" is 
understood as the %%liberty of spontaneity", in which 
the emphasis is laid on the notion of choice or desire, 
or the '"liberty of indifference", stressing the power 
or ability of alternative action. (16) 
Thus philosophical polemics would seem to revolve 
around either a categorical proposition, such that the 
agent "could have acted otherwise if he or she so 
wished", in which case moral liability is extended only 
to those components within the act of which she or he 
is sole agent. Or the proposition can be said to be 
hypothetical, in which case the external determinants 
are considered as a presupposition for moral 
responsibility in that, "I could have acted otherwise" 
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if my disposition, or certain conditions or 
circumstances had been different. (17) 
The dispute is contested then, on the one hand 
between the compatibilists who attempt to reconcile 
their claims that although human behaviour is causally 
determined, voluntary behaviour is nevertheless free to 
the extent that it is not externally constrained or 
impeded. On the other hand their protagonists, the 
incompatibilists or libertarians, insist that there can 
be no genuine freedom in the absence of the power to do 
otherwise, and that an adequate explanation must 
therefore demand a partial exemption from causal law. 
Thus, while the compatibilists uphold causal 
determinism, and advocate that the free-will implied in 
moral responsibility is not incompatible with the 
causal principle, the incompatibilists insist that a 
necessary condition of ascribing moral accountability 
to an agent's actions, requires a contra-causal sort of 
freedom. 
Those scholars who subscribe to a compatibilist 
argument, (18) maintain that the knowledge of having 
acted according to one's choice or desires as 
prescribed to by the -liberty of spontaneity", is not 
the consciousness of the absence of a cause, but 
consists of the feeling that one could choose to act as 
one desires, unimpeded by external restraints. 
Furthermore such compatibilists as Moritz Schlick, 
maintain that the primary concern as to who is morally 
responsible for an act, "is a matter only of knowing 
who is to be punished or rewarded". (19) This 
reinforces the suggestion that the only circumstances 
which would absolve a person of moral responsibility 
would be external constraints. 
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To an incompatibililt such as Campbell, this line 
of argument seeks to modify the traditional conception 
of moral responsibility, reducing a genuine sense of 
free-will to the question as to whether one's desires 
can be translated into actions. The human freedom in 
question according to Campbell, pertains principally to 
internal acts of which the agent is regarded as the 
exclusive instigator. In this way such terms as praise 
or blame worthiness are being used in the traditional 
manner without divesting them of their accustomed 
meaning. (2 0) 
At this stage I have tried merely to illustrate 
that the dispute between compatibilist and libertarian 
assumptions are very complex and intense, for it will 
be necessary to return in a subsequent section of this 
chapter to the debate. Although the area of discussion 
within which philosophical argument is concentrated is 
a relatively narrow one, the issue is essentially a 
conceptual matter of how human nature within the 
physical world is perceived. While some philosophers 
focus on the metaphysical problem of free-will, 
insisting on the significant differences between 
justification for ascribing moral consequences, others 
concentrate on the implications for moral 
responsibility of causal determinism. In this category 
primary concern focuses on the justifiability of credit 
and blame, and this is then considered sufficient 
reason to treat free-will as logically necessary for 
moral accountability. 
At this juncture it is appropriate to briefly 
reconsider the relevance of the doctrine of free-will 
for Christian theology, and consider in the light of 
the issues discussed within the secular debate, the 
implications these have for theism's notion of human 
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responsibility. So far stated, the doctrine of human 
free-will as promoted by Christian theology, has 
provided the means of mitigation for all the adversity 
and afflictions in the world; the wickedness in human 
beings being attributed to the freedom of choice 
bestowed on them by God. This became a problem for 
Christian theism hovever, because for throughout its 
heritage a doctrine of free-will has been supported 
together with the belief in God's ineffable power and 
omniscience. (21) Hence Christianity has sought to 
defend the prescience of God against the challenge 
that, if God has predestined and predetermined all his 
creation, then human nature must also be determined. 
Nevertheless it is disputed that if ultimate 
responsibility for everything that exists rests with 
the first cause, then it is logical to attribute the 
wickedness of human sin to God. All suffering and evil 
must be in some respect part of the divine design and 
plan of the original author, in which case it is not 
appropriate to judge a person morally accountable. 
Theism seeks to reconcile any inconsistency in this 
thesis by asserting, that there is no incoherence in 
its proposition. God has ultimate responsibility for 
making free choice and decision possible, by putting 
them within the grasp of the agent. God's grace which 
sustained his creation would have little value if there 
were no freedom or commitment on the part of human 
beings. It is possible they contend, for an agent to 
be morally liable for an action freely chosen, in which 
God is also responsible for that person having 
accomplished it. 
Furthermore autonomy of control over one's own 
destiny, is not taken away by the fact that God is 
fully responsible for his creation, for he has 
302 
delegated responsibility for this created world to free 
agents to share in the work of the creator. 
Consequently God is not solely responsible for a world 
which necessarily involves the possibility of evil as 
well as g6od. Thus Christian theology maintains that 
freedom and responsibility are indispensable to the 
concept of personal existence in a world in which free- 
will provides moral choice, developing not only a 
deeper responsibility for the world and each other, but 
affording the opportunity to cultivate their spiritual 
awareness. (22) 
Richard Swinburne who has advanced such 
assumptions, has supported the notion that moral 
responsibility can only be developed if human beings 
have acquired the knowledge necessary to make 
significant moral statements. He claims therefore, 
that agents require inductive evidence of natural evils 
to gain the knowledge necessary to make responsible 
choices. He states: "the fewer natural evils a God 
provides., the less opportunity he provides for man to 
exercise responsibilitycr. (23) Eleonore Stump who has 
critically analysed Swinburne's solution to the enigma 
presented to Christian theism, is censorious of his 
presumption that human free-agency is valuable, and 
that the quality of knowledge gained through any 
inductive experience is sufficient justification for 
God to permit such evils. She contends that there can 
be no moral justification for supporting a thesis in 
which God allows such adversity, just to present human 
beings with this choice of destiny and the ability to 
act responsibly. (24) 
Turning now to the notion of moral freedom as 
prescribed to in the Buddhist tradition, it has to be 
acknowledged that the Buddha gave no formal definition 
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in his discourses. Whereas he maintained the supreme 
importance of volition in moral action, and stressed 
the significance of freedom of choice, he did not 
explicitly substantiate this reasoning. Not only did 
the Buddha consider formal dogma to be mere convention, 
arbitrary and incomplete, he regarded it as possibly 
misleading in terms of precise truthfulness. However, 
contained in the 
_", 
Dhammapada- was the substance of the 
Buddha's moral teachings: "not to do evil to cultivate 
the good and to pu-rify one's mind". (25) Buddhism 
claims that, to deserve praise or blameworthiness for 
previous actions, depends upon one's ability to make 
moral choices and decisions of whether to refrain from 
evil and to do good. It is only if we are responsible 
for those acts, in that they are not being strictly 
determined by external and internal causes, that 
ethical statements can be affirmed. Thus the 
psychological significance of the kammic act is 
maintained by the volitional impulse as an essential 
correspondence. In fact the Buddha insisted that, 
"volition, 0 monk, X declare to be kamma". (26) 
Hence any actions of thought, word and deed which 
are the result of a consciously willed stimulus, (27) 
assume moral significance, for it is these volitional 
actions for which responsibility must be assumed. 
Moreover these willed actions condition the nature of 
the human personality for good or evil in the next 
life. In the discourse between the Buddha and Rahula 
in the "Ambalatthika Sutta". it was disclosed to Rahula 
by means of analogy the significance of volitional 
action. The Buddha explained that just as a mirror was 
used to produce a reflection of the actual image, so 
each willed act should only be committed after 
appropriate consideration. It was vital to reflect on 
the possible consequences that such an act could 
have 
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on oneself or others, either in the immediate present 
or at some time in the future. (28) 
Consequently the individual is said to have acted 
freely when the immediate cause of that action is the 
product of volitional endeavour. The Buddha firmly 
endorsed the efficacy of human effort, for he insisted 
that in order to have a consequence the action must be 
produced by a determined effort of the will. It is 
this strong volitional action which constitutes our 
free-will, and hence its moral character, which will 
necessarily have its fruition in the law of kamma. On 
account of this volitional activity cannot be causally 
pre-determined, but is an ever-present factor in the 
determination of events. The Buddha therefore 
emphasised the potency of personal willed action, 
indicating that if the present human condition was the 
exclusive result of previous pre-determined deeds, then 
all actions and experiences in the present would also 
be pre-determined and negate any human effort as 
meaningless. 
Thus Buddhism stresses the importance of 
understanding that willed action free from constraints, 
implies that the individual is acting with self-control 
to make a rational decision, aware that under these 
conditions they will be morally imputable for their 
actions. However, although the Buddha taught the 
prudence of moral volitional activity and the 
conservation of virtuous effort, he stressed that there 
was no essential moral significance to the law of 
kamma. It was only in its conduciveness to the 
refining of the mind, leading to the path necessary for 
the attainment of liberation from the samsaric cycle, 
that it was considered instrumental. Furthermore it 
was by means of the superior nature of one's will power 
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that the individual was assisted to discipline and 
concentrate the mind, thereby realising the intuitive 
truth leading to ultimate perfection. (29) 
A brief review of the Buddhist viewpoint indicates 
that, although the texts do not support a theory that 
volitional acts of will-power are strictly determined 
by the past deeds of the human agent, they do 
nevertheless stress that no choice or decision is 
unaffected by the causal process. Thus while human 
personality must always be conditioned by previous 
psychological factors pertinent to the agent, this 
kammic causality does not totally shape the human 
condition. This element of initiative (arabbhu-dhatu) 
or personal action, provides the means by which these 
factors conditioning our lives can be resisted. 
Nonetheless there seems little doubt that without this 
notion of free-agency, moral accountability within such 
a framework would be barely plausible. However, any 
ethical statements made by the Buddha relevant to moral 
freedom are necessarily dependent on the central 
doctrine of paticcasamuppada. Thus the precise 
relationship between moral action and free-will which 
is associated with the ethical doctrines of kammic 
causation, is pivoted by the universal law governing 
all events. 
Hence it is appropriate now to evaluate how 
Buddhism accounts for kammic causality in relation to 
the causal cosmic order: dhamma-dhatu, "'the nature of 
things". Scholarship critical of the notion of moral 
causation, assert that if the principle of kamma is the 
application of causality in a moral dimension, then by 
placing it within this metaphysics of universal 
causation an indictment of strict determinism can be 
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alleged. Any theory of free-will and moral 
accountability, as a presupposition to the kammic 
principle that proportionates punishment and reward for 
acts committed as universal justice, must then be 
denied. However, the Buddha insisted that causality 
was only a function that operated by means of inter- 
dependence on a variety of dhammas. (30) He would 
consequently have refuted any claims of an 
inconsistency between moral determinism and moral 
freedom. 
307 
The Doctrine of Paticcasamuppada 
It is plainly evident that the theory of causation 
was considered to be the ""chief jewel" of Buddhist 
philosophy, claiming to express the truth of the nature 
of things in a universal cosmic order. Moreover this 
doctrine was understood to sustain an intermediary 
position between the prevailing Indian philosophical 
theories of indeterminism and theistic determinism. 
While the former tended to explain the facts in the 
universe in terms of a randomness in which events took 
place with no relation to their past, the latter 
explained the universe in terms of an arbitrary 
creation by an omnipotent God who dispensed 
predestination. 
Thus Buddhism sought to establish the concept of a 
causally law-ruled universe explained in terms of a 
functional interdependence. Thus the existence of any 
permanent element underlying all phenomenon was denied, 
and a principle of dependent origination was assumed 
between separate impermanent dhammas(31) as a pure 
succession of one phenomenon by another. Hence in the 
""Pali Nika-vas", this central role played by the concept 
of causality was conveyed by the Buddha in his 
teachings as: "he who sees (the nature of) causation 
sees the dhamma and he who sees the dhamma sees(the 
nature of) causation". (32) 
Accordingly, the general principle of causal 
determination as formulated in the I'Abhidha=a-' shows 
that whenever A is present B is present; whenever A is 
absent B is absent; and that B does not occur unless A 
is present. Causality is therefore expounded as the 
conditions necessary for something to come about 
characterised by objectivity, necessity, invariability 
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and conditionality. (33) Stcherbatsky identifies these 
features in his interpretation of this theory of 
causation: 
Evezy point-instant of reality arises in 
dependence upon a combination of point- 
instants to which it necessarily succeeds; it 
arises in functional dependence upon a 
totality of causes and conditions which are 
its immediate antecedents. (34) 
Although Buddhism insists that karmic causation 
has to be understood in the context of this abstract 
formula, it emphasises nevertheless, that it is 
necessary to recognise that the karmic law is 
considered to be a special application of universal 
causality, referenced to the transient world of change, 
and as such not strictly identical with the generalised 
principle. (35) This special law was in fact expounded 
by the Buddha in his discourses to elucidate the second 
and third Noble Truths regarding the origin and 
extinction of dukkha, in that he subscribed to this 
moral precept, but denied any enduring subject of that 
law. 
Hence karmic causation primarily gave account of 
the factors which maintained the process of rebirth to 
a group of disparate elements, while denying any 
metaphysical soul or ego to the psychophysical 
individual. The Buddha therefore attempted to give an 
empirical, causal explanation to the karmic-samsaric 
cycle, which yielded through a causal chain; a 
connection between the doer of the deeds in the present 
life and the experiencing of their fruit in the future. 
This "Chain of Causation" as it became known, described 
the nature of human existence in which the origin and 
development of the individual as a psycho-physical 
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complex, was explained as arising from "links" 
(nidanas) in the life-series of a mutually dependent 
process: (36) 
They appear and disappear according to the 
fox7nulas, "this being, that appears". They 
appear not at haphazard, they are not really 
produced, they appear in interdependent 
apparitions. (37) 
Thus within this chain of causation, continuation 
of the life-series is dependent on the arising of 
consciousness to a mental-corporeal aggregation. The 
determining cause of this being the active tendencies 
which induce intentional actions, thereby generating 
karma in a sequence of lives. (38) The law of ka=a is 
therefore concerned with this specific aspect of 
dispositional producing actions, determining the moral 
quality in relation to the act and its effects. Hence 
karmic causality can be considered as the tangible 
formula from which the general principle, that every 
cause produces its effect in the world, can be 
extrapolated, thus encompassing both the physical and 
psychological causal processes. 
Buddhism has argued that the "'doctrine of 
pat: iccasamuppada" has been seriously misinterpreted by 
western scholarship, (a wider issue discussed by such 
scholars as Welborn) which has resulted in a distorted 
conception of the role of causation as presented in the 
Pali canon. They contend that Western intellectuals 
generally have confined their analysis to an 
understanding of the Nidanas. This is not taking 
sufficient account of the intricate nature of the 
teachings of dependent origination, in that this 
doctrine encompasses and sustains an interdependence 
310 
between all separate, impermanent elements of 
existence. 
Consequently Buddhism claims that, as a result of 
only a rudimentary knowledge of this profound doctrine, 
a common criticism of the law of ka=a has been to 
infer that if we accept the causal dogma governing all 
events, we must legitimately conclude that the karmic 
process necessarily promotes a deterministic 
perspective. It is essential at this juncture 
therefore, to give consideration to any accusation of 
moral determinism, and to establish how Buddhism 
defends any disparity between a causal determinism and 
moral accountability. 
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Buddhism's Refutation of Moral Determinism 
Those critical of the Buddhist notion of causality 
might argue that they have a strong case for insisting 
that, from a logical point of view, the law of karma is 
a highly deterministic theory of causation. Even if 
this doctrine is a special application of universal 
causality operating in a moral dimension, by placing it 
within this all-embracing frame of reference governing 
all. dhammas, it is contended that one could justifiably 
conclude that it is a forceful exemplification of moral 
determinism. Moreover it is claimed that, if the 
karmic theory operates as a law of just recompense in 
the world as an explanation of human life and destiny, 
proposed in terms of this moral causation, then surely 
this entails a fatalistic perspective. 
To further reinforce their argument, those in 
critical debate enlist the support of the Buddha's own 
teachings on the doctrine of dependent origination: 
"When this is present,, that comes to be; from the 
arising of this, that arises. When this is absent, 
that does not come to be; on the cessation of this, 
that ceases". (39) They therefore assert that if all 
events proceed in an orderly causal concatenation, then 
one must conclude that ka=a is a highly deterministic 
theory of causation. Thus if our inherited karma cause 
our dispositional tendencies, which in turn condition 
our present karmic action and subsequent rebirths, 
where the effect can only be altered or avoided by the 
exclusion of one of these causal conditions, then it 
would seem that our behaviour is predetermined, and 
karma has to be recognised as the cause of all forms of 
fortune or misfortune. If we are fated to act in such 
a fixed way, then it is impossible to defend a position 
of moral imputability. 
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Although the Buddha would have supported the 
ubiquitous operation of the doctrine of 
patticasamuppada, he would have firmly denied that this 
cause and effect relationship necessarily implied a 
strict determinism. (40) Moreover the Buddhist 
tradition emphasises that the classical doctrine of the 
"Nika_yas" of the Pali canon, are in fact an extremely 
important way of expressing a universal causality, 
without signifying a one-to-one correspondence of cause 
and effect. Buddhism therefore insists that it is too 
simplistic to categorise this doctrine as totally 
deterministic. 
There is little doubt that in the physical world 
the Buddha upheld a causal determinism, but Buddhism 
emphasises that physical causality is only one aspect 
of universal causation. The Buddha's teachings on this 
doctrine are also referenced to the experience of 
psychological causality, represented by the functioning 
of the karmic law as a moral principle. The Buddha 
clearly expressed the view that moral causation was the 
experiences of the mind, which he regarded as the 
prevailing factor in human behaviour. He stressed that 
because of the power of the mind, human behaviour was 
not entirely determined by all external circumstances. 
The Buddha thus denied that the physical causality 
of all phenomenon over-ruled the powers of moral 
causation, stating that, "the world is led by the 
mindff. (41) The fact that the Buddha's theory of causal 
genesis included mental decisions among the causal 
factors, this accommodated an element of psychological 
indeterminacy into the system, in that human beings 
experienced a conscious state of mind called "choice" 
It is by means of the capacity to exercise one's own 
choice, which manifests itself in the free-action of 
313 
the individual, that enables Buddhism to place 
responsibility for each individual's present 
circumstances squarely on the agent. Thus it argues 
that we are morally accountable for our actions in this 
life-time, and that this responsibility carries over 
into subsequent lives, where there is just retribution 
for actions in previous lives. (42) 
Hence the Buddha in his teachings strongly 
emphasised that moral causation was a co-operation of 
physical factors and the exercise of human free-will. 
He did not disaffirm that external circumstances 
conditioned the factors that affected human action, but 
maintained that human behaviour was not merely an 
evolution of what had been predetermined. in the 
"Anguttara Nikaya",, the Buddha explained that it was an 
expression of the individual's own nature which made 
them act of their own accord. He spoke of, "an element 
of origination, of endeavour, of strength, of 
perseverance and an element of volitional effort". (43) 
There might be forces which influenced and conditioned 
the actions and life of human beings, but this did not 
negate the element of initiative in volitional 
activities which constituted human free-will. On one 
occasion when a Brahmin challenged the feasibility of 
free-agency, the Buddha rebuked him by questioning how 
he could deny this when he could of his own accord 
choose to listen to the Buddha or to walk away from 
him. (44) 
Buddhism has continually been obliged to defend 
the fact that it asserts moral accountability over 
subsequent existences without affirming an unchanging 
self. If the agent who exercises this free-will does 
not exist beyond its causes and conditions, then who 
is 
it the critic queries, who is free to operate within 
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this causal person-series? (45) The Buddha however, 
steadfastly affirmed the doctrine of pat: iccasamuppada, 
and confirmed that the only agent required was an 
underlying causal genesis of events: "There 
is(free)action, there is retribution, but X see no 
Agent which passes out of one set of momentax-y elements 
into another one, except the consecution of these 
ele-ments-". (46) Nevertheless those critical of the 
concept of. anatta challenge whether an ever-changing 
"self" is sufficient guarantee for the function of 
free-will. They question whether there is any 
significant meaning in asking to what extent this 
""self" is predetermined, if no other cause apart from 
dependent conditioning is accepted for the arising of 
phenomena. 
However, on the other hand, if this "self" is 
assumed to be enduring, then the Buddhist theory of 
dependent origination could not preclude a strict moral 
determinism, and any claims to free-agency and 
responsibility must be denied. It is contended 
therefore, that if the conditioning in relation to the 
causal principle is only considered to be loose, then 
this might mitigate against a strong deterministic 
system. Yet to deny the efficacy of moral causation, 
would be to leave the way open for a system which could 
accommodate the notion of a "'self -existent" principle. 
Consequently many would suggest that the promulgation 
of causal continuity alongside the theory of non-self, 
has drawn them still further into a deterministic 
entanglement. 
Buddhism's immediate response would be to insist 
that the moral law of karma cannot conflict with the 
universal principle of causality, because 
it is a 
particular occurrence of that causation. Thus 
human 
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beings can operate as free agents within these 
boundaries of dependent origination. Furthermore they 
would draw attention to the fact that our 
phenomenological conception of a person might have 
explanatory value at the relative level of truth, but 
this is purely for conventional usage, and it is solely 
at this level that it can be said that human beings act 
on freely made choices. One must be mindful that our 
customary use of this concept is only a fabrication, 
which contributes to the belief that personal identity 
endures over time. (47) 
It is therefore recognised that at the ultimate 
level of truth, a psychological determinism has to be 
endorsed, for each psychological state in a person- 
sequence dependently arises, because of some prior 
physical or mental condition. Consequently the free- 
will we attribute to the individual, which provides a 
measure of moral indeterminacy at the relative phase of 
truth, is no longer appropriate at the absolute level. 
Psychological determinism however, is an expression 
about the ultimate reality of the constituents of 
person-series, and although not compatible with the 
empirical aspect of free-will, nevertheless is 
reconcilable with the concept that sustains it. 
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The Compatibilist/Incompatibilist Debate 
Effectively, any genuine discernment of moral 
freedom in the Eastern tradition has centred around an 
essential grasp of the fundamental concept of 
paticcasamuppada and the corresponding doctrines of 
karma and anatta. However, within Western 
philosophical thought, the meaning of moral freedom has 
focused on the polemics generated by the challenge to 
the established tradition of requiring a necessary 
logical association between freedom and responsibility. 
Although explained in various ways by philosophers and 
theologians throughout the ages, moral responsibility 
had required in some sense the existence of a "free- 
cause". Hence it is necessary to briefly review the 
philosophical issues of the compatibilists and the 
libertarians, (48) and to evaluate their implications 
i from the premises of traditional theology. 
It was Hobbes, heralding the empirical 
philosophical tradition, who argued that the problem of 
free-agency and causal determinism was based primarily 
on a linguistic confusion, and that there was no 
genuine incompatibility between determinism and 
freedom. In the "Leviat: han" 
-he 
maintained: 
From the use of the word 'freewi Il -' no 
liberty can be inferred of the will, desire, 
or inclination, but the liberty of the man, 
who consisteth in this, that he finds no stop 
in doing what he has the will, desire or 
inclination to do. (49) 
Continuing this philosophical Position, Hume argued 
that there was no antithesis between liberty and 
necessity, maintaining that moral responsibility was 
concerned with the ""freedom of conduct" attributed 
to 
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human beings. Hence it could make no difference to 
this free-agency that human behaviour was causally 
determined. Consequently he insisted that freedom of 
the will, signified that an agent was free if she or he 
did not act under compulsion, or were hindered by 
external constraints in the fulfilment of their natural 
desire - 
The compatibilists' claim therefore, that human 
behaviour is causally determined, in that we do not 
have the power to act contrary to our causal 
conditioning. Nevertheless we might not possess 
%%liberty of indifference", but we do experience 
"liberty of spontaneity", in which voluntary behaviour 
is free to the extent that it is not externally 
constrained or impeded. In the absence of such 
constraint our actions are the result of free-choice, 
and thus voluntary behaviour is caused by our own acts 
of will, choices, decisions and desires, and as such 
fulfil the requirements for moral accountability in 
that "I could have acted otherwise". 
Those who deny that causal determinism and moral 
responsibility can be reconciled, the compatibilist 
contends, are working from the premise that if the 
universe is deterministic, then all events must obey 
immutable laws. They make the assumption therefore, 
that the agent's behaviour is merely the visible result 
of compelling forces functioning in the mind. In this 
way actions are regarded as determined by an inherent 
character, which is the necessary consequence of innate 
tendencies and external factors during one's lifetime. 
If one's will and motivation is causally determined, 
then an agent cannot be held accountable for his or her 
decisions. The freedom that presupposes moral 
responsibility must thus be exempt from this causation. 
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A. J. Ayer, supporting a compatibilist point of 
view, protests that to contrast the causal principle of 
the natural laws with human moral freedom is misleading 
and senseless. Ayer points out that voluntary action 
is not the notion of freedom from the inescapable 
causality of a scientific formula, (50) but from the 
external constraints of Compulsion. He argues: 
[ --- I from the fact that my action is 
causally detex7nined it does not necessarily 
follow that X am constrained to do it; and 
this is equivalent to saying that it does not 
necessarily follow that X am not free. (51) 
This opinion is shared by Moritz Schlick, who 
declares that the moral free 
beings, is totally distinct 
concerning the deterministic 
laws governing the universe. 
solely a descriptive formula 
natural laws to operate. He 
-will attributed to human 
from any disputes 
nature of the system of 
Causal determinism is 
of how we believe the 
states: 
The law of celestial mechanics do not force 
planets to move by the burdensome laws of 
Keepler in orderly path; these laws do not in 
any way "compel-, the planets, but express 
only what in fact planets actually do. (52) 
Schlick contends that the crucial question to be 
addressed, is how we interpret the relationship between 
this theory of causal determinism and our experience of 
human free-agency. Defending the compatibilist 
position, he affirms that the individual is a free- 
agent with respect to volitional activity, in that we 
are not subject to psychological laws that compel or 
dictate our desires and decisions. Moral decision is 
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not constrained by a law or a sanction, but is a 
resolve to act on a principle that one freely chooses. 
Nevertheless we do not have "'liberty of indifference" 
to act contrary to the causality of the natural laws. 
It is appropriate at this juncture to consider the 
notion of voluntary action from the perspective of the 
Incompatibilists, who argue that an act is only free 
when not completely determined by antecedent causes. 
In fact they maintain that the only decision or action 
of an agent which can be considered as morally 
imputable, is one which is not the consequences of 
prior causal determinants. Those who defend a 
Libertarian position therefore, regard the 
Compatibilists' theory of free-will as abandoning the 
notion of moral responsibility. 
An accomplished champion of the metaphysical 
notion of free-will is C. A. Campbell, who claims that 
moral accountability can only be sustained when our 
moral choices and decisions are extraneous to the law 
of cause and effect. Hence he asserts: "There is not 
unbroken 'causal continuity, in the universe, but we 
are sometimes able to choose between genuine open 
possibilities". (53) This contra-causal freedom is 
demonstrated when the agent acts against his or her 
strongest desires, and pursues their sense of 
obligation. 
Campbell maintains that it is only when human 
beings have to choose between opposing desires in which 
there is a clash of duty, that the individual can be 
said to have the genuine possibility of freely making a 
voluntary decision between the wider field of choice. 
In general, he agrees human behaviour can clearly be 
discerned as inherent to antecedent causes, in which 
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conduct can be anticipated based on known character. 
Consequently he asserts in this sphere of choice free- 
will does not operate effectively. Thus it is only in 
a relatively limited area of this domain we designate 
as "choice", that the notion of free-will can function. 
Moral praise and blameworthiness can only be attributed 
to such situations in which moral endeavour is the 
freedom of decision, to accomplish or resist the effort 
required to choose between the conflict of duty and 
desire. 
Hence the Libertarian argument supports the notion 
that a moral judgement must disregard choices 
determined by heredity or environment, and only 
consider as morally relevant those acts of moral 
decision which can be declared to be self-originating. 
Campbell contends that the essential quality of moral 
decision is a resolution to withstand our strongest 
desire, in the knowledge that it lies within our 
capability to make or resist this choice, independently 
of our characteristic beliefs and behaviour. 
Moral effort is thus considered to be a subjective 
activity depending entirely upon the inner experience 
of the "'individual self". The '"self" as "sole author" 
of the moral decision, is therefore conscious of 
opposing one Is own established personality. Hence the 
moral choice or action although an actual function of 
the individual, does not spring from the '"formed" 
character. Campbell explains that we cannot: "help 
believing that it lies with me here and now quite 
absolutely, which of two genuinely open possibilities I 
adopt-'-'. (54) Accordingly the truly free act is an 
appeal to introspection; it is a creative activity 
which is only discerned from the inner standpoint of 
the participating ""self". Hence free activity 
has to 
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be understood as the capability to transcend one's 
expressed character, in an actively "self-conscious,, 
moral decision. 
P. H. Nowell-Smith, a firm opponent of Campbell's 
libertarianism, is critical of this appeal to 
introspection to distinguish contra-causal freedom from 
causal determinism. The claim that the true nature of 
moral decision can only be comprehended as an inner 
reflective function of the individual, in which the 
agent in certain situations struggles between the 
alternatives of strongest desire and obligation, 
presents a paradox between the moral and non-moral 
aspect of choice and decision. Nowell-Smith contends 
that Campbell's notion of moral responsibility hinges 
on his use of "desires" as a presupposition for all 
motives except a sense of duty. This 
implies that if an individual "'ought" 
then they ""can" do it, and this "can" 
causal freedom. In Nowell-Smith's op 
an abrupt separation in the important 
choice and decision. 
moral principle 
to do something, 
denotes a contra- 
inion this causes 
sphere of moral 
On the one hand the non-moral aspect of one's 
nature is subject to causal necessity, being the 
"formed" attributes of one's character, while on the 
other hand, the creative activity of moral choice, in 
principle transcends one's predictable characteristic 
behaviour. He emphasises that it can reasonably be 
assumed that when we assert that someone "ought" to do 
something, we are claiming that she or he "can" 
realistically be expected to do it. We are in fact 
making a moral judgement concerning the particular 
situation, which does not suggest that the agent's 
character will compel him or her to make the 
decision 
he or she chooses, but that the choice or 
decision to 
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act in a particular way was characteristic of the 
individual. Nowell- Smith consequently maintains that 
the libertarian thesis which presumes "self-creative" 
activity in support of the notion of contra-causal 
freedom, "can only be postulated to avoid the 
unplausible doctrine that all action is 
involuntax-y". (55) 
This scholarly debate between the proponents of 
compatibilism and incompatibilism, in which they 
scrupulously defend their own philosophical convictions 
and rigorously contest any contrary perspective, has 
become identified as analogous to the theological 
disputes designed to demonstrate that determinism and 
divine providence are consistent with human moral 
responsibility. A theistic evaluation of this debate 
must now be considered. 
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Theistic Evaluation of the Debate 
Although the religious analogue concerning the 
philosophical dilemma of reconciling necessity and 
liberty with a concept of human moral responsibility 
can be established from theological premises, it is in 
fact a very specific version of the problem. Whereas 
those that support determinism argue that everything in 
the universe is subsumed under the universal laws of 
nature, and that the consequences of this causal 
necessity logically precludes any genuine liberty, the 
theological problem has to account for a causally 
determined universe as the creation of an omnipotent 
and omniscient God. 
Thus the protagonist argues, that if everything in 
the universe is "'fully caused" by a prescient Deity, 
then not only are all events predetermined throughout 
eternity, but all human affairs are fore-ordained by 
God. Any apparent liberty of action can only be the 
result of the divine predestinator, who must then 
assume ultimate responsibility for all human behaviour. 
David Hume in his ""An Enquiry Concerning Human 
UndersLanding-, concisely expresses the difficulty this 
presents to Christian theism, for he declares it is 
not: "possible to explain distinctly, how the Deity can 
be the mediate cause of all the actions of men, without 
being the author of sin and moral turpitude". (56) 
Hence the challenge extended to Christian 
theologians throughout the ages, has been to 
satisfactorily reconcile the consequences of a doctrine 
of divine providence with human self-determination. 
Consequently critical debate has revolved around the 
question of whether a predetermined account of human 
behaviour logically prohibits the necessary 
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qualification for moral liability, in the claim that an 
agent "could have acted otherwise" than he or she so 
did. Once again Hume succinctly elucidates these 
limitations maintaining that: 
to reconcile the indifference and contingency 
of human actions with prescience; or to 
defend absolute decrees, and yet free the 
Deity from being the author of sin, had been 
found hitherto to exceed all the power of 
philosophy. (57) 
Christian theology acknowledges that it does have 
a legacy that supports divine omnipotence as the 
predetermined arbitrator of all creation. Such a 
doctrine of predestination therefore excludes free-will 
and human moral responsibility. This heritage extends 
back to Saint Augustine, who towards the end of his 
life had ultimately come to the conclusion that God's 
grace and providence was reserved for the elect, and 
others were dammed for all eternity. (58) Whereas 
Augustine struggled to endorse human voluntary action, 
insisting on the accountability of the individual with 
a doctrine of divine sovereignty, during the 
Reformation the Lutheran and Calvinistic traditions 
reinforced the theology that everything was fore- 
ordained by the will of God, and thus human freedom of 
the will was uncompromisingly denied. 
Calvin taught that: 
men do nothing save at the secret instigation 
of God, and do not discuss or deliberate on 
anything but what he has previously decreed 
with himself, and brings to pass by his 
secret directions. (59) 
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This Calvinistic theology, which sustained the doctrine 
of divine predestination and belief in God's providence 
as grace fore-ordained merely for the righteous elected 
for redemption, has been substantially rejected by 
mainstream theism as displaying the precise 
contradictions which they dispute. Hence the 
theological polemics in defence of divine determinism, 
human free-will and moral accountability have been 
demonstrated from the perspective of both a 
compatibilist and libertarian argument. 
There is much to support a compatibilist's 
viewpoint in the medieval theology of Saint Thomas 
Aquinas. Although he expressed the nature of God as, 
"evezy movement both of the will and of nature proceeds 
from God as the Prime Mover", (60) he was anxious to 
present a Christian doctrine which supported human 
freedom of the will teaching that, "libez-um arbitrium 
is the power by which a man is able to judge 
freely". (61) Aquinas maintained therefore that there 
was no incompatibility between divine causality and 
human self-determination in the will's ability '"to 
choose to do otherwise". 
He thus stated: 
the will is said to have domination of its 
act not through exclusion of the first cause, 
but because the first cause does not so act 
in the will that it determines the will from 
necessity to one thing just as it determines 
nature. (62) 
Hence while Aquinas was prepared to assert God's 
divine 
influence as the Prime mover of all human action, he 
could not support any claim that human beings were not 
accountable for their own transgressions. Human 
free- 
agency although ultimately determined by a God of 
326 
infinite power, could also be presumed to be 
indisputably contingent, in that each individual 
possessed the ability to make free choices and 
decisions. 
Those who deny that Aquinas had succeeded in 
presenting an intelligible thesis, refute the claim 
that the traditional doctrine of omnipotence and 
omniscience can be reconciled with an event occurring 
that is both necessary and contingent. They argue that 
Divine infallibility must ultimately withhold any final 
autonomy from human beings. Hence it would seem 
indefensible for the divine creator to judge his 
creatures as morally responsible for their actions 
which have proceeded from the will of God. 
Consequently many consider that the principal import of 
Aquinas' notions were in fact the forerunner of a 
Calvinistic doctrine of divine predestination. 
However, in Aquinas' defence it can be argued that 
his assumptions were more consistent with Calvin's 
modified theology, in which he contended that divine 
providence did not deprive human beings of freedom to 
choose for: "he who has fixed the boundaries of our 
life, has at the same time entrusted us with the care 
of it". (63) Aquinas would have supported this 
judgement, that God had of necessity established the 
boundaries of creaturely existence thereby limiting 
human liberty. Nevertheless within this natural 
limitation, there was a harmony between God's active 
purpose and the assignment of freedom of the will as 
contingent to responsible action. 
Descartes in the seventeenth century, reinforced 
the classical Thomasian view-point that the 
doctrine of 
God's omnipotence could not sustain any ultimate 
human 
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autonomy f or he stated: "his power is So immense that 
it would be a crime for us to think ourselves capable 
of doing anything which he had not already 
ordained". (64) Nonetheless, in the context of his 
discussions concerning the problem of evil he too was 
anxious to affirm that: "it is so evident that we are 
possessed of a freewill that can give or withhold its 
assent, that this may be counted as one of the first 
and most ordinary notions that are found innately in 
us-l-'. (65) Descartes in his '"Philosophical Works- 
indicated the difficulties this presented to theism, 
affirming that it defeated comprehension to harmonise 
these two statements. 
For many therefore a compatibilist view of freedom 
appears totally paradoxical. Any attempt to reconcile 
human behaviour as both caused and determined by a 
divine creator, yet nevertheless free to the extent 
that it is not externally impeded by divine providence, 
does not provide human free-agency in the libertarian 
sense. Alvin Plantinga who has championed the free 
will defence in support of an omnipotent, omniscient 
and perfectly good Deity in the face of the world's 
evils, has developed his theodicy along libertarian 
lines. (66) Compatibilism is rejected; genuine human 
freedom he contends, contrary to the notions of 
Aquinas, is not compatible with a thesis which endorses 
an unmitigated divine causality. 
Plantinga maintains that it is absurd for the 
compatibilist to insist on the one hand that all 
human 
actions are causally determined, and on the other 
hand 
that certain events are autonomous acts. He 
declares 
that it is preferable to consider: 
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that God made men such that some of their 
actions are unfettered [ --- I and that a world 
in which men perfox7n both good and evil 
unfettered actions is superior to one in 
which they perform only good, but fettered 
actions. (67) 
He de ines ""unfettered actions" in the libertarian 
sense; that an agent possesses powers of choice and 
decision of which no total causal account can be given 
to those actions. 
Antony Flew who is critical of libertarian free- 
will, finds it difficult to reconcile Plantinga's 
incompatibilist position with the traditional tenets of 
Christian theism. (68) Whereas the compatibilist would 
simply classify the kind of choice or decision by 
characterising it as "free", Plantinga presents these 
key terms as immensely more significant by claiming 
them as ""unfettered", and therefore confers on these 
words a privileged hypothetical meaning. Furthermore 
liberty is defined as specifically excluding universal 
causality, and hence causal determination, as 
prohibiting all possibility of alternative behaviour. 
Consequently Flew maintains that Plantinga's 
libertarian free will defence does not reconcile 
necessity and free-will, or give an adequate account of 
human moral responsibility. 
Libertarian theists have also put forward the 
argument that by rejecting a Leibnizian position, which 
declares that the actual world is unique amongst 
possible worlds in having maximal goodness, and 
supporting the hypothesis that the actual world is only 
one of an infinite number of possible worlds having 
equal and maximal goodness, then the classical 
attributes of God can be justified. Hence they contend 
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that an omnipotent and omniscient Deity could create 
human beings with free-agency in a libertarian sense, 
and by permitting such voluntary activity would bring 
about a world which was equal in merit and virtue to 
other possible worlds. Since the actual world was 
equally good and unsurpassed in goodness by any other 
possible world, then God as creator of an infinite 
number of possible worlds, could not then be considered 
responsible for the evil choices occurring in the 
actual world. Moral accountability must then be 
attributed to the free-choice of agents in that world. 
Nevertheless the critic of this thesis might argue 
that this line of reasoning does not assist the 
theistic problem, for seemingly evil choices would in 
reality be good choices because they would be essential 
for maximising the goodness of the world. Accordingly 
this thesis too is rejected, in that an incompatibilist 
notion of free-will as responsible action does not 
successfully mitigate for the amount of evil and 
suffering in this particular world. 
It is apparent that within the theological 
disputes intended to demonstrate that divine, causal 
determinism is consistent with human freedom and moral 
accountability, that the proponents of compatibilism 
and incompatibilism will persist in their philosophical 
polemics as to the precise interpretation of "could 
have acted otherwise". If compatibilism is correct, 
then the issue of divine causality can not be employed 
as an argument against the indictment and judgement of 
an agent as morally accountable for her or his actions. 
Causal necessity is regarded as extraneous to the 
question of responsibility in that an individual 
possesses liberty of spontaneity, and therefore does 
not lack the ability of voluntary activity unless 
330 
externally constrained or impeded from making the free 
choice or decision. 
If libertarianism is pursued, then the problem of 
causal determination is central to the notion of moral 
imputability, for the incompatibilist maintains that 
free-agency must imply a contra-causal event. It is 
assumed that unless there is, "'no contingently 
sufficient non-subsequent condition fox- an agent 
choosing to act in this pax-ticular way and no 
othe. r-", (69) a person's choices and decisions are not 
free but ultimately controlled by divine influence and 
their destiny predetermined. Moreover with respect to 
solving the theistic problem of the enigma of evil, the 
libertarian theist would seem to have no advantage over 
the compatibilist. 
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Compatibilism in Buddhist Philosophical Thought 
The aim of this chapter has been to analyse and 
evaluate the notion of moral freedom from within the 
philosophical framework of each tradition. An attempt 
therefore has been made to provide a coherent appraisal 
of the critical debates which encompass these theories 
and doctrines from their relative perspectives. Within 
the Western philosophical tradition scholarly argument 
between compatibilism and libertarianism has been 
central to the whole issue of how free-will and moral 
responsibility is to be precisely interpreted. 
Although such polemics do not have the same relevance 
within the Buddhist tradition, implied in their notions 
of causal determinism and moral freedom is an implicit 
compatibilism that merits defining. Any exploration in 
this manner is not intended as an arbitrary exercise in 
which to categorise the Buddhist conceptual structure, 
but as a means of juxtaposing their philosophical 
viewpoints. 
It is evident that any analysis of moral freedom 
from a Buddhist perception has to be appreciated from 
the perspective of the underlying concept of universal 
causal determinacy. However, Buddhism claims that in 
the moral sphere it does not follow that a person's 
actions are also psychologically determined. Hence the 
doctrine of dependent causal genesis of existence they 
assert, is compatible with both psychological 
determinism and human autonomy, which consequently 
supports a notion of personal moral action. The 
principle of causal dependent origination reinforced by 
the Buddha's perception of reality, is one in which all 
events must follow necessarily from their respective 
causal conditions. Thus conditioned by the acts 
performed in this and prior lives, these 
internal 
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states are the immediate cause of our decisions. In as 
far as all existence is causally conditioned, an 
individual's actions cannot be uncaused for one is 
disposed towards certain beliefs and desires. However, 
one is morally accountable for these choices and 
decisions in that, "one could have chosen to act 
otherwise" if one had so wished. 
This compatibilist theme is stressed by D. T. Suzuki 
who states: 
the law of kax7na is irrefragable [ --- 1. Yet 
there is room for freedom. Xnsofar as we 
confine ourselves to a general superficial 
view of the theoxy of kax7na, it leads to a 
fox7n of detex7ninism, but in our practical 
life, which is the product of extremely 
complicated factors, the doctrine of kax7na 
allows in us all kinds of possibilities and 
all chances of development. We thus escape 
the mechanical conception of life. (70) 
Hence Suzuki claims that viewed from an ontological 
perspective all human beings are psychologically 
determined, in that all events are causally conditioned 
by previous karmic activity. However, empirically in 
the moral sphere an agent is free to make choices and 
decisions. Essentially the ascription of moral 
responsibility is not whether the choice made or the 
action taken is causally determined, but whether the 
decision to act in a particular way is what that person 
wants to do. 
Critics of such a compatibilist position might 
deny that psychological determinacy can be reconciled 
with the alleged human autonomy. They would maintain 
that any analysis of reality in terms of universal 
causality, cannot affirm a genuine freedom without 
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compromising the doctrine of dependent co-arising of 
existence and this perception of the human condition. 
It is argued that if psychological determinism is 
understood as the claim that all our actions are 
causally induced by prior decisions, and these choices 
by previously causally conditioned deliberations, then 
any explanation of freedom in this context cannot be 
genuine. In this case an agent could not have acted 
otherwise than he or she in fact did, for the very 
wanting is itself the product of causal conditions. 
Moral accountability on these terms is seriously 
jeopardised, for it is not sufficient to account for 
human freedom merely by the absence of immediate, 
external determining factors. 
The Buddhist protagonist might respond by pointing 
out that the causality asserted by psychological 
determinism operates at the ultimate level of truth, in 
which the -self" is only a person-sequence of physical 
and mental events. In the conventional sphere, where 
personal identity supports the sense of '"self", the 
agent engages in evaluative deliberation exercising a 
sense of free-will to make choices and decisions. To 
presume that psychological causality operates as an 
arbitrary, deterministic law at the ordinary level of 
truth, is a total misconception of the Dhamma. (71) 
Hence Buddhism would not ascribe to an 
incompatibilist, view-point in the notion of a contra- 
causal freedom in which some actions are considered to 
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have, -', 'no contingently Sufficient non-subsequent 
conditions-'-'. (72) The notion of an agent who engages in 
an act which is solely the formation, deliberation and 
choice of that person is not a criteria which would be 
considered appropriate. Freedom as presented in the 
Pali Canon is part of a consistent, orderly notion of 
causality, and consequently the concept of a contra- 
causal freedom would be meaningless. 
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Summary Comments 
Many Buddhist scholars are of the opinion that the 
problems pertaining to causal determinism, free-agency 
and moral responsibility, are not derived from any 
inherent difficulties but from a blatant 
misunderstanding of the doctrine of 
paticcasamuppada. (73) The principle of universal 
causality, they contend, has been misconstrued by both 
Western and Eastern scholarship alike. (74) By giving 
an arbitrary interpretation to this concept they have 
failed to grasp the intricate functioning of the 
universal process where it applies to psychological 
causality, and the experience of karmic activity in the 
moral sphere. 
Within this area of moral endeavour Buddhism 
considers autonomy a prominent characteristic, for at 
the conventional level of truth it claims that an agent 
is morally imputable for acts freely performed, which 
constitutes for the tradition a necessary notion of 
free-agency. It is important to comprehend however, 
that the notion of free-will is a factual enquiry 
concerning human nature, which in this instance 
illustrates how a moral consideration is related to the 
theory of reality. At this relative level of truth 
therefore, there is no difficulty in reconciling free- 
agency with the notion that certain of our beliefs and 
choices are causally induced as a result of prior 
karmic functioning. 
Problems only emerge when the principles that are 
used to evaluate these concepts at the conventional 
level are employed at the ultimate level of truth. In 
this sphere the utility concept of a personal identity 
is eliminated in favour of a psychological determinism, 
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in the physical and mental constituents of a person- 
series. Likewise the concept of free-will must be 
illusory at this level of truth, for this notion too is 
a conventional concept pragmatically involved in 
affecting the future behaviour of a person-sequence, 
and consequently is bound up with the idea of personal 
identity in a "self". Hence at this absolute level 
there can be no irreconcilable truth to be agreed. 
Many Western thinkers would support Buddhism's 
claim that the issue of free-will is not a question of 
morality but an enquiry into the reality of human 
nature; as to whether human beings are so constituted 
as to have the capacity of free volitional activity. 
They maintain therefore that this is an ontological 
concern, whereas moral accountability is a normative 
enquiry, for it questions the justice of holding an 
agent morally praise or blameworthy for her or his 
actions. To make this moral judgement it requires 
affirmation that the agent acted freely in some sense 
of this word, (75) and was not compelled to act contrary 
to his or her wishes. 
Hence they consider that there is an incoherence 
in our present framework of attitudes. A conceptual 
mistake is being applied, in that ideas of what 
constitutes moral justice are employed to prove a 
factual notion about our perspective of reality. To 
suppose that our choices, decisions and actions stand 
in causal relationship to the paradigm of universal 
physical causality, is to radically misunderstand the 
principle of voluntary action. It can only result in 
the conclusion that voluntary action operates as 
internal events causally conditioned in the mechanism 
of the min . 
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There is no doubt that we verbally utilise the 
term "'cause" when we talk about the choice or decision 
of an agent. (76) In fact what is being inferred is the 
spontaneous response to the rational, evaluative 
deliberations of an individual. "Cause" is a word that 
can ensnare in both philosophical and ordinary 
locution: it is important to recognise the context or 
language-game in which it is being employed. The frame 
of reference under consideration is the moral justice 
applicable to human conduct, and it is not appropriate 
to conclude that this term refers to the causal 
conditions of personal action, in the same manner as 
the causation of a physical nature which pertains to 
the natural laws. 
In general, Christian theism supports the argument of 
the libertarians in the claim that free-agency is not 
contingent on external circumstances. The nature of 
free-will that is assumed is that of an internal 
autonomy as a pre-condition of humanity. It is because 
of this God-given birthright that we can address the 
issue of moral responsibility, for in the last analysis 
we are accountable to God for our actions. Peter Vardy 
summarises the theist position when he states: 
[ --- ] human beings are made for fellowship 
with God, and it is only in responding to 
this possibility that true happiness can be 
found. Human beings are free to take 
responsibility for themselves as individuals, 
no matter what their circumstances, and to 
respond to God or not. (77) 
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Conclusion 
The essential concern of this thesis has been to 
test my original hypothesis, which claimed that a 
notion of free-will is as indispensable a concept to 
the philosophical principles of the Buddhist tradition 
as it is to the theistic tenets of Christianity. The 
implications of claiming that a notion of free-will is 
"indispensable" to their conceptual structures, is to 
make the assertion that in some specific way this issue 
is intrinsic to their philosophical framework. Thus 
each chapter has sought to establish to what extent a 
notion of free-will can be considered a meaningful 
concept within a particular sphere of reference. 
Exploration into the doctrines and precepts that 
sustain their respective belief systems has enabled me 
to penetrate the precise character of this notion in 
both function and nature. Furthermore, critical 
evaluation has permitted me to establish how central 
and vital the issue of free-will is in both theory and 
practice. Finally, and the quintessential element of 
this thesis, I have been able to reflect upon the 
distinctive nature of this centrality and what it has 
revealed about the status of human free-will within the 
context of each tradition's understanding of reality. 
To conclude this thesis therefore it is 
appropriate to reflect upon such enquiry and to judge 
whether my hypothesis can be endorsed as a significant 
proposition. To assist me in this task I have found it 
helpful to produce a graphical representation of each 
chapter. This visible illustration has enabled me to 
readily identify each specific area where the 
issue of 
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free-will is a central factor to the tradition's 
philosophical conceptualisation. (1) 
Clearly within the theological philosophy of 
Christian theism all my categories of enquiry have 
demonstrated a most explicit usage of a notion of free- 
will. The level of rhetoric and vocabulary has 
established a particular mode of expression and 
performance that is consistent throughout all areas of 
exploration. (2) Thus it is interesting to note that my 
analysis has revealed free-will to be a profoundly 
central agenda in all spheres of reference. 
Hence the status and function of cognitive freedom 
has been a perduring aspect of Christian theology 
throughout its long ancestry. The substantial 
treatises of Augustine have certainly provided the 
major responses to what he called the "enigma of human 
freedom", and has sustained a heritage of considerable 
scholarly controversy throughout the ages. Thus the 
defence of free-will has been a relevant function 
within its conceptual framework to the present. 
Specialised technical vocabulary has been employed to 
elucidate specific agendas from the paradoxical nature 
of theodicy, to the Calvinistic theology of 
predestination, to the modern philosophical polemics 
between the compatibilists and the libertarians. 
Thus in all aspects of Christian theology a 
concept of free-will would seem to function as an 
indispensable role to its world view and vision of 
reality. Fundamentally central to a belief and 
understanding of God and humanity therefore, free-will 
is explicitly expressed and defended in both doctrine 
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and dogma. moreover the reality of human autonomy is 
consistently confirmed in the notion of an "'inner self" 
that is further endorsed in an eschatological and 
soteriological agenda. Hence within the specific 
domain of Christian theism the function of free-will is 
perceive as a factual and native element of 
theological persuasion and exposition. 
There is no doubt that the level of rhetoric and 
vocabulary concerning the notion of free-will is very 
modest within the Buddhist teachings and philosophical 
treatises. Any overt acknowledgement of this issue is 
only to be found in the Buddha's confirmation of the 
efficiency of human effort with regard to one's karmic 
status. It is clear that the Buddha's attitude to the 
principles of ka=a supported self-discipline, self- 
knowledge and self-control as a means of reshaping 
one's karmic heritage. He undoubtedly considered self- 
determination an essential factor in providing the 
means for human beings to take responsibility for their 
own destiny. However, the precise function and 
character of free-will has to be inferred and deduced 
principally from implicit propositions. 
Graphical portrayals of the Buddhist categories of 
enquiry have revealed a very varied record of the 
centrality of this concept to their philosophical 
understanding of reality. The range is ar more 
comprehensive and complex than within a Christian 
theistic perspective. (3) Analysis has indicated that 
within the various themes pursued in this thesis, 
wherever psychological causality, in which the karmic- 
samsaric moral order functions as a meaningful feature 
of reality, the issue of free-will operates as crucial 
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and central to a Buddhist philosophical agenda. Hence 
I have been able to deduce from the doctrinal teachings 
and propositions that in such areas as gratuitous 
activity, the predicament of human existence as dukkha, 
the concept of anatta and the theory of the 'non-self', 
and also the nature of moral responsibility, that the 
function of free-will penetrates far into the 
philosophical framework. (4) 
However, my exploration has also demonstrated that 
the Buddhist goal of complete freedom is attained in 
the enlightened state of nirvana. By embracing the 
discipline of the Eightfold Path the mind is directed 
away from all compounded existence and all its 
attachments, to concentrate on the emptiness of all 
things. Liberation is therefore free from all 
conceptualisation and beyond the external reality of 
karma. Hence ultimate reality is based on the 
unconditioned nature of all things just as they are, 
and at this level of truth the notion of human free- 
will becomes a meaningless concept. 
Consequently, displayed visually, the Buddhist 
topics of enquiry further verify that a concept of 
free-will is totally central to the theories which 
govern the notion of karmic-samsaric existence. 
Although there is little explicit rhetoric or 
formulated propositions concerning its function, it is 
nevertheless relevant to the way in which the world 
is 
understood and experienced. However, 
it is also 
evident that the function of free-will 
in both 
expression and performance becomes an 
inappropriate and 
illusory agenda at the ultimate level of reality. 
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It is evident therefore, that within both a 
Christian and Buddhist sphere of reference a notion of 
free-will functions in some distinct sense as a central 
and meaningful concept. Hence to what extent does this 
meaningfulness constitute an indispensable doctrine to 
endorse and maintain their particular philosophical 
framework? Within a Christian theistic context all my 
analysis indicates that the whole edifice of 
philosophical theology is built upon this notion. In 
general, Christian theism supports the resolution that 
free-will is a pre-condition of humanity and a God- 
given birthright. Thus this distinct element of 
internal autonomy plays a significant part in defining 
one's innermost nature. 
Within religious experience volitional motivation 
explains and defines the personal relationship between 
Creator and creature. A notion of free-will functions 
as a primary focus to encourage human beings to freely 
devote themselves to their Creator, so that God's 
gratuitous action can provide the necessary resources 
for redemption and sanctification. Process theism 
might deny the traditional attributes of God, promoting 
an interdependent relationship between God and 
humankind, but nevertheless free-will still remains a 
vital factor. Human self-determination prevails as an 
essential component in this reciprocal interaction of 
God's personal involvement in the destiny of all 
creatures. 
There is no doubt, that the relevance of cognitive 
freedom in relation to the theological problem of evil 
and suffering renders the notion of human free-will a 
crucial and highly significant concept. Essentially it 
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vindicates God from responsibility for human action 
whilst providing justification for the principle of 
human moral accountability. Moreover it maintains 
God's justice and mercy by supporting a metaphysical 
system of eternal destiny through God's divine 
redemptive and salvific purposes. Without a highly 
developed doctrine of free-will to sustain a plausible 
argument it is difficult to determine whether Christian 
theism has the ability to justify the actions, 
character or very existence of God. 
Within the Buddha's ethical teachings relating to 
the human predicament the role of human free-will is 
certainly an integral function, vitally relating to the 
actual conditions of living in the world. The 
doctrines that form the basis of the ka=ic-samsaric 
formula plainly encourage belief in self-determination. 
Although the anatta doctrine aims to promote a 
cognitive awareness of the actual nature of reality, a 
sense of autonomy is still maintained in the immediacy 
of a subject which is itself a result of samsaric 
conditioning. Even the all-encompassing devotional 
compassion demonstrated through the bodhisattva ideal 
and the nembutsu formula, can only act as a catalyst to 
the self-awareness of one's karmic constrained 
existence. 
Hence within the Buddhist tradition free-will 
provides the mechanism for moral accountability inside 
the cosmic causal process. On many occasions the 
Buddha had to defend karmic reality as a special 
application of the inexorable laws governing universal 
causality. He maintained that the karmic principle had 
to be understood as referring to the transient world of 
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change, and as such, moral causation regarded in terms 
of psychological causality. It follows therefore that 
within the area of moral endeavour, autonomy must be 
considered as a prominent feature and intrinsic to the 
morally ordered self-regulating laws of karmic 
existence. 
Moreover the necessity of moral sanctions within 
karmic reality further endorses the function of free- 
will. There can be no doubt that human autonomy is 
required to give credibility to the concept of moral 
retribution within the samsaric cycle of existence. I 
believe Buddhism would affirm therefore that at the 
relative level of truth of the empirical world, free- 
will functions as an indispensable precondition of 
"conventional" existence. However, unlike Christian 
theism for whom this notion consistently underpins 
their metaphysical structures, Buddhism negates human 
self-determination and all that signifies phenomenal 
reality at the level of ultimate truth. 
Buddhist soteriological strategy in the goal of 
nirvana certainly pivots on the ethical structure in 
which free-agency functions as a vital agenda of the 
spiritual discipline needed to follow the path to 
enlightenment, yet it also points to the release of all 
volitional desires. Emancipation from the causal moral 
laws can only be realised through the cessation of all 
self-originating attachments, for liberation transcends 
any such duality. From a Buddhist perspective the 
function of free-will does not require formulated 
propositions for it is simply regarded as a factual and 
practical issue concerning human nature. Its 
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existential reality is enshrined in the way in which 
the world is actually experienced. 
Here t ere is a notable contrast with the way 
Christian theism regards the notion of free-will. In 
both traditions it is an intrinsic part of human 
nature, but for Christian theology it becomes hallowed 
with ontological status while in Buddhism it remains 
purely a phenomenological reality. Thus how should the 
nature of this significance be evaluated? Clearly from 
the evidence of my analysis, within the Christian 
theistic tradition a notion of free-will qualifies as 
an indispensable function to a theory generated 
philosophical framework. Given a priori significance, 
theological doctrines and dogma have been articulated 
and constructed to sustain this theoretical premise. 
The reality of free-will is maintained as an 
ontological magnitude determined by a long chain of 
metaphysical speculation and presumptions. 
However, the Buddhist tradition has no need to 
formulate such immutable theories, for they do not have 
to preserve a world view in which God exists as the 
primal being of the created order. Considered as an 
existential part of human nature, free-will functions 
naturally as an empirical reality. Hence such a 
concept has a posteriori status functioning in an 
intrinsic capacity, having only normative significance 
within the Buddhist theories of conventional existence. 
There can be no ontological imperative as in Christian 
theism, for this notion is progressively distilled as 
one prospers along the path to enlightenment. At the 
ultimate level of truth and nirvanic realisation, such 
a concept would be totally illusory. 
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Returning finally to my original hypothesis; can 
it now be recognised as a genuine statement? Evidently 
I can only claim partial endorsement of this 
supposition. Expressed in this hypothesis is the 
explicit assumption that within a Christian theistic 
sphere of reference free-will undoubtedly provides an 
indispensable role. I consider that this thesis has 
established the credibility of this proposition. 
Moreover I regard that my analysis and evaluation of 
this issue from a Buddhist perspective, has adequately 
confirmed that free-will certainly functions as an 
indispensable concept to support their doctrinal 
principles of the experiential world. However, within 
a Buddhist frame of reference all concepts at an 
ultimate level of truth have to be recognised as 
conditioned, relative and ultimately empty. Clearly 
this is the crucial and significant distinction, for 
the contrived and ontological purpose of the Christian 
theological agenda can never be shared by Buddhist 
philosophical thought. 
In conclusion, I would like to acknowledge that 
the outcome of this thesis is defined by my particular 
methodology. Within the parameters of analogous 
interpretation I have engaged in the process of 
assessing a notion of free-will within the 
philosophical principles and religious language of both 
Christian theism and Buddhist thinking. Based upon 
each tradition's categories of experience and practice 
I have sought to carefully justify any speculative 
enquiry and evaluative assumptions this has yielded. 
Thus appreciation of how and why each tradition values 
this concept as significant and essential to their 
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truth claims has been made intelligible through this 
framework. 
I admit that academic appraisal of such a 
methodology could be highly critical of the precise 
manner in which I have defined the "voice" of the 
Christian and Buddhist traditions. Many would claim 
that I have assumed too much commonality amongst those 
of a Christian or Buddhist affiliation. I believe 
however, that I have pursued an adequate framework of 
enquiry in which genuinely to explore my hypothesis. 
Throughout this thesis I have been very mindful that 
language and meaning cannot be assumed to correspond to 
insight and experience. In my opinion this thesis has 
clearly exposed this to be the case. In both 
traditions a notion of free-will is regarded as an 
intrinsic part of being human. For Buddhism this 
remains a factual issue concerning existential reality 
maintaining a posteriori status within Buddhist 
insight. Yet within christian theological perception, 
insight and experience have united to create and 
sustain this issue as an ontological reality. A shared 
presumption becomes distinctive expectations with 
crucially divergent convictions. 
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NOTES TO THE CONCLUSION 
See appendices 1-6.1 have used intensity of 
colour to denote the centrality of free-will to 
the specific area of enquiry. Hence the more 
intense the colour the more vital or central I 
consider this concept to be. 
2 See appendices 2-6: diagrams of each chapter. 
Although my exploration has revealed a systematic 
rhetoric for the notion of free-will I have not 
based my assessment upon the explicit nature of 
this language. 
See appendix 1.1 would emphasise again that the 
intensity of colour is my estimation of how 
central a notion of free-will is within the 
specific areas of exploration. 
4 See appendices 2-6: diagrams pertaining to the 
Buddhist philosophical framework. 
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